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In this dissertation, Essay 1 draws upon agency theory and corporate governance 
to classify control enhancing corporate governance provisions and to examine the use of 
these provisions within the context of publicly traded family firms. I argue that publicly 
traded family firms will differ from publicly traded nonfamily firms in terms of the 
frequency of the use of different types of control enhancing governance provisions. 
Specifically, I argue that family ownership will influence the frequency of the use of 
provisions and family management will moderate the relationships between family 
ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions. I develop and test the 
hypotheses on a sample of 386 of S&P500 firms. Findings do not support the 
hypothesized relationships. A rationale for the non-significant relationships is also 
provided. 
In Essay 2, drawing upon agency theory and the extant family governance 
literature, I examine the link between family involvement, the use of governance 
provisions, and firm performance. I suggest that the frequency of the use of different 
Template Created By: James Nail 2010 
types of control enhancing governance provisions differentially influence the relationship 
between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family management) in the 
business and firm performance. I develop and test the hypotheses on 386 of the S&P500 
firms. Findings support the hypotheses suggesting the moderation effects of (a) the 
frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners in terms of their 
sustainability of controlling status on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance, (b) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
management legally on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance, (c) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling 
owners in terms of their voting rights on the inverted u-shaped relationship between 
family management and firm performance, (d) the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting noncontrolling owners on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance, and (e) the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting management monetarily on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance. Finally, results, future research directions, and 
implications for practice are discussed. 
 
Key words: Family Involvement, Principal-principal Agency, Corporate Governance, 
Firm Performance 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Even though family owned and/or managed firms dominate the economic 
landscape around the globe (Morck & Yeung, 2004), organizational research tends to 
limit its focus to nonfamily firms without considering the idiosyncrasies of family 
governance in their conceptualizations (Dyer, 2003).  Family business studies in 
management also tend to mostly investigate small-to-medium sized firms. These limit our 
understanding of the unique governance dynamics of publicly traded family firms 
theoretically and practically. Pertinent to the purpose of this dissertation, no study to date 
has examined the propensity to use corporate governance provisions and their influence 
on the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family 
management) and firm performance within the context of publicly traded family firms.  
The use of control enhancing corporate governance provisions may be the key in 
understanding unique corporate governance characteristics of publicly traded family 
firms. This can also shed light on the differences between publicly traded family and 
nonfamily firms as well as among family firms themselves. Indeed, the use of governance 
provisions can lead to opportunistic actions by owners and/or managers and result in 
agency problems.   
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On the one hand, family firms may be prone to more severe principal-principal 
agency problems arising between controlling and noncontrolling owners owing to 
families‟ significant stock ownership, participation in management and the board, and 
pursuit of family-centered goals (Ali et al., 2007; Maury, 2006). On the other hand, 
publicly traded family firms may exhibit less severe principal-agent agency problems 
because of controlling families‟ involvement in ownership and management and their 
effective monitoring (Maury, 2006). Control enhancing governance provisions may come 
into play by strengthening the family‟s ability to pursue family oriented goals, rather than 
increasing shareholder wealth. Hence, the propensity to use control enhancing 
mechanisms within the context of publicly traded family firms and their impact on the 
relationship between family involvement and firm performance require more research 
attention, since some of them may be associated with principal-principal agency costs, 
which can consequently harm firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2010; Morck et al., 
1988).  
Gompers et al. (2003) identify 24 control enhancing governance provisions which 
can result in higher agency costs when managers use them to resist different types of 
shareholder activism. However, the authors do not consider the contextual differences 
between family and nonfamily publicly traded firms. Therefore, studies examining the 
use of control enhancing governance provisions, particularly as used by the firms in the 
US, are needed to better understand corporate governance in US firms and to better 
understand differences between publicly traded family and nonfamily firms. 
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To investigate the propensity to use corporate governance provisions and their 
influence on the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and 
family management) and firm performance within the context of publicly traded family 
firms, I draw upon agency theory, corporate governance, and the literature on family 
firms. In Essay 1, the governance provisions are classified based on the various purposes 
of usage and the existence of different interest groups (i.e. controlling owners, 
noncontrolling owners, managers and directors, and employees). I then test several 
hypotheses on how family ownership and family management will differentially affect 
the use of governance provisions using a sample of 386 firms from the S&P 500. In 
Essay 2, I develop and test hypotheses on the moderating effects of the use of governance 
provisions on the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and 
family management) and firm performance. The dissertation ends with a conclusion 
chapter summarizing the important results and implications.
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CHAPTER II 
 
ESSAY 1. 
 
CONTROLLING FAMILIES‟ PROPENSITY TO USE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS 
Introduction 
Berle and Means (1936: 2) define a corporation as “a means whereby the wealth 
of innumerable individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and whereby 
control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direction”. Within the 
framework of the corporate system, shareholders supply capital to the enterprise and 
expect a return from it. Berle and Means (1936) also highlight that corporate control 
appears in many forms such as minority shareholder control, large shareholder control, 
and management control. Many publicly traded corporations in the U.S. are controlled by 
a large shareholder group, typically founding families (Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2009). 
Family involvement occurs when a family exerts control over the firm through ownership 
and management (Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004; Chrisman, Chua & Steier, 2005). 
Accordingly, family controlled publicly traded firms are those in which the founders or 
family members are officers, directors, or blockholders, either individually or as a group 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2009). When family involvement leads to the pursuit of 
particularistic goals and strategies (Carney, 2005), family firm behavior is expected to be 
distinct from those in nonfamily firms. Despite the inherent differences between family 
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and nonfamily firms and among family firms themselves, family involvement is 
underresearched in organizational studies, which limits the generalization of findings and 
leads to theoretical ambiguity (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson & Barnett, forthcoming; Dyer, 
2003).   
Strategic decisions concerning the use of control enhancing corporate governance 
provisions may be the key in understanding differences between publicly traded family 
and nonfamily firms since they may frame opportunistic actions of owners and/or 
managers as legitimate and result in idiosyncratic agency relationships and associated 
problems.  Governance is a system of control or regulation which includes the process of 
appointing the controllers or regulators (Turnbull, 1997). The central concern of 
corporate governance is to construct rules and incentives to effectively align the interests 
of managers and owners (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Turnbull, 1997).   
Within the context of corporate governance, publicly traded family firms tend to 
exhibit less severe principal-agent agency problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and management, because of the direct involvement of family owners in 
management as well as the ability to monitor the managers through their direct 
involvement in firm governance (Maury, 2006). However, family firms are believed to 
exhibit more severe principal-principal agency problems arising between controlling and 
noncontrolling shareholders owing to families‟ significant stock ownership and control 
over the board of directors, which allow them to pursue their own interests, which are 
likely to be different from those of noncontrolling owners (Ali et al., 2007; Maury, 2006). 
Indeed, some families may exhibit more concern with the private benefits of control (i.e., 
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benefits appropriated by large shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders) 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and the preservation of socioemotional wealth to achieve 
noneconomic goals (Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2003; Chrisman, Chua, 
Pearson, Barnett, forthcoming; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) than increasing shareholder 
wealth. For example, the controlling family may attempt to expand in order to create jobs 
for family members and to sustain family control, even though the investment may not be 
profitable for the firm and may lower shareholder value (i.e., stock market valuation of 
the corporation) or resist diversification that may be potentially profitable (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2010). Likewise, Berrone et al. (2010) show that family firms tend to engage in 
risky environmental investments that go beyond regulatory compliance since they bear 
only a fraction of the risk, while enjoying the noneconomic benefits such as enhanced 
family image and reputation in public eye. Control enhancing governance mechanisms, 
such as unequal voting rights in favor of the controlling family, can strengthen the 
family‟s ability to pursue noneconomic and economic goals primarily benefiting family 
members, rather than increasing shareholder wealth. 
Gompers et al. (2003) show that control enhancing governance provisions can 
lead to higher agency costs if managers use them to resist different types of shareholder 
activism (geared toward directing executives and directors to manage the firm in line 
with shareholders‟ long-term interests) (Daily et al., 2003). These control enhancing 
mechanisms generally increase voting rights of the families relative to their share 
ownership (Villalonga & Amit, 2006b). However, studies investigating control enhancing 
governance index provisions, particularly as used by the firms in the US, are needed to 
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better understand corporate governance in US firms and to distinguish between publicly 
traded family and nonfamily firms. 
Control enhancing mechanisms within the context of publicly traded family firms 
require more research attention, since some of them may be associated with acute 
principal-principal agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2010; Morck et al., 1988). Additionally, 
increasing ownership to a point at which managers become entrenched can elevate 
agency costs (Crutchley, 1999). Nevertheless, we do not know enough about the factors 
that enhance or mitigate controlling owners‟ ability and willingness to pursue policies 
that lead to the expropriation of minority shareholder wealth in family firms as opposed 
to those that increase shareholder wealth (Chrisman et al., 2010).  
Thus, this essay applies agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) with a focus on principal-principal agency issues and corporate 
governance theory concerned with i) corporate ownership, control, and power; ii) 
shareholder value and activism; and iii) control enhancing mechanisms (Becht et al., 
2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Hart, 1995; Herman, 1981), as well as the extant family 
business literature to develop and test the model in this essay. The model addresses how 
the frequencies of different types of control enhancing governance provisions used by 
family firms are likely to differ from those used by nonfamily firms (i.e. how family 
ownership affects the frequency of the use of governance provisions and how family 
management moderates these relationships). Accordingly, this model examines the use of 
governance provisions within the context of family firms. 
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This essay contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, the model 
enhances the development of the theory of the family firm by drawing upon agency 
theory and incorporating corporate governance into family business studies to explain 
how families control corporations differently; in particular, controlling families‟ 
propensity to use governance provisions and why and how they utilize control enhancing 
governance provisions idiosyncratically. By doing so, this essay contributes to a better 
understanding of the differences between publicly traded family and nonfamily firms. 
Second, corporate governance provisions are classified within the context of family firms 
considering the purpose of usage and the existence of different interest groups (i.e. 
controlling and noncontrolling owners). This is an important step in explaining distinctive 
corporate governance dynamics in family controlled publicly traded firms. Then, this 
essay examines the interplay between family ownership and family management in 
influencing the use of different types of governance provisions. Hence, this essay 
contributes to the literature by incorporating insights from agency theory with a focus on 
principal-principal agency problems and corporate governance into the developing theory 
of the family firm (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma, 2005). 
 In the remainder of this essay, a theoretical overview is provided and governance 
provisions are classified. Then, the model is developed and tested. Finally, a discussion 
of results, future research opportunities, and implications for practice are presented. 
 
 
 
 
9 
Theoretical Overview 
Agency Theory 
Agency relationships occur when a principal hires an agent to perform services 
and delegates authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen 
(1994), agency problems are likely to arise among individuals engaging in cooperative 
endeavors in any given setting (e.g. commerce, family, or other social organizations), 
since people are often driven by their self-interests and subsequently experience self-
control problems. Agency theory is particularly concerned with contractual arrangements 
containing the agreed upon terms of agency (Ross, 1973). Since contracts are incomplete 
owing to bounded rationality and information asymmetries, separation of ownership and 
control can lead to problems when the interests of the principal and the agent diverge, and 
when it is difficult for the principal to monitor the behavior of the agent (Eisenhardt, 
1989). This can lead to principal-agent agency problems, whereas principal-principal 
agency problems arise from the conflict between controlling and noncontrolling 
shareholders (Ali et al., 2007).  
Agency problems can appear in the forms of adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Adverse selection occurs when the principal hires an agent who is 
less able, committed, industrious, or ethical, or whose interests are less compatible with 
those of the principal than expected (Chrisman et al., 2004). Moral hazard refers to “lack 
of effort on the part of the agent” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 61). Moral hazard can be in the 
forms of commission or omission of actions (e.g. shirking and the consumption of perks), 
after the hiring of the agent (Chrisman et al., 2004). Within the firm, these problems of 
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opportunism can be mitigated via incentives and monitoring; while the market for 
corporate control provides an additional external check on opportunistic behavior 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Agency Problems in Family Firms 
Many suggest that fewer agency problems will be experienced in firm governance 
with unified ownership and management (Chrisman et al., 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Alignment of interests, monitoring advantages, and 
increased concern for shareholder wealth owing to property rights tend to mitigate some 
agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001). Additionally, reciprocal 
altruism in family firms can mitigate agency costs. Reciprocal altruism is a mutual moral 
value that motivates individuals to act in a manner that would benefit other individuals 
without expecting anything in return (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2002).  On the one 
hand, when family business members are reciprocally altruistic to each other (Chrisman, 
Chua, & Sharma, 2005), their interests may be aligned with the interests of the family 
firm (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004) and family business members may hold business 
objectives above their personal objectives (Zahra, 2003).  As reciprocal altruism 
facilitates bonding through trust, communication, respect, and love (Lubatkin, Schulze, 
Ling & Dino, 2005), family firms foster collectivistic behaviors rather than self-serving 
behaviors (Corbetta et al., 2004).  On the other hand, family relationships characterized 
by asymmetric altruism can lead to agency problems such as self-control (e.g. owner-
managers take actions that can harm themselves and others), adverse-selection (i.e. 
“principal may contract with family members who are less able, committed, industrious, 
 
 
11 
or ethical, or whose interests are less compatible than the principal expected” (Chrisman 
et al., 2004: 336-337), and moral hazard (i.e. “commission or omission of actions, after 
contracting that work in the interest of the agent but are detrimental to that of the 
principal” (Chrisman et al., 2004: 336-337), which can be in the forms of shirking or the 
consumption of perks in family firms (Jensen, 1994; Schulze et al., 2001). Within the 
framework of agency theory, people are indeed motivated by nonmonetary factors such 
as altruism, and may harm themselves and others in the case of asymmetric altruism 
(Jensen, 1994). For example, when parents with nepotistic tendencies hire and promote 
offspring (or other kin) based on irrelevant criteria (e.g. kinship ties) in contrast to 
universalistic criteria based on competence (Perrow, 1972), this can lead to adverse 
selection and biased evaluation, restrictions in human capital, and result in inertia in 
strategic decision making that potentially harms the long term survival and growth of 
family firms (Chua et al., 2003; Dyer, 2006; Ensley, 2006; Lester & Cannella, 2006; 
Mitchell, Morse & Sharma, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2002; Zahra, Hayton & 
Salvato, 2004; Hoy et al. 1994).  
Principal-principal versus Principal-agent Agency Problems 
Many public corporations in the U.S. and around the world are controlled by 
families through their participation in ownership and management (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003a, 2003b, 2004; McConaughy et al. 1998; McConaughy & Phillips, 1999; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). In publicly traded family firms, agency 
problems are expected to be different from those in nonfamily firms exhibiting more 
principal-agent agency problems.  Agency problems in publicly traded family firms are 
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also expected to be different from privately held family firms, owing to the existence of 
various groups of owners and/or managers with different, and often conflicting, interests 
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001). Because family owners often 
have management representation as well, the interests of owners and managers tend to be 
relatively more aligned than in nonfamily publicly traded firms. However, these 
controlling family owners and managers in family controlled corporations are likely to 
hold interests that are not identical to those of noncontrolling shareholders, who have less 
power due to minority ownership and less active participation in management. Hence, in 
publicly traded family firms, the concern is that when the CEO and board positions are 
dominated by the family because they may act for the controlling family but not for the 
noncontrolling owners in general (Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
Expropriation of Noncontrolling Shareholder Wealth 
Research shows that principal-principal agency problems tend to be more 
prevalent than owner-manager agency problems in publicly traded family firms (Ali et 
al., 2007; Chrisman et al., 2010; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). This is because concentrated control simplifies the task of monitoring agents (who 
may also be owners), but increases the incentive and power of owners to expropriate 
minority shareholder wealth (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Andres, 2008; Gilson & 
Gordon, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000; La Porta et al. 1999). Expropriation occurs within the 
weak governance context when large or majority owners control the firm and limit 
noncontrolling owners‟ right to appropriate returns on their investments (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000; Young et al., 2008).  
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One way controlling owners expropriate noncontrolling shareholder wealth is by 
tunneling through non-arm‟s-length, related-party transactions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Young et al., 2008). Transfer pricing, which is a related-party transaction, can occur by 
managers‟ forming independent companies that they own personally and selling the 
products of the main company they manage to the independent firms at below market 
prices or vice versa. Misallocation of company funds can be through self-dealing 
transactions such as exclusive dividends, high compensation, loan guarantees using the 
firm‟s assets as collateral, or sub-optimal investment decisions that create empire 
building opportunities for family members (i.e. excessive expansion), while lowering 
shareholder value owing to the ex post inefficiencies. The management can also hold 
excessive cash within the firm allowing the family to exploit it to their private benefit 
rather than investing or returning it to investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Furthermore, managerial resistance to value-increasing takeovers in order to 
protect the private benefits of family control can lower shareholder wealth (Mahoney & 
Mahoney, 1993; Mahoney et al., 1996, 1997; Cremers & Nair, 2005). Indeed, 
shareholders tend to gain large positive abnormal returns from corporate takeovers owing 
to the economies of scale and other synergies available from combining or reorganizing 
control and management of corporate resources (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Berkovitch & 
Narayanan, 1993; Bebchuk, 2003). Takeovers can also lead to an increase in market 
power in product markets, tax advantages, and avoidance of bankruptcy. As a result, the 
combined firm generates cash flows with a present value in excess of the sum of the 
market values of the bidding and target firms (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 1988). 
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However, transfer of control may not be favorable for controlling owners of a target 
family firm owing to the loss of private benefits of family control, despite the pecuniary 
benefits of the takeover. Therefore, family managers‟ anti-takeover actions, independent 
of the price offered, indicates managerial pursuit of self- and family-interest at the 
expense of shareholders (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Accordingly, Gompers et al. (2003) 
show that anti-takeover Governance Index provisions in the US are associated with lower 
firm value. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the problem of expropriation can be 
acute particularly when the controlling owners are wealthy enough and they simply prefer 
to maximize private benefits of control rather than shareholder wealth. Interestingly, 
much of the tunneling is legal and takes places in developed countries as well (Johnson et 
al., 2000). However, in countries (e.g. U.S.) where pyramidal group structures are 
relatively rare, many transactions inside a group would be challenged on fairness grounds 
by minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). Therefore, when a legal system such as 
that in the U.S. provides investor protection, the controlling owners may still overpay 
themselves, place family members in management and/or board positions, undertake 
some fruitless projects, reduce innovation, avoid diversification, affect dividend policy, 
and oppose raising capital for expansion (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2003b; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). 
Entrenchment of Controlling Family 
Aside from the expropriation problem, higher levels of ownership and 
management can also result in managerial entrenchment of family members. Managerial 
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entrenchment occurs when a manager remains active in management and resists transfer 
of control even though he/she is no longer competent or qualified to run the firm 
(Anderson et al., 2002; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Claessens et al., 2002; Crutchley, 
1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Westhead et al., 2001). Managerial entrenchment is often ensured by managers‟ 
obscuring or hiding negative attributes, hiring consultants to legitimize decisions, 
influencing the board to elude the board‟s monitoring and control, manipulating 
information, making themselves indispensable by initiating projects that require their 
skills and abilities, and attributing poor firm performance to environmental factors 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) argue that family firms may be more prone to 
managerial entrenchment because family ties and emotions may influence the perceived 
competence of the family executive(s), lowering the effectiveness of monitoring and 
resulting in biased judgments of executive performance. Accordingly, a study by 
Westhead et al. (2001) shows that family member CEOs maintain their CEO positions for 
much longer than nonfamily CEOs in family firms. Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) 
also draw attention to lengthy CEO tenures in family firms, with tenures ranging from 15 
to 25 years. In addition, the proportion of shares owned by directors in family firms tends 
to be significantly more than the proportion owned by directors in nonfamily firms 
(Westhead et al., 2001).  
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The Drivers of Principal-principal Agency Problems 
Studies suggest that the equity level of the controlling family can influence the 
conflicts between family and nonfamily shareholders (Gilson & Gordon, 2003; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006a). In large US corporations, founding families appear to be the 
only blockholders whose control rights on average exceed their cash-flow rights 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2009b). The discrepancy between family‟s control rights and 
ownership tends to exacerbate the agency problem of the expropriation of noncontrolling 
owners since families bear only a fraction of the costs associated with the private benefits 
they reap (Claessens et al. 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006b). Ang et al. (2000) argue that a manager with less than 
100 percent ownership share of the firm has the incentive to consume perks rather than to 
maximize firm value since the manager gains 100 percent of the amount spent on perks, 
but sacrifices only his/her percentage of share in firm profit.  
Moreover, family owners may simply prefer to maximize the noneconomic 
benefits of control rather than wealth. In family firms, family-oriented noneconomic 
goals can be in the forms of preservation of family harmony, identity, dynasty, social 
capital, reputation, and ability to be altruistic toward family members and exercise family 
influence (Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2010). 
The achievement of these goals creates socioemotional wealth for the family and elevates 
their intention to sustain family control (Chua et al., 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
The loss of socioemotional wealth, however, can result in diminished intimacy, lowered 
status, and inability to meet family‟s expectations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Hence, 
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family firms could be willing to accept greater performance hazard in order to preserve 
socioemotional wealth rooted in noneconomic goals (Chrisman et al., 2003; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) show that family firms may be willing to 
accept risk to their performance to avoid the loss of socioemotional wealth, but at the 
same time be risk averse in making other business decisions. As a result, family-centered 
noneconomic goals may not create wealth for nonfamily stakeholders and the benefits 
obtained from the attainment of these goals are usually not transferable to nonfamily 
stakeholders (Chrisman et al., 2010).  
Additionally, family firm leaders often desire to pass on a sustainable legacy to 
future generations of the family (Dyer & Whetten, 2006), which leads to parsimony in 
resource conservation and allocation (Carney, 2005), particularly when a family‟s equity 
ownership constitutes a significant portion of the family‟s undiversified total wealth 
(Wright et al., 1996). In these cases, family owners and/or managers may be reluctant to 
support innovation or other risky investments necessary to maximize firm performance 
and growth (Morck & Yeung, 2003; Wright et al., 1996). Accordingly, researchers (e.g. 
Daily et al., 2003; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999) suggest that the risk aversion of family 
owners may cause them to forego profitable growth opportunities with the side effect of 
lowering the potential growth of the firm. This may consequently create conflict of 
interests between the controlling family and outside shareholders in the form of 
reductions in the family‟s risk exposure at the expense of other shareholders‟ potential 
higher returns.  
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The Mechanisms Exacerbating Principal-principal Agency Problems 
The controlling owners tend to increase their power as well as their voice to direct 
the firm toward meeting their demands by creating a wedge between their control rights 
and cash-flow rights. This allows them to avoid incurring their fair share of the cost of 
their actions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Villalonga & Amit, 2009b). The primary sources 
of the wedge are dual-class stock, disproportionate board representation, and voting 
agreements. Indirect ownership through trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, and 
other corporations is also prevalent but rarely creates a wedge (Villalonga & Amit, 
2009b). Specifically, when there is a substantial departure from the one-share-one-vote 
system of stock ownership, controlling owners are able to treat themselves exclusively at 
the expense of noncontrolling owners (e.g. by not paying out cash flows as pro-rata 
distributions to all investors, but rather paying themselves only) (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997).  
Furthermore, controlling shareholders either actively participate in management 
or are positioned to assure that management and even the board serve their interests 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). According to Brecht et al. (2005), controlling shareholder 
actions are often channeled through the board of directors, who are often appointed by 
the controlling owners to represent their interests (Brecht et al., 2005). This is in line with 
family owner and managers‟ particularistic tendencies with regard to whom they 
personally choose to work with in their organizations (Carney, 2005). In that case, the 
board of directors often involves family members and affiliate directors with personal 
and/or business connections and obligations to the controlling family. Hence, these board 
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members are expected to play an advisory role rather than a monitoring role without 
reducing the control of family owners (Brecht et al., 2005; Combs, 2008; Herman, 1981; 
Jones et al., 2008). According to Combs (2008) and Jones et al. (2008), affiliate directors 
in publicly traded family firms may be influential in adopting growth-oriented strategies 
such as diversification. However, a controlling family‟s active involvement in 
management and the board can hamper monitoring and enable the controlling family‟s 
expropriation of noncontrolling shareholders‟ wealth and continued entrenchment, which 
can undermine the benefits of affiliate directors‟ advice. 
In addition, the generation in charge can lead to differences in the agency costs 
between family and nonfamily firms (Villalonga & Amit, 2006a, 2009a). Villalonga and 
Amit (2006a) show that the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms may be more 
costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO 
firms, whereas the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-
CEO firms can be more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms. 
According to Villalonga and Amit (2009a), while all types of controlling families and 
individuals seek to maximize value for themselves, only founding families are willing 
and able to maximize value for all shareholders. This may be owing to the founder‟s or 
founding family‟s legitimate power and focus on performance. Descendants, however, 
may be preoccupied with engaging in power contests individually or through forming 
family coalitions, shifting the focus from performance to politics, which can foster 
relational conflict and harm performance (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns 
& Eddleston, 2004). Even if the family exhibits harmony, the transition from founding 
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family control to the descendant family control leads to dispersed family influence with 
lower levels of family‟s identification and attachment to the organization (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007), which can increase agency problems and lower firm performance. The other 
factors that may play a role in descendant-CEO firms‟ relatively lower performance may 
be the descendants‟ being less capable and their appointment to their position based on 
kinship ties rather than an objective evaluation of qualifications and/or their industry(s)‟s 
becoming mature with reduced returns and opportunities over time. 
Hence, principal-principal agency problems arising between controlling and 
noncontrolling shareholders can sometimes be more severe than the principal-agent 
agency problems in publicly traded family firms (Ali et al., 2007). However, according to 
Gilson and Gordon (2003), noncontrolling shareholders will continue to prefer the 
presence of a controlling shareholder so long as the benefits from reduction in principal-
agent agency costs are greater than the costs of private benefits of control. Interestingly, 
the authors also suggest that some private benefits of control may be even necessary to 
encourage a party or a group to be the controlling shareholder, owing to the costs 
associated with holding a concentrated position and with monitoring, whereas a 
nonmonitoring shareholder often enjoys the full benefits of the monitoring provided by a 
controlling shareholder without incurring any monitoring cost (Ang et al. 2000). 
In sum, dominant family ownership and management can be a root cause of 
principal-principal agency problems. Expropriation of noncontrolling owners‟ wealth can 
take different forms such as appointing family members and acquaintances to key 
positions without proper evaluation of qualifications, implementing strategies (e.g. 
 
 
21 
resistance to takeovers or little/lack of investment into R&D) that allow family agendas 
to be followed at the expense of firm performance, and engaging in related-party 
transactions (Young et al., 2008). Entrenchment occurs when a controlling family resists 
transfer of control and remains active in management even when this is no longer 
beneficial to the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The root 
causes for expropriation and entrenchment problems associated with family involvement 
in the business may be that the family bears a small portion of the costs associated with 
private benefits and prefers to maximize noneconomic goals. Families can expropriate 
noncontrolling owners‟ wealth and entrench themselves through creating a wedge 
between voting and cash-flow rights and actively participating in management or 
appointing managers and directors acquainted by the family (Brecht et al., 2005; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997; Villalonga & Amit, 2009b). The generation in charge tends to play a 
role in differences in the agency costs between family and nonfamily firms as well 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006a, 2009a). A summary of agency theory and agency problems 
can be seen in Appendix A. This essay extends this line of research by investigating the 
link between family involvement and the use of different types of governance provisions. 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is “the determination of the broad uses to which 
organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the 
myriad participants in organizations” (Daily et al., 2003b: 371). According to Gourevitch 
and Shinn (2005), corporate governance encompasses both the structure of power within 
each firm that determines allocation of money (i.e., who gets the cash flow, who allocates 
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jobs, who decides on research and development, on mergers and acquisitions, in hiring 
and firing CEOs, on subcontracting to suppliers, on distributing dividends or buying back 
shares or investing in new equipment) and responsibility (i.e., who is liable for 
wrongdoing, misuse of funds, or poor performance). Accordingly, Gedajlovic et al. 
(2004: 910) define governance as “a system of incentives, authority relations, and norms 
of legitimacy”. 
Corporate governance becomes particularly important when there is an agency 
problem involving the members of an organization and this agency problem cannot be 
dealt with through an incomplete contract (Hart, 1995). On the one hand, in an idealized 
situation when there is no agency problem, all organizational members are motivated to 
maximize profit and minimize cost, which consequently maximizes shareholder value. In 
addition, no governance is necessary to resolve disagreements or conflicting interests. On 
the other hand, in the real world, there are agency problems and complete contracts are 
infeasible owing to bounded rationality and information asymmetries (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Corporate governance therefore plays a critical role in allocating residual rights of control 
which are “rights to decide how assets should be used, given that a usage has not been 
specified in an initial contract” (Hart, 1995: 680; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Corporate 
control, within the framework of corporate governance, involves the rights to determine 
the management of corporate resources (e.g. the rights to hire, fire, and set the 
compensation of top-level managers) (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). These rights are usually 
determined by the ownership level and participation in management and the board. 
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In this section, corporate governance dynamics (i.e., management and ownership, 
board of directors, corporate governance mechanisms, and large shareholders) are 
discussed. In the following section, family involvement in corporate governance will be 
explained. 
Ownership and Management 
Grossman and Hart (1986) define ownership as the purchase of the residual rights 
of control and the power to exercise control. In publicly traded firms, however, where 
ownership and management are separated via diffuse ownership structures, dispersed 
owners‟ interests can be under-represented because corporate management tends to be the 
main decision maker (Demsetz, 1983). When the largest shareholder‟s ownership 
constitutes less than one percent of all shares outstanding, no shareholder can dominate 
management or use holdings for the accumulation of the majority of votes necessary to 
exercise day-to-day control over management (Berle & Means, 1936; Hart, 1995). 
Thereby, the shareholders hold a set of legal and factual interests in the corporation, such 
as the corporation‟s profitability with a reasonable level of risk, receipt of equitable share 
of profits distributed, and stocks‟ marketability at a fair price, whereas the ones in control 
hold the legal and factual powers to it (Berle & Means, 1936). Hence, conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers are often resolved in management‟s favor through 
abnormally high managerial salaries or excessively large firms owing to overexpansion 
(Demsetz, 1983). This implies that firm resources may not be entirely used in the pursuit 
of shareholders‟ profit (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Indeed, shareholders with small 
amounts of ownership have little or no incentive to monitor management when 
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monitoring is costly (Demsetz, 1983). The shareholders retain expectations that the 
management will run the corporation for their benefit and the law holds the management 
to standards of conduct, which are a decent amount of attention to business, fidelity to the 
interests of the corporation, and reasonable business prudence (Berle & Means, 1936). 
Hence, “all the powers granted to management and control are powers in trust” (Berle & 
Means, 1936: 336).  
Board of Directors 
In the absence of monitoring, management can pursue personal goals through 
elevating executive compensation, investing in power-enhancing unprofitable projects, 
and entrenching themselves, despite their primary duty to maximize shareholders‟ wealth 
(Crutchley et al., 1999). Owing to the risk of managerial opportunism, either in the form 
of expropriation of shareholders, and/or misallocation of firm‟s resources, there is a need 
for ongoing supervision of management and alignment of interests between the 
management and shareholders (Demsetz, 1983). Therefore, the shareholders delegate 
control to a board of directors and assign them to oversee the actions of management 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986). This can reduce principal-agent agency problems. According 
to Jensen (1993: 862), the board of directors is “the apex of the internal control system”. 
This is because they are responsible for effective corporate control over organizational 
functioning through key oversight tasks such as hiring, firing, and compensating CEOs, 
monitoring management, voting on important decisions such as mergers and acquisitions, 
and changes in the firm‟s capital structure such as stock repurchases or new debt issues 
(Becht et al., 2005; Daily et al., 2003b). 
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Nevertheless, the members of the board themselves may also have interests that 
diverge from those of the shareholders and little incentive to monitor unless they are 
significant shareholders themselves (Demsetz, 1983; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). Also, 
the board‟s effectiveness depends on its independence from the CEO of the firm 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). When founders are still active and the CEO has a large 
ownership position, the boards tend to be dominated by insiders (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003). In that case, even outside directors may play a limited, dependent, and passive 
role, if they have ties and obligations to insiders by some sort of personal or business 
relationship, which can diminish their independence (Becht et al., 2005; Herman, 1981). 
When management dominates the board selection processes and the board is compliant to 
management, management control is enhanced. According to Herman (1981), the 
increase in the number and proportion of outside directors do not alter this pattern 
significantly. Indeed, boards tend to “carry with them vestiges of their history and 
traditions” despite the need for change (Lynall et al., 2003: 416). In the U.S., the board of 
directors is often composed of managers of the firm itself, which lowers or eliminates 
their independence from management, and outside directors who have no ownership 
stake at the company, raising the issue of little incentive to monitor (Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro, 1998). In publicly traded family firms, a family member CEO is often the Chair 
of the board of directors as well (Miller et al., 2007), which can significantly lower the 
board‟s independence and further elevate family control over the firm. 
 
 
 
 
26 
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Aside from the expected monitoring provided by the board of directors, other 
corporate governance mechanisms are used as checks and balances. This can include 
proxy fights (i.e. a shareholder proposes new candidates and persuades other shareholders 
to vote for them in order to replace ineffective board members), takeovers (i.e. a bidder 
acquires the control of an underperforming company and can replace, or at least control, 
the management), debt financing (i.e. debt as a bonding or commitment device 
disciplining management when management is willing to repay the debt), and large 
shareholders (i.e. one or several investors in the firm have substantial minority stakes) 
(Hart, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Large Shareholders 
Large shareholders can be particularly important in corporate governance since 
not all shareholders are able and willing to control management, but presume that owners 
with large stakes will oversee the management (Demsetz, 1983). More concentrated 
shareholdings by insiders provide a superior incentive and ability to monitor owing to a 
claim on all residual profit and control over the board of directors (Agrawal & Knoeber, 
1996; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Bolton & Scharfstein, 1998; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 
1998). Hence, according to Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998), concentrated ownership is a 
powerful constraint on managerial discretion.  
In the U.S., shares in most large firms are relatively diffused, such that even the 
largest shareholder holds a modest stake in the company (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). 
US courts also intervene to ensure that shareholdings are dispersed (Morck & Steier, 
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2005). The US also has litigious shareholders and a well-developed corporate takeover 
mechanism, which can discipline or remove ineffective corporate insiders, including 
large shareholders (Morck et al., 2005). However, families tend to sustain or enhance 
their control by using control enhancing mechanisms, which protect controlling 
shareholders and managers‟ rights and create excess voting rights over their cash flow 
rights (Villalonga & Amit, 2006a, 2006b). An example for the controlling family‟s voting 
rights greatly exceeding its cash flow rights is the Ford Motor Co., where as of 1998, the 
Ford family owned only 6% of the shares, but owned 40% of the votes through utilizing 
dual-class shares (Villalonga & Amit, 2006b).  
Family Involvement in the Corporate Arena 
Family firms are distinguished from nonfamily firms and from each other by the 
amount and type of influence they choose to exert through the involvement of the family 
in firm ownership and management (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chua et al., 
1999).  Family involvement is significant “when a family owns all or a controlling 
portion of the business and plays an active role in setting strategy and in operating the 
business on a day-to-day basis” (Kelly et al., 2000: 27).  Hence, ownership and 
management are important in determining the family‟s ability to exert its influence on a 
business (Sundaramurthy & Kreiner, 2008). Concentrated holdings by families in 
publicly traded firms tend to be universally common, despite legal restrictions on high 
levels of ownership (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Villalonga & Amit, 
2009). Family ownership and management may be particularly beneficial in corporate 
governance owing to easier monitoring, a concern for protecting the family‟s wealth, 
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long-term orientation, reputation concerns, and lower cost of debt financing (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Barth et al., 2005; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; James, 1999; La Porta et al., 
1999; McConaughy et al., 1998).  
Classification of Governance Provisions 
Governance provisions constitute an important part of corporate governance in 
today‟s corporate environment. In the 1980s, hostile takeovers and corporate raider 
activities emerged in the US, in contrast with previous lax corporate governance 
(Holstrom & Kaplan, 2001). Hostile takeovers are carried on by an outside entity by 
making a tender offer (i.e., a price for their stock, which is higher than the current market 
price) to shareholders of a target firm without involving the target‟s management and 
board (Davis, 1991). Once the raider firm acquires a substantial ownership position to 
exercise control, it may merge with the target firm, liquidate its assets to finance the 
takeover, replace top management and board, or sell off some of the divisions (Davis, 
1991). Between 1980 and 1989, one-quarter of the firms in the Fortune 500 experienced 
a takeover or buyout attempt, which were mostly hostile and successful (Davis, 1991). 
Takeover threats constitute the source of external governance provided by the market for 
corporate control and discipline corporate management (Davis, 1991; Sundaramurthy et 
al., 1996; Cremers & Nair, 2005). As a result, takeovers benefit shareholders of target 
and acquiring companies through facilitating change and generating substantial gains 
(Jensen, 1988; Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; Cremers & Nair, 2005).  
In the 1990s, hostile takeovers declined substantially, while at the same time 
executive stock options and the greater involvement of boards of directors and 
 
 
29 
shareholders appeared in the corporate world. Through these changes, corporate 
governance mechanisms began to play a greater role (Holstrom & Kaplan, 2001). 
Gompers et al. (2003) suggest that governance provisions generally allow management to 
resist shareholder activism, and prevent or delay takeovers, as can be seen in Table 2.1.  
Shareholder activism serves the purpose of encouraging executives and directors 
to adopt practices that protect shareholders from managerial self-interest by providing 
incentives for executives to manage firms in shareholders‟ long-term interests (Daily et 
al., 2003b). The activist shareholders tend to focus on the poorly performing firms in 
their portfolio and pressure the management of such firms for improvement of 
performance and shareholder value (Gillan & Starks, 2000). According to Daily et al. 
(2003b), shareholders with significant ownership often have the incentive and influence 
to bring about necessary changes. In the case of takeovers, a bidder, particularly a hostile 
one, often buys a firm and implements profit increasing changes (e.g. replacing managers 
who the board is unwilling or unable to discipline) against the wishes of both the board 
and the top management of the target firm. Families, who control publicly traded firms 
and are unwilling to let go of control, are expected to utilize control enhancing 
governance provisions in order to enhance and sustain their power. 
Gompers et al. (2003) classify firms based on the frequency of the use of control 
enhancing governance provisions (G) and draw attention to the two extreme groups of 
firms. On the one hand, firms with higher frequencies of the use of provisions (G ≥ 14) 
have the weakest minority shareholder rights. On the other hand, firms with lower 
frequencies of the use of provisions (G ≤ 5) have the strongest minority shareholder 
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rights. The frequency levels of the use of provisions at 6 through 13 indicate moderate 
levels of the shareholder rights. Gompers et al. (2003) find that broader shareholder rights 
are associated with higher firm value and profits, whereas, according to Pagano and 
Volpin (2005), weak shareholder protection allows insiders to extract private benefits of 
control. 
A summary of the corporate governance literature can be seen in Appendix B. 
Firms are likely to differ from each other in their corporate governance concerning 
ownership, management, composition of board of directors, and other corporate 
governance mechanisms depending on the key controlling parties‟ preferences. Family 
firms are likely to exhibit unique corporate governance characteristics owing to the 
existence of controlling families and noncontrolling owners with different interests. 
Therefore, governance provisions need to be classified and investigated within the 
context of family firms. In the following section, governance provisions are classified 
accordingly. 
According to Danielson and Karpoff (1998), firms tend to use governance 
provisions in groups. In line with Danielson and Karpoff‟s (1998) argument, Gompers et 
al. (2003) divide governance provisions into five groups based upon the purpose of their 
usage: tactics for delaying takeovers (delay), director/officer protection (protection), 
voting rights (voting), state laws (state), and other takeover defenses (other). However, 
the authors do not distinguish between family and nonfamily firms nor consider the 
differences between controlling family and noncontrolling owner groups and their 
distinct characteristics, interests, and rights. For example, controlling owners can decide 
 
 
31 
“what businesses to enter and exit, what companies to acquire, what assets to sell, how 
much to invest, what officers and directors to select, how much to pay them, and how 
much money (if any) to distribute themselves and minority shareholders”, whereas 
noncontrolling owners‟ rights are “to participate in dividend or other cash-flow 
distributions (that controlling owners decide on), and to benefit from capital gains (if 
there are any, and if the shares can be freely sold so that minority shareholders indeed 
realize those gains)” (Villalonga, 2008: 1,2). Controlling owners may pursue family-
centered goals and strategies to achieve those goals, which may consequently be 
beneficial to the controlling family, but not to the noncontrolling owners and the firm in 
general, which can consequently harm firm performance. Hence, it is important to 
identify differences between family and nonfamily firms, examine family firm owners, 
managers, directors, and noncontrolling owners, and their propensity to use different 
types of governance provisions in order to have a better understanding of the corporate 
governance idiosyncrasies in publicly traded family firms. 
The main purpose of this essay is to identify the differences between family and 
nonfamily firms in terms of the use of governance provisions. These provisions are 
classified into four categories based on their protecting the rights of different stakeholder 
groups with different interests (i.e. the controlling owners, management, non-controlling 
owners, and others involving a broad group of employees) in family firms (Table 2.1 and 
Appendix C). 
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Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners 
These provisions enhance controlling owners‟ rights and power. They provide 
protection to the controlling owners by delaying the transfer of control to a raider or an 
acquiring firm through placing preferred stock with certain preferred shareholders, 
requiring a majority vote for the acquisition, requiring a waiting period for the raider 
company to acquire the target firm, making acquisition expensive or unattractive, diluting 
the potential acquirer‟s voting power, enhancing voting rights of controlling owners 
through concentrating controlling owners‟ votes or limiting non-controlling owners‟ 
rights, helping controlling owners elect directors, or elevating the value of controlling 
owners‟ shares, as can be seen in Appendix C and explained below.  
These provisions are also sub-grouped based on different purposes of use such as 
enhancing voting rights (i.e. cumulative voting, unequal voting rights, and supermajority) 
and sustaining controlling status (i.e. poison pills, blank check, bylaw, charter, business 
combination laws, fair price provision, and antigreenmail). According to Davis (1991), 
these provisions both indicate and enhance controlling owners‟ influence on the business. 
Controlling owners who are able to adopt them already have substantial voice, and by 
having them in place, they buffer themselves from the market for corporate control by 
raising the barriers to particularly takeover (Davis, 1991). 
Provisions Protecting Voting Rights 
a) Unequal voting rights: Limit voting rights of some shareholders and expand those of 
others (Danielson & Karpoff, 1998; Gillan et al., 2003; Gompers et al., 2003; Bianco et 
al., 2005). 
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b) Cumulative voting: Allows shareholders to concentrate their votes and helps them to 
elect directors (Gordon, 1994; Mahoney et al., 1996; Brockington et al., 1998; Danielson 
& Karpoff, 1998; Sundaramurthy 2000; Gillan et al., 2003; Bianco et al., 2007). 
c) Supermajority: Requires majority voting for approval of mergers (Agrawal & 
Mandelker, 1990; Davis, 1991; Bojanic & Officer, 1994; Mahoney et al., 1996; 
Sundaramurthy, 2000; Bebchuk et al., 2005; Bianco et al., 2007). 
Provisions Protecting Controlling Status 
a) Blank check: A preferred stock over which the board of directors (BOD) has broad 
authority to determine voting, dividend, conversion, and other rights. It is used to prevent 
takeovers by placing this stock with certain friendly investors (Agrawal & Mandelker, 
1990; Ambrose & Megginson, 1992; Gillan et al., 2003; Cremers & Nair, 2005). 
b) Business combination law: Requires a waiting period for transactions such as 
mergers between a large shareholder and the firm, unless the transaction is approved by 
the BOD (Gompers et al., 2003). 
c) Poison pill: Gives the holders of the target firm‟s stocks the right to purchase 
additional stocks in the target at a steep discount and to sell shares at a premium if 
ownership changes. This makes the target unattractive or dilutes the acquirer‟s voting 
power. Shareholder approval is not required for the use of poison pills (Jensen, 1988; 
Mahoney et al., 1996; Bebchuk et al., 2005; Bianco et al., 2007).  
d) Bylaw: Limit shareholders‟ ability to change the governing documents of the company 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2005). 
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e) Charter: Limit shareholders‟ ability to amend the governing documents of the 
company (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2005). 
f) Fair price: Requires a bidder to pay to all shareholders the highest price paid to any 
during a period of time before the commencement of an offer. This makes an acquisition 
more expensive and unattractive to the bidder (Romano, 1987; Mahoney et al., 1997; 
Gillan et al., 2003). 
g) Antigreenmail: Prohibits a firm‟s controlling owners/managers from paying a raider 
„greenmail‟, which involves the repurchase of blocks of company stock, at a premium 
above market price, in exchange for an agreement by the raider not to acquire the firm. 
Eliminating greenmail may discourage potential bidders from considering the target firm 
for a takeover. Hence, while greenmail is used as an antitakeover measure, anti-greenmail 
can also be used as an antitakeover device (Mahoney et al., 1997; Danielson & Karpoff, 
1998; Bianco et al., 2007).  
Controlling families usually increase their power and voice by elevating their 
voting rights and creating a wedge between their voting rights and cash flow rights 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006a, 2006b). Unequal voting rights can expand the controlling 
family‟s voting rights while limiting the voting rights of noncontrolling owners and 
cumulative voting can facilitate family‟s concentrating their votes and electing directors. 
Mergers or acquisitions can also be delayed or prevented by using supermajority 
provision requiring majority voting for the approval.  
Additionally, a controlling family aiming to preserve family control over the firm 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) is expected to be willing to take anti-takeover actions such as 
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delaying or preventing takeovers through issuing blank checks (i.e. placing preferred 
stock) for family members and/or family‟s well trusted particular business partners or 
investors. A required waiting period by business combination law can also prolong 
family control by delaying or preventing takeovers. Moreover, bylaw and charter 
amendment limitations restrict noncontrolling shareholders‟ ability to amend the 
governing documents of the company, which is also beneficial for the controlling family 
in preventing a change that may result in the loss or a decrease in family control. In 
addition, poison pills allow the target firm‟s shareholders to buy the shares of the target 
firm at a discount, which makes the target firm unattractive for the raider and dilutes the 
voting power of the raider. Since shareholder approval is not required for the use of 
poison pills, the controlling family can utilize this provision through being influential 
over management, who has the full discretion over poison pill usage decisions. Another 
way for families to extend their control is to make their firm unattractive and expensive 
for potential raiders. For those purposes, the controlling family can use fair price 
provision to make their firm expensive by requiring the acquirer to pay the highest price 
to all shareholders or use anti-greenmail to discourage potential bidders from bidding for 
a takeover.  
Provisions Protecting Noncontrolling Owners 
a) Cash-out laws: Shareholders can sell their stakes to a controlling shareholder at a 
price based on the highest price of recently acquired shares. It works as fair-price 
provisions extended to nontakeover situations (Danielson & Karpoff, 1008; Bianco et al., 
2007). 
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b) Secret ballot: Confidential voting. Either an independent third party or employees 
sworn to secrecy count proxy votes and management does not look at proxy cards. This 
indicates an increase in shareholder rights (Danielson & Karpoff, 1998; Bianco et al., 
2007; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007). 
 These provisions increase value of noncontrolling owners‟ shares in case of 
selling shares to a controlling owner and ensure the secrecy of voting. Hence, the use of 
these provisions may increase noncontrolling owners‟ rights. However, since the use of 
these provisions can diminish controlling owners‟ power substantially while increasing 
noncontrolling owners‟ rights, families preferring to maintain family control are expected 
to be less likely to use them than nonfamily firms. 
Provisions Protecting Management and Directors 
These provisions enhance management‟s and directors‟ power and rights. As can 
be seen in Appendix C and explained below, these provisions protect managers and 
directors‟ positions, protect their monetary benefits, and protect them against legal 
actions. These mechanisms do this by requiring extra time to replace the management 
and/or board of directors and providing monetary benefits to senior executives and 
directors in case of a change of control, limiting the managers‟ and directors‟ personal 
liability, and enabling the board of directors to reject or delay takeovers even though they 
may be beneficial to non-controlling shareholders. Classified board, director‟s duties, 
special meeting, and written consent delay or prevent takeovers or proxy fights. 
Compensation plans, golden parachute, and severance provide executives and directors 
monetary compensation and nonmonetary benefits that assure the continuity of their 
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position in case of a change in control. Contracts, indemnification, and limitations on 
director‟s liability indemnify executives and directors from legal liabilities. Hence, these 
provisions are subgrouped into provisions protecting managers and directors in terms of 
their positions in the firm and protecting them monetarily and legally. 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors‟ Positions 
a) Classified board: The board is split into different classes, with only one class up for 
election in a given year. Hence, an outsider who gains control of a corporation may need 
to wait a few years in order to be able to gain control of the board (Agrawal & 
Mandelker, 1990; Bojanic & Officer, 1994; Sundaramurthy, 2000; Bebchuk & Cohen, 
2005; Faleye, 2007)). 
b) Special meeting: Limitation of the ability to call a special meeting. This adds more 
time to proxy fights since bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled annual meeting 
to replace BOD or dismantle takeover defenses (Danielson & Karpoff, 1998; Gillan et al., 
2003; Cremers & Nair, 2005; Bianco et al., 2007). 
c) Written consent: Limitations on certain actions through the requirement of 
unanimous consent or the elimination of the right to take action. These add extra time to 
proxy fights since bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled annual meeting to 
replace BOD or to dismantle takeover defense (Gillan et al., 2003; Cremers & Nair, 
2005; Bianco et al., 2007).  
d) Director’s duties: Allows directors to consider interests of nonshareholders when 
voting for a merger. This provides BOD with a legal basis for rejecting a takeover that 
would have been beneficial to shareholders (Gillan et al., 2003; Bianco et al., 2007). 
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Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Monetarily 
a) Compensation plans: In case of a change in control, this provision allows participants 
of incentive bonus plans to cash out options or accelerate the payout of bonuses 
(Gompers et al., 2003). 
b) Golden parachute: Severance agreements that provide cash or noncash compensation 
to senior executives upon an event such as termination, demotion, or resignation 
following a change in control (Jensen, 1988; Davis, 1991; Sundaramurthy, 2000; 
Bebchuk et al., 2005). 
c) Severance: Agreements assuring executives of their positions or some compensation 
and are not contingent upon a change in control (Gompers et al., 2003). 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Legally 
a) Contracts: Indemnifies officers and directors from legal expenses and judgments 
resulting from lawsuits (Gompers et al., 2003). 
b) Indemnification: To indemnify officers and directors from certain legal expenses and 
judgments resulting from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct (Danielson & Karpoff, 
1998; Bianco et al., 2007). 
c) Limitations on director liability: Limit directors‟ personal liability (Gompers et al., 
2003). 
Management in family and nonfamily publicly traded firms are likely to use 
different subgroups of the provisions protecting managers according to their distinct 
primary interests. Family firm managers and directors are expected to be particularly 
concerned with maintaining their positions in the firm owing to their long-term 
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orientation (James, 1999a; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005) and desire for preservation 
of family control in the business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), whereas nonfamily 
managers may be more concerned with monetary and legal protection. Additionally, the 
provisions protecting managers and directors in terms of their positions in the firm 
protect controlling owners indirectly since they delay or prevent takeovers. Indeed, the 
protection of managers‟ and directors‟ positions can enable the controlling family to 
continue to exert influence over the business through management. 
Provisions Protecting Others  
a) Pension parachutes: To prevent an acquirer from using surplus cash in the pension 
fund of the target firm (Gompers et al., 2003). 
b) Silver parachutes: To provide severance payments to a large number of firm‟s 
employees upon a change in control (Gompers et al., 2003). 
 These provisions provide severance payments and secure the pension fund to a 
broader group of employees of the target firm in case of an acquisition. Because these 
provisions make a takeover more expensive for the bidder, family firms are expected to 
utilize these provisions in order to protect controlling owners and management indirectly. 
The expected use of these provisions is also in line with research suggesting family firms‟ 
greater employee care and loyalty (Donckels & Frochlich, 1991; Habbershon & 
Williams, 1999; Ward, 1988). Family firms with greater concern for employees‟ 
wellbeing (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) and the positive image and reputation of the 
family (Miller et al., 2008) are likely to use these provisions more than nonfamily firms 
do. 
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This essay will investigate the provisions based on different purposes of use (i.e. 
protecting controlling owners, noncontrolling owners, management, and directors, and 
others, as can be seen in Table 2.1 and Appendix C) owing to the idiosyncrasies of the 
publicly traded family firm context and the distinctiveness of each group, their interests, 
and rights.  The value of the shares of these different groups also vary based on their 
different rights, which are priced in capital markets (Morck et al., 2005; Villalonga, 
2008). As discussed in the following hypotheses development section, family firms are 
expected to use certain provisions more than nonfamily firms do in order to be able to 
exert family influence on the business, maintain family control, and limit noncontrolling 
owners‟ activism. 
Hypotheses Development 
The model illustrates how the frequencies of different types of control enhancing 
governance provisions used by family firms are likely to differ from those of nonfamily 
firms (i.e. how family ownership affects the frequency of the use of governance 
provisions and how family management moderates these relationships), as can be seen in 
Figure 1. Hence, the main concern in this essay is to explain the use of governance 
provisions by publicly traded family firms. 
Family Involvement and the Use of Governance Provisions  
The use of governance provisions differ across firms owing to firm-specific and 
industry-level factors and different costs and benefits associated with them (Gillan et al., 
2003). Publicly traded family firms are expected to differ from nonfamily firms in terms 
of the frequency of the use of different types of governance provisions owing to different 
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constituent groups and their distinct interests. There may be controlling owners and/or 
management in both family and nonfamily firms (Brecht et al., 2005). However, their 
composition in each firm context is different. In family firms, controlling owners are 
composed of the family members and management is composed of family members and 
nonfamily members likely to be trusted by the controlling family (Brecht et al., 2005). In 
nonfamily firms, management tends to control the firm since the shareholders are often 
dispersed (Berle & Means, 1936; Demsetz, 1983). When there is an individual or 
institution as a blockholder, their interests are also likely to differ from those of a 
controlling family. 
Family Ownership and Protection of Controlling Owners 
In family firms, family members are by definition the controlling owners and they 
are often involved in management and board of directors as well (Miller et al., 2007). 
Through higher levels of ownership and control, families have substantial discretion to 
exercise property rights as they want (e.g. alter, modify, or destroy, and appropriate rents) 
(Gedajlovic et al., 2003). In some cases, family owners may prefer to play only the role 
of investor and use professional nonfamily managers if they are not able or willing to 
manage the firm themselves.  
However, in nonfamily firms, ownership and management are often separated. 
Dispersed owners with relatively little ownership share usually do not participate in 
management and the board. Since there is no controlling owner, the management holds 
the control power (Morck et al., 2005). In some instances, an individual or an institution 
may be a blockholder (i.e. large shareholder) in nonfamily firms (Becht et al., 2005) and 
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this individual or group may be involved in management and/or board as well. Whether 
dispersed or blockholder, the ownership in nonfamily firms tends to possess different 
interests than the family-centered interests of controlling families in publicly traded 
firms. 
In family firms, the controlling owners‟ interests are largely focused on the 
preservation of the ownership control of the family. In extreme cases of preservation of 
family control and socioemotional wealth, families may even be willing to forego the 
possibility of higher firm performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). To be able to pursue 
family-oriented goals and preserve family control, family owners are likely to attempt to 
insulate themselves from noncontrolling shareholder activism through enhancing the 
controlling family‟s voting rights and sustaining their controlling status. Hence, family 
firms are expected to utilize control enhancing governance provisions, which can 
primarily elevate their power through voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights and 
sustain their controlling owner status in order to be able to reflect the family‟s vision into 
business practices and to pass their family legacy to future generations.  
Conversely, nonfamily firms are likely to use provisions that protect their status, 
position, and power less frequently than family firms, owing to the shareholders‟ short-
term orientation. Family owners‟ concern for the preservation of family control over the 
business is rooted in their long-term orientation with considerations for the family‟s 
future in terms of income, jobs, and security (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005a, 2005b). 
In long-term oriented family firms, family members tend to refrain from the pursuit of 
short-term personal gains for the long-term well-being of the family firm and invest in the 
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business for continued prosperity and growth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Miller et al., 
2008, 2010). Owing to the concern for the long-haul and dynastic thinking (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2006), family firm leaders often refrain from following faddish trends (Craig et 
al., 2008), instead envision a longstanding family firm with continuous family 
involvement and steadfast investment strategies.  
However, after an optimum level of ownership is reached, families may not be 
concerned with the further enhancement of voting rights and controlling status since the 
higher levels of ownership will naturally provide them substantial voting rights and allow 
them to exert and maintain control over the firm. Hence, after a certain point of family 
ownership, family owners‟ frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling 
owners‟ voting rights (i.e. unequal voting rights, cumulative voting, and supermajority) 
and controlling status (i.e. blank check, business combination laws, poison pill, bylaw 
and charter, and fair price) is likely to diminish.  
Hypothesis 1a. Family ownership will have an inverted u-shaped relationship with 
the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting controlling owners‟ 
voting rights. 
Hypothesis 1b. Family ownership will have an inverted u-shaped relationship 
with the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting controlling 
owners‟ controlling status.  
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Family Ownership and Governance Provisions 
Protecting Noncontrolling Owners 
Governance provisions protecting noncontrolling owners (i.e. cash-out laws and 
secret ballot) tend to empower them at the expense of the family owners‟ controlling 
power. Cash-out laws allow shareholders to sell their stakes to a controlling shareholder 
at a price based on the highest price of recently acquired shares. Secret ballot placing 
confidentiality on shareholders‟ voting can facilitate the ability of noncontrolling 
shareholders to make decisions against the controlling family‟s will without fearing 
retaliation.  
Since the empowerment of noncontrolling owners requires controlling owners to 
compromise control and power, family owners may not be willing to use them. Indeed, 
family owners tend to be generally unwilling or reluctant to dilute their control of the 
firm to nonfamily members (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). Additionally, if noncontrolling 
owners are empowered, they can initiate proxy fights (Hart, 1995) and replace top 
management team members and board of directors. Accordingly, Burkart et al. (2003) 
argue that families usually desire to maintain control as long as they can. However, they 
may be willing to let go of control in case of a need to raise capital, or the death of the 
founder, or to avoid high inheritance taxes (Burkart et al., 2003).  
In addition, the preservation of family control facilitates reputational benefits in 
both economic and political markets. If family control is diminished, the family may 
compromise its well established family firm image and reputation as well as political 
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connections (Burkart et al., 2003). These may constitute the rationale for families‟ 
“hanging on the control too long” (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003).  
Hence, controlling family owners are expected to restrict noncontrolling owners‟ 
influence on the firm and insulate themselves from noncontrolling owners‟ activism 
through the relatively less use of provisions protecting noncontrolling owners. However, 
in nonfamily firms, since the noncontrolling owners are the majority with substantially 
less power than that of management, they may be more prone to have these provisions in 
place to enhance their voice over the dominant management.  
Hypothesis 2. Family ownership will be negatively associated with the frequency 
of the use of governance provisions protecting noncontrolling owners. 
Family Ownership and Protection of Managers and Directors 
Family Ownership and Protection of Managers and Directors’ Positions 
In family firms, the controlling owners are also concerned with the protection of 
rights of management since family owners are often involved in management by 
appointing family members as CEO, Chairman of the board, or director of the board 
(Morck et al., 2005). Even if family owners are not actively involved in management, 
they are expected to exert influence in management and on the board through the 
appointment of well trusted nonfamily managers and affiliate directors (Combs et al., 
2008; Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2008; Morck et al., 2005). According to 
Herman (1981), the dominant owners tend to select managers and directors, if they don‟t 
occupy these positions themselves. Indeed, family business members usually prefer 
business relationships and contacts with certain trustworthy individuals owing to their 
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personalistic and particularistic tendencies (Carney, 2005) and higher levels of family 
ownership and management can allow a controlling family to do so. A manager or 
director selected by the family is likely to be friendly and helpful, rather than critical. At 
the same time, they can also guide family firms to implement growth strategies such as 
diversification through an advisory role without the threat of loss of family control (Jones 
et al., 2008). Hence, they are expected to represent the family by exhibiting similar values 
and aspirations to the family owners and managers owing to their compliance and 
commitment to the controlling family rooted in their personal ties and also encourage 
growth owing to their sense of obligation and reciprocity to the family. This can allow 
family to be indirectly involved in management and board with similar organizational 
outcomes to that of being directly involved.  
Therefore, the family owners would desire the management team, which may 
include family or nonfamily members, to maintain their positions to facilitate the family‟s 
sustained influence over the business and pursuance of the family-centered goals. Hence, 
governance provisions protecting managers‟ positions indirectly serve the purpose of 
protecting controlling owners as well. Additionally, the controlling family with 
perceptions of top management team benevolence rooted in family ties and acquaintances 
may feel compelled to reciprocate by using governance provisions that protect top 
management team members positions in the firm (Cruz et al., 2010). Hence, as family 
ownership increases, the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting 
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managers‟ positions will increase
1
 even if the family is not actively involved in 
management. Additionally, the ownership rights of the family can provide them the 
unchallenged discretion and power to utilize provisions protecting managers and 
directors. 
Hypothesis 3a. Family ownership will be positively associated with the frequency 
of the use of governance provisions protecting managers‟ positions.  
Family Ownership and Monetary Protection of Managers and Directors  
Relative to nonfamily owners, controlling family owners are expected to be 
driven more by intrinsic rewards (Davis et al., 1997; Deci & Ryan, 1985) such as family 
control, power, status, and prestige than by extrinsic rewards such as compensation 
involving salary and benefits. With the future generations in their minds, controlling 
families tend to make strategic decisions and use firm resources carefully and 
parsimoniously (Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic et al., 2004). 
Family business owners‟ parsimonious tendencies often result in lower executive 
compensation to family executives (Combs et al., forthcoming; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2003), lower dividends, or profit sharing (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005a, 2005b). 
However, executives with family ties tend to have greater job security and guaranteed 
                                                 
1 However, when family members are actively involved in management, this will not prevent the 
controlling family from blaming and penalizing the nonfamily managers/directors, rather than family 
managers, in case of a setback in firm performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Furthermore, family 
firms in the process of grooming heirs/heiresses for executive positions will also often  follow a 
“seat-warmer strategy” by temporarily hiring an interim non-family manager until a qualified family 
member becomes available to take over (Klein & Bell, 2007; Lee et al., 2003). 
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stream of future compensation despite lower overall compensation (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2001, 2003). Indeed, family executives are less likely to compete in external managerial 
labor markets owing to their “family handcuffs” and emotional attachment to their firms 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001, 2003). Accordingly, McConaughy (2000) shows that 
founding-family CEOs are paid less and receive fewer compensation-based incentives 
than nonfamily CEOs since they have superior incentives deriving from their position and 
require less compensation and incentive pay to align their interests with the family 
controlled firm than do nonfamily CEOs.  
Additionally, as family ownership increases, families will be wealthy enough not 
to be driven by monetary gains or incentives primarily. In extreme cases outside the U.S., 
some dynastic wealthy families tend to have more interest in maintaining status quo 
through preserving old capital rather than being innovative and actively participate in the 
political arena to influence public policies, which consequently prevent capital mobility 
and retard economic growth in a broader sense (Morck et al., 1998, 2005; Morck & 
Yeung, 2003; Morck & Steier, 2005). Indeed, after an optimum level of wealth has been 
achieved, family owners may prefer to pursue private benefits of control, rather than 
economic goals (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Accordingly, a recent study by Chen and Hsu 
(2009) shows that family ownership is negatively associated with R&D investment. The 
authors also show that R&D investment in family firms may increase when the CEO and 
Chair of the board roles are separated or when more independent outsiders are involved 
in the board. Also, Short et al. (2009) suggest that family firms may exhibit less 
autonomy, proactiveness, and risk taking propensities. 
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In nonfamily firms, executives and boards tend to have more voice than dispersed 
shareholders and are concerned with insulating themselves from shareholder interference 
and maximize their monetary gains. Personal connections of the managers and boards 
with the dispersed owners tends to be minimal, if they exist at all. Accordingly, an 
executive‟s link to publicly traded firm is expected to be primarily pecuniary, rather than 
intrinsic. As a result, executives‟ compensation is often tied to firm performance 
(Murphy, 1985). According to Becht et al. (2005), an executive‟s compensation package 
is typically composed of a salary, a bonus tied to short run performance (e.g. accounting 
profits), and a stock participation plan (e.g. stock options). The package also includes 
pension rights and severance pay often in the form of golden parachutes. Managers in 
nonfamily firms may be more concerned with monetary gains as an extrinsic reward than 
family or family-acquainted managers in family firms, which exhibit personalistic and 
particularistic propensities (Carney, 2005). Accordingly, family firms tend to offer 
greater intrinsic rewards such as job security and promotion opportunities to kin and to 
those acquainted to kin particularly at higher levels of family ownership and management 
where the controlling families have more discretion and power to do so (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2003). Also, contrary to controlling families‟ parsimonious tendencies, executives in 
nonfamily firms, who bear less risk than controlling owners and are driven by short-term 
monetary gains, may lead their firms into overinvestment or overexpansion creating 
complexity and higher sales, which can justify their higher compensation (Jensen, 1986) 
and enhance their power, prestige, and indispensability. Indeed, a concentration of the 
family‟s wealth in a single organization generates more risk bearing for family executives 
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than that of executives in nonfamily firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
Moreover, unlike managers in family firms, the horizons of nonfamily firm 
executives‟ are limited to the length of their tenure, which is usually not predictable. 
Hence, executives in nonfamily firms may not be primarily driven by the preservation of 
power and control as are family owners and managers to which they are willing to accept 
a performance hazard risk. Since tangible indicators such as their current compensation 
level and firm performance, rather than intangible indicators such as power and control, 
may be considered as a benchmark or a reference point for their future career 
opportunities that may be captured by transferring to other firms, they may be driven by 
elevating their monetary earnings and firm performance. Managers in nonfamily firms 
are able to maximize their monetary gains since they hold the control power unlike 
dispersed minority shareholders, whereas family owners tend to have substantial property 
rights that allow them to have a say in monetary decisions and be parsimonious generally. 
Since family managers do not tend to be as concerned about career opportunities outside 
the family firm, they do not need to create a high reference point for future compensation 
at other organizations.  
Hypothesis 3b. Family ownership will be negatively associated with the 
frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting managers monetarily. 
Family Ownership and Legal Protection of Managers and Directors  
Controlling families are also driven by maintaining a positive reputation (Dyer & 
Whetten, 2006). Unlike non-family firms, family firms are concerned that a bad 
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reputation could “soil the good name of the family” (Dyer & Whetten, 2006: 791). 
Hence, family firm leaders tend to make a concerted effort to build a positive 
organizational image and reputation (Miller et al., 2008). This makes family leaders more 
apt to avoid questionable or irresponsible business practices (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). As 
noted earlier, Berrone et al. (2010) show that family firms voluntarily adopt environment-
friendly policies and risky environmental investments beyond regulatory requirements 
owing to their noneconomic goals such as maintaining family legacy and prestige and 
accumulating social capital. 
Additionally, family members‟ pride deriving from a positive reputation of 
themselves and their firm enables them to police one another‟s behavior (Sundaramurthy 
and Kreiner, 2008). Close monitoring and control by family owners also elevate the 
quality of products or services and help build relational or goodwill trust with 
stakeholders (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Sako, 1991; Tagiuri et al., 1996; Ward & Aronoff, 
1991; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988).  Indeed, family businesses seem to develop and sustain 
strong relationships with internal and external stakeholders (Aronoff & Ward, 1995; Dick 
& Basu, 1994; Habbershon et al., 1999; Lyman, 1991) that help to establish a strong 
positive image, which can lower the possibility of wrongdoing and litigation. 
Family members also know that they cannot switch families if their family firm‟s 
reputation, to which family identity is intertwined, is damaged (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). 
Accordingly, research suggests that individuals who strongly identify with their 
organizations feel responsible for the organization (Dipboye, 1977) and exhibit helpful 
and supportive behaviors to their firms (Dutton et al., 1994). Owing to family members‟ 
 
 
52 
higher levels of identification with the firm, they exhibit a stronger emotional attachment 
to the firm, which enhances their organizational commitment and involvement (Minichilli 
et al., 2010). Organizational identification, emotional attachment, and commitment to the 
firms are likely to lower mishaps and possible law suits involving family firms. 
In contrast, internal monitoring in nonfamily firms is often not as effective as in 
family firms owing to the separation of ownership and management (Berle & Means, 
1936; Demsetz, 1983). Furthermore, owing to their lack of or limited personalistic and 
particularistic propensities, managers in nonfamily firms may be less likely to identify 
with their firms. Therefore, an executive in a nonfamily firm is expected to keep his/her 
individual identity and firm identity separate. Hence, maintaining a positive firm 
reputation in the long-run may not be as great of a concern for nonfamily executives and 
directors. This may increase their propensity to engage in wrongdoings. For example, a 
study by Burns and Kedia (2006) shows that the sensitivity of the CEO‟s option portfolio 
to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport, which is an 
principal-agent type of agency problem in the form of moral hazard. Hence, executives 
and directors in nonfamily firms will also be concerned with minimizing their legal 
liability from possible wrongdoing and the consequent law suits, whether they are 
personally at fault or not. The limited liability and indemnification from legal expenses 
and judgment in case of a lawsuit can help executives and directors protect themselves in 
the case of inappropriate behavior in a firm and move onto other career opportunities in 
other firms without any interruption or financial and/or legal harm to themselves, 
regardless of losses to the firm and diminished shareholder value.  
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Family owners‟ higher levels of ownership can allow close monitoring and 
provide a long-term orientation. Image and reputation concerns may inhibit them from 
being involved in wrongdoings and managerial mishaps. If so, legal protection for 
managers and directors may not be essential. Indeed, families tend to establish cohesive 
organizational environments as “their personal values and ethics are deeply embedded in 
their company and reflected in all its behavior” (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005: 521). 
The core ethical concern for families tends to be making contributions that count and will 
reflect well on a controlling family and its future generations (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2005). Controlling families‟ building relationships with internal and external stakeholders 
based on generosity, trustworthiness, and high ethical standards can diminish the 
possibility of wrongdoings and hence the concerns for legal protection. Trust among 
family business members, which is often extended to include trustworthy nonfamily 
business associates, can be a substitute for contractual enforcement and prevent mishaps 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006), which may consequently lower legal liability concerns. 
Hypothesis 3c. Family ownership will be negatively associated with the frequency 
of the use of governance provisions protecting managers legally. 
Family Ownership and Protection of Others 
 Governance provisions protecting others provide severance payments and secure 
the pension fund to a broader group of employees of the target firm in case of an 
acquisition. Since these provisions make a takeover more expensive for the bidder, family 
firms are expected to utilize these provisions in order to protect controlling family owners 
indirectly. The expected use of these provisions is also in line with research suggesting 
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family firms‟ greater employee care and loyalty (Donckels & Frochlich, 1991; 
Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Ward, 1988). According to Miller and Le Breton-Miller 
(2005: 521), since controlling “families so cherish the firm, they also treasure those who 
staff it and sustain it”. Hence, they generally treat their employees well. Owing to the 
duality of benefits associated with the use of these provisions (i.e. greater employee care 
and takeover/acquisition repellence), family owners are likely to utilize them. 
Hypothesis 4. Family ownership will be positively associated with the frequency 
of the use of governance provisions protecting others.  
Moderation Effects of Family Management  
According to Schulze and Gedajlovic (2010), studies have not always 
distinguished between the different effects of family ownership and family management. 
On the one hand, family owners may desire to govern their firms in certain idiosyncratic 
ways. On the other hand, family‟s involvement in management can facilitate family 
owners‟ governing their firms in the ways they desire.  
In some cases, family management may not always accompany family ownership. 
Indeed, some family owners may not be willing and/or able to be involved in 
management and prefer to play the investor role. However, it is uncommon for families to 
be solely involved in management without any ownership. Therefore, in this essay, 
family management is distinguished from family ownership and investigated as a 
moderator in the relationship between family ownership and the frequency of the use of 
governance provisions owing to its strengthening family owners‟ ability and willingness 
to adopt and utilize governance provisions that may primarily meet the family‟s needs. 
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Family involvement in management can legitimize family owners‟ authority and 
empower family owners to take actions benefiting the family. When more family 
members are involved in management and the board, the resistance of nonfamily 
managers or noncontrolling owners to controlling family‟s decisions and actions will be 
less effective. Hence, family owners‟ and management‟s goals are expected be aligned 
(Chrisman et al., 2010). This can enhance the owners‟ ability to protect their voting 
rights, controlling status, management, directors, and others and limit noncontrolling 
owners‟ rights through the adoption and the use of governance provisions serving these 
purposes.  
Without active participation in management, family owners‟ influence over 
management and the board to adopt the provisions exclusively serving the family‟s needs 
may not be as substantial. Also, when family owners prefer not to use certain provisions, 
which may interfere with the sustainability of family control or may not be needed by the 
family owing to higher levels of equity ownership position, family‟s involvement in 
management will enable them not to use such provisions. For example, family 
management will strengthen the ability of family owners‟ use of provisions protecting 
controlling owners through voting rights up to an optimum ownership level and then after 
the optimum level, family management will strengthen family owners‟ ability not to use 
those provisions. Similarly, family management will strengthen the ability of family 
owners‟ use of provisions protecting controlling owners through sustaining controlling 
status up to an optimum ownership level. Then, after this optimum level, family 
management will strengthen family owners‟ ability not to use those provisions since 
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family owners simply may not need them at higher ownership levels. Hence, family 
management will strengthen the effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use 
of governance mechanisms. In inverted u-shaped relationships, this will result in a shift 
of the inverted u-shaped curve through a shift of the optimal point.  
Hypothesis 5a. Family management will moderate the inverted u-shaped 
relationship between family ownership and the frequency of the use of 
governance provisions protecting controlling owners through voting rights, such 
that family management will strengthen the positive effects of family ownership 
on the frequency of these governance provisions up to an optimum level, and then 
strengthen the negative effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use of 
these provisions after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 5b. Family management will moderate the inverted u-shaped 
relationship between family ownership and the frequency of the use of 
governance provisions protecting controlling owners through sustaining their 
controlling status, such that family management will strengthen the positive 
effects of family ownership on the frequency of these governance provisions up to 
an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative effects of family ownership on 
the frequency of the use of these provisions after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 5c. Family management will moderate the relationship between 
family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions 
protecting noncontrolling owners, such that family management will strengthen 
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the negative effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use of these 
governance provisions. 
Hypothesis 5d. Family management will moderate the relationship between 
family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions 
protecting management and directors in terms of their position, such that family 
management will strengthen the positive effects of family ownership on the 
frequency of the use of these governance provisions. 
Hypothesis 5e. Family management will moderate the relationship between 
family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions 
protecting management and directors monetarily, such that family management 
will strengthen the negative effects of family ownership on the frequency of the 
use of these governance provisions. 
Hypothesis 5f. Family management will moderate the relationship between family 
ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting 
management and directors legally, such that family management will strengthen 
the negative effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use of these 
governance provisions. 
Hypothesis 5g. Family management will moderate the relationship between 
family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance provisions 
protecting others, such that family management will strengthen the positive 
effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use of these governance 
provisions. 
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Methodology 
Data Collection 
Panel data regarding governance provision usage in firms was obtained from a 
larger project designed to investigate all the companies incorporated in the U.S. in the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center books in terms of their usage of 22 (business 
combination law and cash-out laws were missing in the dataset) out of 24 control 
enhancing governance mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003). Accounting, market, 
ownership, and management data was obtained from Thompson Reuters Thompson One 
Corporate Development database. Family business members were identified by using the 
Hoover‟s database and annual reports in Mergent Online. Data was analyzed on a 
restricted sample of firms based on publicly available data for the lag years 2001, 2003, 
and 2005 regarding ownership, management, and control variables and the years 2002, 
2004, and 2006 regarding the frequency of the use of governance provisions.  
Consistent with previous studies investigating publicly traded family firms, the 
sample came from the first 400 firms listed in S&P 500 (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 
2003b, 2004; Short et al., 2009; Combs et al., forthcoming). Missing data brought the 
sample size to 386. S&P 500 stock market index is maintained by Standard & Poor‟s and 
involves 500 large-cap U.S. firms covering about 75% of the U.S. equity market. First, 
this sample includes both family and nonfamily firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) 
suggest that families are present in one-third of the S&P 500. Second, family firms 
among the population are likely to have substantial number of nonfamily shareholders 
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unlike privately held firms. Hence, this sample is representative of the publicly traded 
family and nonfamily firm population. 
Variables  
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables were 7 categories of governance provisions that group 
the 22 available provisions in the database (data regarding the use of Business 
Combination Law and Cash-out Laws were missing in the dataset) according to the 
purposes of their usage by firms. Judgment-based categorization (Perreault & Leigh, 
1989) of the governance provisions was used. The validity of this categorization was 
confirmed by three expert judges who assessed the degree to which the provisions 
represent the categories (Netemeyer et al., 2003).  
The first dependent variable was the frequency of the use of governance 
provisions protecting controlling owners through voting rights (VOTING). The years 
were 2002, 2004, and 2006 for the dependent variables. This variable involved the 
following provisions: (1) Unequal voting rights, (2) Cumulative voting, and (3) 
Supermajority. The second dependent variable was the frequency of the use of 
governance provisions protecting controlling owners through sustaining control status 
(STATUS) and included the following provisions: (1) Blank check, (2) Poison pill, (3) 
Bylaw, (4) Charter, (5) Fair price, and (6) Antigreenmail. The third dependent variable, 
the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting noncontrolling owners 
(NONCONTROLLING) included provisions concerning: (1) Secret ballot. The fourth 
dependent variable was the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting 
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management and directors in terms of their position (POSITION). This variable involved 
the following provisions: (1) Classified board, (2) Special meeting, (3) Written consent, 
and (4) Director‟s duties. The fifth dependent variable, the frequency of the use of 
governance provisions protecting management and directors monetarily (MONETARY) 
included provisions concerning: (1) Compensation plans, (2) Golden parachute, and (3) 
Severance. The sixth dependent variable was the frequency of the use of governance 
provisions protecting management and directors legally (LEGAL). This variable involved 
the following provisions: (1) Contracts, (2) Indemnification, and (3) Limitations on 
director liability. The seventh dependent variable was the frequency of the use of 
governance provisions protecting others (OTHERS) involving provisions: (1) Pension 
parachutes, and (2) Silver parachutes. 
In a given year, provisions that were used by a firm were coded as “1” and 
provisions not used are coded as “0”. The frequency of the use of each category was 
calculated by adding usage/no usage figures (i.e. 1/0) in each category. For robustness 
tests, particularly when one provision group (i.e. NONCONTROLLING) included only 
one provision due to missing provision data, categorical provision group variables were 
also included (1 = At least one mechanism is used; 0 = None).  
Independent Variables 
Family ownership (FO) is the percentage of equity ownership held by members of 
a family. In addition, the squared family ownership (FO
2
) variable was used to indicate 
nonlinear relationships between the independent variable (FO) and the dependent 
variables. The years were 2001, 2003, and 2005 for the independent variables. 
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Moderators 
Family management (FM) is the number of family members serving in the top 
management and/or the board of directors of a firm. Family members participating in 
both management and board are only counted once. The consideration for the family‟s 
participation in management as well as the board follows Astrachan et al. (2002), Handler 
(1989) and Zahra (2003). For robustness tests, the proportion of number of family 
managers and board of directors (PFM) to total number of managers and board of 
directors was also calculated. The years were 2001, 2003, and 2005 for the moderator. 
Control Variables 
Variables that were expected to influence the frequency of the use of different 
categories of governance provisions were controlled. As firms grow in size, firms may be 
more likely to use control enhancing corporate governance provisions to sustain control 
(Gompers et al., 2003). Firm size (FS) was controlled and measured via the log of the 
number of employees following Dewar and Dutton (1986). Similarly, as the firm ages, a 
firm gets more established and becomes more likely to use corporate governance tools in 
order to sustain control. Hence, firm age (FA) was controlled and measured as the 
number of years the firm has been in existence since founding (Davis & Harveston, 
2000). Moreover, the use of governance provisions may be more frequently used in 
certain industries. Primary firm industry (FI) was measured by classifying all firms into 
one of four industrial categories: (1) retail, (2) service, (3) manufacturing, and (4) other, 
following Chrisman et al. (2010). Three categorical variables, coded 1-0, were created to 
indicate retail, service, and manufacturing firms. Firms in other industries were coded as 
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zero for each variable. For further specification of industry, four-digit SIC codes and 
sector names were also identified and entered for each firm. Additionally, generational 
majority in management and board was controlled because family influence tends to be 
weaker when family influence is more dispersed or fractionalized owing to the 
involvement of later generations (Schulze et al., 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Two 
categorical variables, coded 1-0, were created to indicate either first generation (GEN1) 
or second generation or later (GEN2). Nonfamily firms were those that were coded as 
zero for each of these two variables.  
Institutional owners such as mutual or pension funds may also play a significant 
role in corporate governance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004) concerning the use of provisions. 
Institutional ownership (IO) is the percentage of overall institutional ownership of shares 
outstanding. Similarly, other insiders‟ ownership can influence corporate governance 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Hence, other insiders’ ownership (OIO), which is the equity 
holdings of top managers and directors (minus family managers‟ and directors‟ 
ownership), was controlled to capture the incentive effects of other insiders‟ ownership 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004).  
Firm risk may be another factor that can influence the use of governance 
provisions because higher levels of firm risk may make firms more susceptible to 
takeovers and those firms may utilize governance provisions for takeover defense. Firm 
risk (FR) was measured as the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 60 
months following Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b). The years were 2001, 2003, and 
2005 for the control variables. 
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Analyses 
Table 2.2 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the 
variables used in the study. Tables 2.3-2.9 present the results of the Fixed Effects Tobit 
Models, with the frequency of the use of different types of provisions, as the dependent 
variables.   
Hypotheses 1a through 5g were tested via Tobit panel data analysis for lag years 
which are 2002, 2004, and 2004 for the dependent variables and 2001, 2003, and 2005 
for the controls, independent variables, moderator, and interactions. NLOGIT version 4.0 
Econometric software was used. The Fixed Effects Tobit estimation model was used to 
control for omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time, whereas 
a random effects model was used when some variables may be constant over time but 
vary between cases and some variables may be fixed between cases but vary over time. 
NLOGIT4 selected the estimation model as the Fixed Effects estimation model. Tobit 
Fixed Effects estimation was used owing to the existence of a large number of variables 
with values of zero (Maddala, 1991). Prior to running the analyses, the variables‟ 
distributions were examined by graphing the distributions and examining the skewness 
and kurtosis in Excel. Additionally, Variance Inflation Factors for the variables were 
calculated. VIFs range between 1.10 and 3.24. Collinearity was not a problem since all 
VIFs were less than 10.  
The number of observations in the panel data analysis was 1,158 (i.e. 386 * 3 = 
1,158) since the lag years 2001, 2003, and 2005 regarding ownership, management, and 
control variables and the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 regarding the frequency of the use 
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of governance provisions were investigated for 386 firms. G*Power software was used 
for power analysis. The post-hoc test computed achieved power given alpha (0.05), 
sample size (1,158), and conventional small (0.10), medium (0.30), and large (0.50) 
effect sizes. Even at small effect size, power was .96, giving confidence that there was 
enough power to detect even small effects. Conventionally, in social sciences, 80% and 
higher power at up to 0.10 alpha level is acceptable (Cohen, 1988).  
As shown in Table 2.3, when the dependent variable was the frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting controlling owners through enhancing voting rights (VOTING), 
Model 1 was the base model where I entered the set of control variables. First 
generation‟s majority in management and/or board, second (or after) generation‟s 
majority in management and/or board, service industry, manufacturing industry, firm age, 
and firm risk were significant and the log likelihood function was -259.44.  In Model 2, 
the independent variables were entered. The beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) 
was positive and significant (β=2.59, p<0.05) and the beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership Squared (FO
2
) was negative and not significant (β=-.05, ns). The log 
likelihood function for the second model was -228.79. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was not 
supported. In Model 3, the moderator (FM) and the interactions of family ownership and 
family management (FO*FM and FOS*FM) were entered. The log likelihood function 
was -44.59. The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family Management (FO*FM) 
was positive and not significant (β=24.8, ns) and the beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership
2
*Family Management (FO
2
*FM) was negative and not significant (β=-0.68, 
ns). Hence, Hypothesis 5a was not supported. 
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As shown in Table 2.4, when the dependent variable was the frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting controlling owners through sustaining controlling status 
(STATUS), Model 1 was the base model the set of control variables were entered. Firm 
age and firm size were significant and log likelihood function was -222.17.  In Model 2, 
the independent variables were entered. The log likelihood function for the second model 
was -68.44. The beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) was positive and not 
significant (β=.02, ns) and the beta coefficient of Family Ownership Squared (FO
2
) was 
negative and not significant (β=-.00, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 1b was not supported. In 
Model 3, the moderator (FM) and the interactions of family ownership and family 
management (FO*FM and FOS*FM) were entered. The beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership*Family Management (FO*FM) was negative and significant (β=-10.34, 
p<0.001) and the beta coefficient of Family Ownership
2
*Family Management (FO
2
*FM) 
was positive and significant (β=0.28, p<0.001). The log likelihood function was -61.34. 
Since the significant relationships were in the opposite direction from what was 
hypothesized, Hypothesis 5b was not supported. 
As shown in Table 2.5, when the dependent variable was the frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting noncontrolling owners (NONCONTROLLING), Model 1 was the 
base model where the set of control variables were entered. Firm size, other insiders‟ 
ownership, and firm risk were significant and log likelihood function was 66.07.  In 
Model 2, the independent variable was entered. The log likelihood function for the 
second model was 66.07. The beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) was positive 
and not significant (β=0.00, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. In Model 3, 
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the moderator (FM) and the interactions of family ownership and family management 
(FO*FM) were entered. The log likelihood function was 66.07. The beta coefficient of 
Family Ownership*Family Management (FO*FM) was negative and not significant (β=-
0.00, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 5c was not supported. 
When the dependent variable was the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting management and directors‟ positions (POSITION), Model 1 was the base 
model where he set of control variables were entered (see Table 2.6). Second (or later) 
generation‟s majority in management and/or board, manufacturing industry, institutional 
ownership, firm age, firm size, other insiders‟ ownership, and firm risk were significant 
and log likelihood function was -71.17.  In Model 2, the independent variable (FO) was 
entered. The log likelihood function for the second model was -71.40. The beta 
coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) was negative and not significant (β=-0.01, ns). 
Hence, Hypothesis 3a was not supported. In Model 3, the moderator (FM) and the 
interactions of family ownership and family management (FO*FM) were entered. The 
log likelihood function was -63.11. The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) was positive and not significant (β=0.03, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 
5d was not supported. 
When the dependent variable was the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting management and directors monetarily (MONETARY), Model 1 was the base 
model where the set of control variables were entered (see Table 2.7). Second (or later) 
generation‟s majority in management and/or board, retail industry, manufacturing 
industry, institutional ownership, firm size, and firm risk were significant and log 
 
 
67 
likelihood function was 40.55.  In Model 2, the independent variable (FO) was entered. 
The log likelihood function for the second model was 39.68. The beta coefficient of 
Family Ownership (FO) was negative and not significant (β=-0.01, ns). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3b was not supported. In Model 3, the moderator (FM) and the interactions of 
family ownership and family management (FO*FM) were entered. The log likelihood 
function was 39.76. The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family Management 
(FO*FM) was negative and not significant (β=-0.00, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 5e was not 
supported. 
When the dependent variable was the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting management and directors legally (LEGAL), Model 1 was the base model 
where I entered the set of control variables (see Table 2.8). The service industry, 
manufacturing industry, institutional ownership, firm age, other insiders‟ ownership, and 
firm risk variables were significant and log likelihood function was -17.83.  In Model 2, 
the independent variable (FO) was entered. The log likelihood function for the second 
model was -18.50. The beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) was positive and not 
significant (β=0.18, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 3c was not supported. In Model 3, the 
moderator (FM) and the interactions of family ownership and family management 
(FO*FM) were entered. The log likelihood function was -18.50. The beta coefficient of 
Family Ownership*Family Management (FO*FM) was negative and not significant (β=-
0.06, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 5f was not supported. 
As shown in Table 2.9, when the dependent variable was the frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting others (OTHERS), Model 1 was the base model where the set of 
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control variables were entered. Institutional ownership, firm size, and firm risk were 
significant and the log likelihood function was -90.99.  In Model 2, the independent 
variable (FO) was entered. The log likelihood function for the second model was -89.61. 
Beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) was positive and not significant (β=0.01, ns). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. In Model 3, the moderator (FM) and the 
interactions of family ownership and family management (FO*FM) were entered. The 
log likelihood function was -85.27. The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) was positive and not significant (β=0.01, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 
5g was not supported. 
The results were compared to the Pooled Model through OLS Regression. The 
results of OLS were compatible with the Tobit panel data analyses. Robustness tests also 
included the analyses with categorical dependent variables (i.e. 1=at least one provision is 
used in each provision group; 0=none) and the proportion of family managers and/or the 
board of directors (PFM). The results of these analyses were consistent with the results 
presented above.  
In summary, there was no support for the hypotheses. The summary of findings 
can be seen in Table 2.10. The findings are discussed in the following section. 
Discussion 
Recent research draws attention to the distinctive effects of family involvement 
(i.e. ownership and management) on the behavior of publicly traded firms (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003, 2004; Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). 
Despite this, we do not know enough about why and how families own and control 
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corporations in the ways they do (Villalonga & Amit 2006, 2009). For instance, 
controlling families‟ propensity to use different types of governance provisions is still 
under researched although the use of these provisions may shed light on the acute 
principal-principal agency problems in some family firms, which can be detrimental to 
firm performance and shareholder wealth.  
In an attempt to fill this gap, this essay suggests that the theory of the family firm 
will be advanced by the investigation of the link between family involvement 
components (i.e. family ownership and family management) and the use of control 
enhancing governance provisions. Accordingly, this paper addresses the question of: 
How do family ownership and management differentially affect the use of different types 
of governance provisions? I develop and test a model linking family involvement (i.e. 
family ownership and family management) and the use of governance provisions on a 
sample of 386 of SP500 firms via panel data analysis. The hypotheses suggesting links 
between family ownership, family management, and the use of governance provisions are 
not supported. 
The nonsignificant relationships may have occurred for several reasons. First, the 
use of provisions might be institutionalized among corporations. In other words, the use 
of provisions may have become routines, largely diminishing the effects of family 
ownership and family management on the adoption and the usage of them. Indeed, in 
institutionalized contexts, corporations tend to become similar because of environmental 
forces and network ties (Bruton et al., 2010; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Palmer & 
Barber, 2001; Zucker, 1987). The adoption of certain practices, resulting in isomorphism 
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in the institutional environment, tends to increase the probability of adaptation and 
survival of firms (Zucker, 1987). This institutional logic is consistent with hostile 
takeovers forming pressure on corporations to ubiquitously adopt and use provisions 
which can prevent or delay takeovers as a defense tactic (Bebchuk, 2003; Gompers et al. 
2003). Accordingly, a recent review by Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, and Kellermanns 
(working paper) suggests that the effects of family firm governance may largely rely on 
the existence of institutional forces. Hence, the findings of this essay indicating lack of 
influence of family involvement on the use of provisions may also suggest that the 
adoption and use of provisions may be largely influenced by isomorphism among 
corporations while dealing with takeovers. Therefore, future research can investigate the 
dynamics in the institutionalization process of the use of governance provisions through 
the lens of institutional theory. 
Second, family firms may not need to use provisions more than nonfamily firms 
since controlling families in family firms already have substantial power, authority, and 
legitimacy through ownership and/or participation in management. Indeed, even 
relatively small percentages of ownership and management provide families with a high 
level of control compared to dispersed noncontrolling owners with very small percentage 
of ownership and no active participation in management in publicly traded family firms. 
This may naturally elevate their ability and power in decision making (Chrisman et al., 
2010), diminishing the need for the use of power enhancement tools such as governance 
provisions. Additionally, family owners and managers may be less likely to use 
governance provisions owing to the compatibility of their noneconomic and economic 
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goals (Stewart & Hitt, 2010). For example, noneconomic goals such as transgenerational 
succession and continuity of family legacy can be complementary to economic goals 
since transferring a failing business to offspring will not have much utility to the new 
generation. Hence, family business members with transgenerational succession intentions 
will be motivated to attain economic goals. Since the use of provisions may harm firm 
performance by preventing or delaying takeovers which may eventually be beneficial to 
the firm, the family owners and managers with compatible economic and noneconomic 
goals may not use them. 
Third, family owners and managers with stewardship tendencies may choose not 
to use provisions which may only be beneficial to the controlling family. Indeed, the 
family owners and managers‟ interests may be aligned with the interests of the firm, 
which would suggest that “pro-organizational collectivistic behaviors have higher utility 
than individualistic self-serving behaviors” (Davis et al., 1997: 24).  Accordingly, family 
firm members may value firm-level objectives such as maximization of shareholder 
wealth, higher than their individual or family-centered objectives (Zahra, 2003). A 
stewardship perspective in explaining why family firms do not use governance provisions 
more than nonfamily firms, despite the potential advantages of doing so, is in line with 
family business studies suggesting that organization members tend to demonstrate high 
levels of trust and unity (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996; Habbershon & Williams, 1999) that lead 
to superior performance and competitive advantages.  
In contrast to above, another reason for the finding that family ownership and 
management do not influence the use of provisions is that family owners and managers 
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may have lower power than expected in US corporations. In the US, ownership in most 
large firms is relatively dispersed and US courts intervene to ensure diffused ownership 
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Morck & Steier, 2005). The US also exhibits effective 
legal protection of noncontrolling shareholders, shareholder activism, and a well-
developed corporate takeover mechanism (Burkart et al., 2003; Daily et al., 2003b; Gillan 
& Starks, 2000). Furthermore, principal-principal agency problems in corporations in the 
US may not be as severe as in some other countries where family owners and managers 
would want to manipulate the use of control enhancing governance provisions. Indeed, 
powerful family business groups primarily driven by private benefits of control can even 
manipulate their countries‟ political systems and retard economic growth in less 
developed countries (Morck & Yeung, 2003, 2004a, 2004b). In the US, weak corporate 
governance can result in stock price decreases triggering shareholder lawsuits, hostile 
takeovers, and institutional owners‟ criticisms in shareholder meetings in nonfamily 
firms. Therefore, family owners and managers in the US may not have enough power to 
dominate the strategic decisions concerning the adoption and use of governance 
provisions.  
Accordingly, Peng and Jiang (2010) suggest that the impact of family ownership 
and control on firm value is associated with the level of shareholder protection embodied 
in legal and regulatory institutions of a country. On the one hand, when there is effective 
investor protection, family owners tend to dilute their equity to attract minority 
shareholders and delegate management to professional managers (Peng & Jiang, 2010). 
In this case, family owners and managers do not have as much incentive to utilize 
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governance provisions to enhance their power. On the other hand, when the legal system 
is weak, family owners want to maintain their control by participating in management in 
order to mitigate potential principal-agent agency problems that can generate from 
professional managers‟ opportunistic behaviors (Peng & Jiang, 2010). However, the 
downside of the enhanced power of the controlling family in an environment 
characterized by weak legal noncontrolling shareholder protection is the vulnerability to 
principal-principal agency problems such as expropriation of noncontrolling shareholder 
wealth and entrenchment of controlling family. Hence, future research can investigate the 
use of corporate governance mechanisms in family firms within the context of different 
countries‟ legal environments.  
The findings of this study also include a significant moderation effect of family 
management on the relationship between family ownership and the frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting the control status of owners that was in the opposite direction 
from what was hypothesized in Hypothesis 5b. Accordingly, family management 
weakens the positive effects of family ownership on the frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting controlling owners‟ control status up to an optimum level and then 
weakens the negative effects after an optimum level is reached. This may be because 
family owners may be more concerned with the enhancement of their control status when 
they are not involved in management. However, when they participate in management, 
they may not be concerned with the enhancement of control status since participation in 
management naturally provides them sufficient control at low-to-moderate levels of 
ownership. After an optimum level of family ownership, though, family owners already 
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have substantial control even without participating in management. Therefore, they do 
not need to use the provisions enhancing control. However, family management appears 
to weaken the negative effects of family ownership on the use of provisions enhancing 
control after an optimum level of family ownership since family managers may become 
more concerned with the family‟s control status and may not be willing to give up or 
compromise control at higher levels of ownership, where the family is substantially 
committed to the firm both via family‟s wealth and family managers and directors‟ 
careers tied up to the family firm. Indeed, at higher levels of family ownership, family 
managers may feel more attached and committed to firm, elevating their concern for the 
family‟s control status. This can weaken the negative effects of family ownership on the 
use provisions enhancing control after an optimum level of ownership. 
The findings regarding the significant relationships between the use of provisions 
and the generational majority among family managers and board members, which was a 
control variable, also deserve some discussion. When the first generation constitutes the 
majority of family managers and board directors, significant positive effects on the 
frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners through voting rights are 
observed while investigating H1a and H5a, as can be seen in Table 2.3. Similarly, when 
second or later generation forms the majority among family managers and board 
directors, this leads to significant positive effects on the frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting controlling owners through voting rights. Therefore, family‟s 
involvement in the business, rather than the extent of family involvement may be the 
driver of the use of governance provisions enhancing voting rights.  
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Other interesting findings pertaining to the generational majority, are that control 
by second or later generation family managers and directors positively affects the 
frequency of the use of provisions protecting managers and directors‟ positions (Table 
2.6) and negatively affecting the frequency of the use of provisions protecting managers 
and directors monetarily (Table 2.7). These findings indicate that when the second or 
later generation represents the family in management and board more than the first 
generation, the firm is more likely to use of provisions protecting managers and directors. 
The findings also suggest that second or later generation family managers‟ behaviors and 
intentions to protect their managerial or board membership position may be greater owing 
to diminishing family influence in later generations and their perceptions of relatively 
less job security than first generation family managers and directors or managers and 
directors in nonfamily firms (Schulze et al., 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Conversely, they tend to differ from managers in nonfamily firms by negatively 
influencing the provisions protecting managers and directors monetarily. The reason for 
that may be a lower need for monetary protection owing to their inherited family wealth. 
Hence, second or later generations are more likely to use provisions protecting managers 
and directors‟ positions and less likely to use provisions protecting managers and 
directors monetarily than nonfamily firms, whereas first generation does not seem to 
differ from nonfamily firms in the use of those provisions. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The limitations of this essay can also lead to a number of future research 
directions. First, as stated above, the regulatory context can affect the observed 
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relationships and generalizability to the corporations around the world since the sample 
included S&P500 firms headquartered in the U.S. Even though increased globalization 
tends to cause similarities in business conduct in world economies, different legal 
regimes (e.g. common versus civil law) in different countries can result in differences in 
corporate governance (Peng & Jiang, 2010). For example, the legal system prevents 
pyramiding in the US, whereas it is permissible even in many developed countries in 
Asia and Europe (Peng & Jiang, 2010). Hence, since legal context may be influential to 
the findings of this essay, future studies can test or extend the model in other countries 
with different legal systems. 
Similarly, despite the panel data analyses examining multiple years (2001, 2003, 
and 2005 regarding ownership, management, and control variables and the lag years 
2002, 2004, and 2006 regarding the frequency of the use of governance provisions), the 
findings may vary in other time periods (e.g. in 1990s) owing to the changes in the legal 
system. For example, the examined time periods in this essay involves the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, also known as Investor Protection Act, as a reaction to 
corporate accounting scandals and the aftermath of its enactment. This act enhanced the 
reliability of financial reporting, transparency, and accountability through increased 
internal controls and auditing (Coates, 2007). Hence, future research can compare or 
contrast the findings of this essay to earlier periods. This can also show whether 
legislation affects corporate governance. 
Another limitation is that, in this essay, the seven categories of governance 
provisions that group the 24 provisions identified by Gompers et al. (2003) according to 
 
 
77 
the purposes of their usage by firms are formed by a judgment-based categorization 
(Perreault & Leigh, 1989). Future research can assess the sensitivity of the findings to the 
use of alternative categorizations. 
 In this essay, the link between the “components-of-involvement” (i.e. family 
ownership and family management) and the use of provisions are examined. However, 
according to the “essence” approach in defining family firms, the intentions, vision, 
familiness, and/or behaviors may be the distinctive factors distinguishing a family firm 
from not only a nonfamily firm, but also other family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005). Since 
the elements of the essence approach are expected to lead to differences in corporate 
governance systems in family firms, the link between family owners and/or managers 
intentions, vision, familiness, and/or behaviors (e.g. intentions for transgenerational 
succession and the intentions to preserve socioemotional wealth) and the use of 
provisions can be investigated in future research.  
Additionally, there may be other family firm-specific factors such as a family 
member‟s being a CEO and the Chair of the Board and the number of generations 
involved in ownership, management, and/or board which can influence the use of 
governance provisions. Hence, future family business studies can investigate the links 
between these and other family firm idiosyncrasies and the use of provisions.  
As another future research avenue, firm performance as the outcome of the 
interplay between family involvement and the use of different types of governance 
provisions can be studied. Studies generally suggest a nonlinear (i.e. an inverted u-
shaped) relationship between family involvement and firm performance (e.g. Sciascia & 
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Mazzola, 2008; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2003b; Claessens et al., 2002). But, we still do 
not know enough about how and why this phenomenon occurs. One underlying reason 
for the nonlinear inverted u-shaped relationship between family involvement and firm 
performance may be the family‟s tendency to pursue noneconomic goals as family 
ownership and management increase (Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008; Chrisman, Chua, 
Pearson & Barnett, 2010). They are able to do so owing to the legitimacy and power 
obtained through ownership and management positions they hold in the company 
(Chrisman et al., 2010). When the level of family management increases along with the 
level of family ownership, the noneconomic goals are likely to be aligned with the 
interests of both owners and managers, resulting in a relatively lower cost of adopting the 
goals and lower resistance by management and/or noncontrolling owners (Chrisman et 
al., 2010). In addition, the use of different types of governance provisions (e.g. provisions 
enhancing controlling owners‟ voting rights) can strengthen or weaken the effects of 
family involvement on firm performance. Future research can explore these interactions 
of family involvement components and the use of different types of governance 
provisions, and their impact on firm performance in publicly traded family firms. All 
these factors suggest additional applications of corporate governance to the study of 
family businesses.  
 Furthermore, the effects of family involvement on the use of governance 
provisions might vary in family firms depending upon top management team 
characteristics (i.e. heterogeneous versus homogeneous), board composition (i.e. 
proportion of insiders, outsiders, and related outsiders) (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), board 
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independence (Klein et al., 2005), CEO duality (Zahra, 2003), leadership styles of family 
managers and directors (Bass, 1990), social capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), strategic 
networks (Arregle et al., 2007), image concerns (Memili et al., 2010), and life-cycle 
phases. All these factors suggest additional applications of corporate governance to the 
study of family businesses. 
 In conclusion, this essay provides agency theory and corporate governance 
perspectives to family involvement in corporations. The differences between family and 
nonfamily firms as well as the model examined in this essay can help scholars and 
practitioners better understand the family dynamics that play an important role in 
corporations owned and/or managed by families. If publicly traded family firms can 
amplify the positive effects of family involvement through the proper use of corporate 
governance mechanisms and mitigate agency problems, they can achieve long-term 
survival and prosperity. Publicly traded family firms with effective use of corporate 
governance provisions will be sought after by the investors and benefit from positive 
corporate image.
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Table 2.1 
 
Governance Provision Types 
 
I - PROVISIONS 
PROTECTING 
CONTROLLING 
OWNERS 
II - PROVISIONS 
PROTECTING 
MANAGEMENT 
AND DIRECTORS 
III - PROVISIONS 
PROTECTING 
NONCONTROLLING 
OWNERS 
IV- PROVISIONS 
PROTECTING 
OTHERS 
IA - Provisions 
enhancing  
voting rights  
IIA - Provisions 
protecting managers’ 
and/or 
directors’ 
position 
a) Cash-out laws a) Pension parachutes 
a) Unequal Voting 
Rights 
a)  Classified Board b) Secret ballot b) Silver parachutes 
b) Cumulative 
Voting 
b) Special Meeting   
c) Supermajority c) Written Consent   
 d)  Directors‟ Duties   
IB - Provisions 
sustaining 
controlling status 
IIB - Provisions 
protecting  
managers and/or 
directors 
monetarily 
  
a) Blank Check a) Compensation Plans   
b) Business 
Combination Laws 
b) Golden Parachute   
c) Poison Pill c) Severance   
d) Bylaw      
e) Charter    
f) Fair Price    
g) Anti-greenmail IIC - Provisions 
protecting  
managers and/or 
directors 
legally 
  
 a) Contracts   
 b) Indemnification   
 c) Limitations on 
Director Liability 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptives and Correlations – Essay 1 
Variables* Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1.VOTING .30 .50 1                     
2.STATUS 2.06 1.05 .06 1                    
3.NONCON .21 .41 -.06 .01 1                   
4.POSITIO 1.65 1.15 .07 .37 .05 1                  
5.MONETA 1.58 .66 .03 .22 .07 .14 1                 
6.LEGAL .96 .97 .10 .06 .02 -.17 .03 1                
7.OTHERS .04 .22 .03 .19 .11 .06 .09 .03 1               
8.GEN1 .05 .23 .08 -.03 -.05 -.02 -.11 -.04 .01 1              
9.GEN2 .14 .35 -.00 -.11 -.05 -.08 -.19 .09 -.04 -.10 1             
10.RETAIL .10 .30 -.04 -.09 -.12 .03 -.04 -.08 -.03 .06 .05 1            
11.SERVIC .28 .45 -.01 -.02 -.03 .10 -.05 -.07 -.04 .01 -.03 -.21 1           
12.MANUF .39 .49 -.00 .05 .05 -.07 -.07 .06 .03 -.08 .01 -.27 -.49 1          
13.OTHER .23 .42 .02 .03 .06 -.04 .16 .06 .03 .04 -.03 -.18 -.34 -.43 1         
14.IO 32.29 11.21 -.03 .08 -.07 .05 .18 -.04 .03 -.05 -.07 .11 -.07 .03 -.04 1        
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
 
 
15.FA 59.20 44.63 .10 .10 .08 .04 .06 .13 .02 -.15 .10 -.09 .03 .05 -.03 -.27 1       
16.FSL 4.23 .56 -.07 .00 .30 .04 -.07 .10 .05 -.05 -.01 .17 .03 .05 -.20 -.15 .22 1      
17.OIO 3.97 6.80 -.01 -.16 -.19 -.14 -.09 -.10 -.06 -.07 -.14 .13 .02 -.02 -.09 -.02 -.16 -.18 1     
18.FR 43.85 46.59 -.04 -.04 -.11 -.02 -.03 -.17 -.03 .03 -.11 .02 -.02 .06 -.05 .15 -.27 -.24 .19 1    
19.FO 1.69 6.21 .00 -.10 -.08 -.09 -.33 .07 -.03 .34 .46 .06 .07 -.05 -.07 -.22 -.02 -.00 -.11 .04 1   
20.FOS 41.43 213.3
4 
-.00 -.10 -.05 -.09 -.29 .05 -.03 .29 .30 .03 .09 -.05 -.06 -.20 -.03 .00 -.08 -.02 .94 1  
21.FM .02 .00 -.00 -.17 -.04 -.12 -.23 .08 -.07 .36 .70 .13 -.04 -.05 .02 -.12 .01 .00 -.14 -.06 .61 .45 1 
 
*Variables: 
VOTING: The frequency of the provisions protecting controlling owners’ voting rights 
STATUS: The frequency of the provisions protecting controlling owners’ controlling status 
NONCON: The frequency of the provisions protecting noncontrolling owners 
POSITIO: The frequency of the provisions protecting managers and directors’ positions 
MONETA: The frequency of the provisions protecting managers and directors monetarily 
LEGAL: The frequency of the provisions protecting managers and directors legally 
OTHERS: The frequency of the provisions protecting others 
GEN1: First generation’s majority in management and board 
GEN2: Second or later generation’s majority in management and board 
RETAIL: Retail industry 
SERVIC: Service industry 
MANUF: Manufacturing industry 
OTHER: Other industry 
IO: Institutional ownership 
FA: Firm age 
FSL: Log of firm size 
OIO: Other insiders’ ownership 
FR: Firm risk 
FO: Family ownership 
FOS: Family ownership squared 
FM: Family management 
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Table 2.3 
 
Results of Analyses for Testing Hypotheses 1a and 5a 
 
Dependent Variable: VOTING (Frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting owners through voting rights in 2002, 2004, 2006)  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls (01, 03, 05)    
GEN1 (Generational majority in management and board) 1.15* -23.22+ 218.89 
GEN2 (Generational majority in management and board) .58* -23.68+ 174.17 
RETAIL  -.60 -18.26 -242.43 
SERVICE -.49* -1.48 -1.48 
MANUFACTURING -.64* -4.5** -4.5** 
IO (Institutional Ownership) .00 -.01* -.01* 
FA (Firms Age) .01* -.01 -.01 
FSL (Log of Firm Size) .01 3.91*** 3.91*** 
OIO (Other Insiders‟ Ownership) -.93 -.17*** -.17*** 
FR (Firm Risk) -.00** .00+ .00+ 
Independent Variables (01, 03, 05)    
FO (Family Ownership)  2.59* -30.50 
FOS (Family Ownership Squared)  -.05 1.02 
Moderator (01, 03, 05)    
FM (Family Management)   -153.44 
Interactions (01, 03, 05)    
FOFM (Family Ownership * Family Management)   24.8 
FOSFM (Family Ownership Squared * Family Management)   -.68 
    
Log likelihood function -259.44 -228.79 -44.59 
+p< .10; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001    
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Table 2.4 
 
Results of Analyses for Testing Hypotheses 1b and 5b 
 
Dependent Variable: STATUS (Frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting owners through sustaining control status in 2002, 2004, 2006) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls (01, 03, 05)    
GEN1 (Generational majority in management and board) .05 .75 -89.18*** 
GEN2 (Generational majority in management and board) -.38 1.02* -70.99*** 
RETAIL  .27 -7.52*** 86.80*** 
SERVICE -.1 -2.05*** -2.62*** 
MANUFACTURING -.03 -2.65*** -3.01*** 
IO (Institutional Ownership) -.00 -.02*** -.01 
FA (Firms Age) .01*** -.02*** -.02*** 
FSL (Log of Firm Size) -.53*** .12 .47* 
OIO (Other Insiders‟ Ownership) -.02 -.03+ -.01 
FR (Firm Risk) -.00 -.01* -.01* 
Independent Variables (01, 03, 05)    
FO (Family Ownership)  .02 12.82*** 
FOS (Family Ownership Squared)  -.00 -.43*** 
Moderator (01, 03, 05)    
FM (Family Management)   63.54*** 
Interactions (01, 03, 05)    
FOFM (Family Ownership * Family Management)   -10.34*** 
FOSFM (Family Ownership Squared * Family Management)   .28*** 
    
Log likelihood function -222.17 -68.44 -61.34 
+p< .10; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001    
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Table 2.5 
 
Results of Analyses for Testing Hypotheses 2 and 5c 
 
Dependent Variable : NONCONTR (Frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting noncontrolling owners in 2002, 2004, 2006) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls (01, 03, 05)    
GEN1 (Generational majority in management and board) -.98 -.99 -1.47 
GEN2 (Generational majority in management and board) -1.15 -1.17 -1.33 
RETAIL  1.77 1.75 1.67 
SERVICE 1.26 1.26 1.26 
MANUFACTURING .43 .43 .43 
IO (Institutional Ownership) .00 .00 .00 
FA (Firms Age) .00 .00 .00 
FSL (Log of Firm Size) .98*** .98*** .98*** 
OIO (Other Insiders‟ Ownership) -.05*** -.05*** -.05*** 
FR (Firm Risk) .00** .00** .00** 
Independent Variables (01, 03, 05)    
FO (Family Ownership)  .00 -.01 
FOS (Family Ownership Squared)    
Moderator (01, 03, 05)    
FM (Family Management)   .33 
Interactions (01, 03, 05)    
FOFM (Family Ownership * Family Management)   -.00 
FOSFM (Family Ownership Squared * Family Management)    
    
Log likelihood function 66.07 66.07 66.07 
+p< .10; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001    
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Table 2.6 
 
Results of Analyses for Testing Hypotheses 3a and 5d 
 
Dependent Variable: POSITION (Frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting managers’ positions in 2002, 2004, 2006) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls (01, 03, 05)    
GEN1 (Generational majority in management and board) 1.63 1.73 4.63 
GEN2 (Generational majority in management and board) 1.34*** 1.43*** 3.42*** 
RETAIL  -8.4 -8.12 -9.68 
SERVICE -2.12 -2.01 -2.44 
MANUFACTURING -1.59*** -1.51*** -1.83** 
IO (Institutional Ownership) .02** .02** .03*** 
FA (Firms Age) -.02*** -.02*** -.02*** 
FSL (Log of Firm Size) 1.08*** 1.06*** 1.23*** 
OIO (Other Insiders‟ Ownership) -.07*** -.07*** -.06*** 
FR (Firm Risk) .01* .01* .00 
Independent Variables (01, 03, 05)    
FO (Family Ownership)  -.01 -.05 
FOS (Family Ownership Squared)    
Moderator (01, 03, 05)    
FM (Family Management)   -.95*** 
Interactions (01, 03, 05)    
FOFM (Family Ownership * Family Management)   .03 
FOSFM (Family Ownership Squared * Family Management)    
    
Log likelihood function -71.17 -71.4 -63.11 
+p< .10; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001    
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Table 2.7 
 
Results of Analyses for Testing Hypotheses 3b and 5e 
 
Dependent Variable: MONETARY (Frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting managers monetarily in 2002, 2004, 2006) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls (01, 03, 05)    
GEN1 (Generational majority in management and board) -.13 -.04 -.20 
GEN2 (Generational majority in management and board) -.28* -.19 -.32 
RETAIL  -1.27** -.93 -.78 
SERVICE 1.51 1.63 1.68 
MANUFACTURING -.48** -.4* -.36+ 
IO (Institutional Ownership) .02*** .02*** .02*** 
FA (Firms Age) -.00 -.00 -.00 
FSL (Log of Firm Size) -.23** -.26** -.29** 
OIO (Other Insiders‟ Ownership) .00 .00 .00 
FR (Firm Risk) -.00+ -.00 -.00 
Independent Variables (01, 03, 05)    
FO (Family Ownership)  -.01 .00 
FOS (Family Ownership Squared)    
Moderator (01, 03, 05)    
FM (Family Management)   .04 
Interactions (01, 03, 05)    
FOFM (Family Ownership * Family Management)   -.00 
FOSFM (Family Ownership Squared * Family Management)    
    
Log likelihood function 40.55 39.68 39.76 
+p< .10; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001    
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Table 2.8 
 
Results of Analyses for Testing Hypotheses 3c and 5f 
 
Dependent Variable: LEGAL (Frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting managers legally in 2002, 2004, 2006) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls (01, 03, 05)    
GEN1 (Generational majority in management and board) 1.84 -.17 -.48 
GEN2 (Generational majority in management and board) 1.96 -.04 -.32 
RETAIL  -.19 -2.23 -.32 
SERVICE 3.62*** 3.61*** 3.61*** 
MANUFACTURING .72* .72* .72* 
IO (Institutional Ownership) -.02** -.02** -.02** 
FA (Firms Age) .01** .01** .01** 
FSL (Log of Firm Size) -.03 -.03 -.03 
OIO (Other Insiders‟ Ownership) -.04** -.04** -.04** 
FR (Firm Risk) .01*** .01*** .01*** 
Independent Variables (01, 03, 05)    
FO (Family Ownership)  .18 .24 
FOS (Family Ownership Squared)    
Moderator (01, 03, 05)    
FM (Family Management)   .32 
Interactions (01, 03, 05)    
FOFM (Family Ownership * Family Management)   -.06 
FOSFM (Family Ownership Squared * Family Management)    
    
Log likelihood function -17.83 -18.5 -18.5 
+p< .10; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001    
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Table 2.9 
 
Results of Analyses for Testing Hypotheses 4 and 5g 
 
Dependent Variable: OTHERS (Frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting others in 2002, 2004, 2006) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls (01, 03, 05)    
GEN1 (Generational majority in management and board) 1.13 1.04 2.13 
GEN2 (Generational majority in management and board) .31 .29 1.70+ 
RETAIL  -1.6 -1.6 -2.43+ 
SERVICE -.27 -.26 -.38 
MANUFACTURING .38 .46 .46 
IO (Institutional Ownership) .05* .04* .03 
FA (Firms Age) .01 .01+ .01+ 
FSL (Log of Firm Size) -.00** -.00** -.00** 
OIO (Other Insiders‟ Ownership) -.00 -.00 -.00* 
FR (Firm Risk) -.00+ -.00+ -.00* 
Independent Variables (01, 03, 05)    
FO (Family Ownership)  .01 .05 
FOS (Family Ownership Squared)    
Moderator (01, 03, 05)    
FM (Family Management)   -1.55+ 
Interactions (01, 03, 05)    
FOFM (Family Ownership * Family Management)   .01 
FOSFM (Family Ownership Squared * Family 
Management) 
   
    
Log likelihood function -90.99 -89.61 -85.27 
+p< .10; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001    
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Table 2.10 
 
Summary of Results – Essay 1 
 
Hypotheses Conditions that will demonstrate support for the hypotheses  Findings 
Main Effects   
H1a Beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) is positive and 
significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family Ownership 
Squared (FO
2
) is negative and significant (p<0.05). 
 
Not 
supported 
(Table 2.3) 
H1b Beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) is positive and 
significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family Ownership 
Squared (FO
2
) is negative and significant (p<0.05). 
 
Not 
supported 
(Table 2.4) 
H2 Beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) is negative and 
significant (p<0.05). 
 
Not 
supported 
(Table 2.5) 
H3a Beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) is positive and 
significant (p<0.05). 
 
Not 
supported 
(Table 2.6) 
H3b Beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) is negative and 
significant (p<0.05). 
 
Not 
supported 
(Table 2.7) 
H3c Beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) is negative and 
significant (p<0.05). 
 
Not 
supported 
(Table 2.8) 
H4 Beta coefficient of Family Ownership (FO) is positive and 
significant (p<0.05). 
 
Not 
supported 
(Table 2.9) 
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Table 2.10 (continued) 
 
 
Hypotheses Conditions that will demonstrate support for the 
hypotheses  
Findings 
Moderators   
H5a Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) is positive and significant 
(p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership
2
*Family Management (FO
2
*FM) is 
negative and significant. 
 
Not supported 
(Table 2.3) 
H5b Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) is positive and significant 
(p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership
2
*Family Management (FO
2
*FM) is 
negative and significant. 
Not supported  
(Table 2.4) 
(U-shaped relationship 
is significant rather 
than the hypothesized 
inverted U-shaped 
relationship) 
H5c Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) is negative and significant 
(p<0.05). 
Not supported 
(Table 2.5) 
H5d Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) is positive and significant 
(p<0.05). 
Not supported 
(Table 2.6) 
H5e Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) is negative and significant 
(p<0.05). 
Not supported 
(Table 2.7) 
 
H5f Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) is negative and significant 
(p<0.05). 
Not supported 
(Table 2.8) 
H5g Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Family 
Management (FO*FM) is positive and significant 
(p<0.05). 
Not supported 
(Table 2.9) 
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Figure 2.1   The Link between Family Involvement and Provisions 
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CHAPTER III 
ESSAY 2. 
THE LINK BETWEEN FAMILY INVOLVEMENT,  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS,  
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE  
 
Introduction 
Family involvement in corporate governance is common in the U.S. and around 
the world (Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2009), typically through families‟ participation in 
ownership and management (Chrisman et al., 2004). Indeed, family business members 
are often officers, directors, or blockholders, either individually or as a group (Villalonga 
& Amit, 2009). Since family involvement can lead to the pursuit of particularistic goals 
and strategies (Carney, 2005), family firm behavior and performance are expected to be 
distinct from not only those in nonfamily firms but also vary across family firms as well. 
Thus, examining how the use of governance provisions affects the relationship between 
family involvement and firm performance can improve our understanding of corporate 
governance in publicly traded family firms.  
Publicly traded family firms tend to exhibit less severe principal-agent agency 
problems because of the direct involvement of family owners in management as well as 
the ability to monitor the managers through their direct involvement in firm governance 
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(Maury, 2006). Nevertheless, family firms are believed to exhibit more severe principal-
principal agency problems arising between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders 
due to families‟ significant stock ownership and control over the board of directors which 
allow them to pursue their own particular interests (Ali et al., 2007; Maury, 2006). 
Accordingly, some families may exhibit more concern with the pursuit of noneconomic 
goals (Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2003; Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, 
Barnett, forthcoming; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) than increasing shareholder wealth. The 
use of control enhancing governance provisions, such as unequal voting rights in favor of 
the controlling family, can strengthen the family‟s ability to pursue noneconomic and 
economic goals that benefit family members, rather than increasing shareholder wealth. 
Hence, unchecked family involvement in the business elevates the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior, which can consequently harm firm performance in family 
controlled firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). 
Gompers et al. (2003) show that control enhancing governance provisions can 
lead to higher agency costs if managers use them to resist different types of shareholder 
activism (geared toward directing executives and directors to manage the firm in line 
with shareholders‟ long-term interests) (Daily et al., 2003). They also suggest that such 
mechanisms may be associated with performance differences among firms.  The authors, 
however, do not differentiate between family and nonfamily firms. There has been a 
stream of research investigating whether family firms outperform nonfamily firms. 
Generally, the conclusion has been they do, although performance differences also seem 
to be a function of the type of family involvement (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller et 
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al., 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Pertinent to this essay, Villalonga and Amit (2009a) 
found that the impact of control enhancing mechanisms on firm performance depends on 
the mechanism used. However, only a few of the control enhancing mechanisms such as 
voting agreements, dual-class stock, cross-holdings, pyramids,
2
 and their impact on firm 
performance have been investigated within the framework of publicly traded family firms 
(e.g. Villalonga & Amit, 2006a, 2006b). These control enhancing mechanisms generally 
increase voting rights of the families relative to their share ownership (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006b). However, studies investigating control enhancing governance index 
provisions, particularly as used by the firms in the US, are needed to better understand 
corporate governance and to distinguish between publicly traded family and nonfamily 
firms. 
There has been a call for studies examining family firm performance and its 
antecedents, owing to the critical role of firm value in buy out decisions, tax payments, 
executive compensation, capital raising strategies, and selling the company (Villalonga, 
2009). Family ownership and management can enhance firm value since the controlling 
family can provide superior oversight through lengthy tenure, invest in long-term 
projects, or exhibit reputation concerns that diminish the possibility of questionable or 
irresponsible business practices (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Dyer & Whetten, 2006). 
However, the use of control enhancing mechanisms, which may be driven by intentions 
                                                 
2 According to Morck and Steier (2005), a pyramid is a structure prevalent around the world except 
in the U.S. and U.K. in which a shareholder, usually a family, controls a single company and this 
company then holds control blocks in other companies and each of these companies holds control 
blocks in even more companies, which is rare in the US.  
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to maintain family control to preserve socioemotional wealth (Chrisman et al., 2010; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), may also negatively influence the effects of family ownership 
and management on firm performance.  To date, the interaction effects of family 
involvement and control enhancing governance provisions on firm performance have not 
been fully investigated.  Instead, the focus has been mostly on the direct effects of 
governance mechanisms on firm performance (Daily et al., 2003). Control enhancing 
mechanisms within the context of publicly traded family firms require more research 
attention, since some of them may be associated with acute principal-principal agency 
costs (Chrisman et al., 2010; Morck et al., 1988). Additionally, increasing ownership to a 
point at which managers become entrenched can elevate agency costs (Crutchley, 1999). 
Nevertheless, we do not know enough about the factors that enhance or mitigate 
controlling owners‟ ability and willingness to pursue policies that lead to the 
expropriation of minority shareholder wealth in family firms as opposed to those that 
increase shareholder wealth (Chrisman et al., 2010).  
Thus, this essay applies agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and the extant family governance literature to develop and test a model 
demonstrating how the frequencies of the use of these provisions moderate the 
relationships between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and management) and 
firm performance. Specifically, this model explores the effects of the use of governance 
provisions on the relationship between family involvement and firm performance. Hence, 
governance provisions are expected to influence firm performance through interacting 
with family ownership and family management with reinforcing effects. 
 
 
97 
 This essay contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, it illustrates the 
interplay between family involvement and corporate governance provisions in 
influencing firm performance. By doing so, it contributes to a better understanding of the 
differences between publicly traded family and nonfamily firms that are likely to have an 
impact on firm performance through the use of control enhancing governance provisions. 
Second, findings of this essay shed light onto the principal-principal agency costs since 
some of the provisions may be associated with agency problems in publicly traded family 
firms.   
 In the remainder of this essay, a theoretical overview is provided and hypotheses 
are developed. Then, the hypotheses are tested. Finally, results, future research 
opportunities, and implications for practice are discussed. 
Theoretical Overview 
Agency Theory 
Agency relationships occur when a principal hires an agent to perform services 
and  delegates authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, according to 
Jensen (1994), agency problems are likely to arise among individuals engaging in 
cooperative endeavors in any given setting (e.g. commerce, family, or other social 
organizations), since people are often driven by their self-interests and subsequently 
experience self-control problems. Agency theory is particularly concerned with 
contractual arrangements containing the agreed upon terms of agency (Ross, 1973). Since 
contracts are incomplete owing to bounded rationality and information asymmetries, 
separation of ownership and control can lead to problems when the interests of the 
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principal and the agent diverge, especially when it is difficult for the principal to monitor 
the behavior of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). This can lead to principal-agent type of 
agency problem, whereas principal-principal type of agency problem arises from the 
conflict between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders (Ali et al., 2007).  
Agency Problems in Family Firms 
The original view was that fewer agency problems would occur in firm 
governance with unified ownership and management (Chrisman et al., 2004; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983), which results in alignment of interests, 
monitoring advantages, and increased concern for shareholder wealth (Chrisman et al., 
2004; Schulze et al., 2001). On the one hand, in family firms where relationships are 
characterized by reciprocal altruism (i.e. a mutual moral value encouraging individuals to 
act in a manner that would benefit other individuals without expecting anything in 
return), agency costs can be lowered (Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2002).  When family 
business members are reciprocally altruistic to each other (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 
2005), their interests are likely to be aligned with the interests of the family and the 
family firm (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004) and family business members may hold business 
objectives above their self-interests (Zahra, 2003).  Since reciprocal altruism can 
facilitate bonding through trust, communication, respect and love (Lubatkin, Schulze, 
Ling & Dino, 2005), family firms can foster a collectivistic environment rather than a 
self-serving one (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004).  
On the other hand, family relationships exhibiting asymmetric altruism can lead to 
other agency problems such as owner-managers‟ taking actions that can harm themselves 
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and others, adverse-selection (i.e. the principal hires an agent who is less able, 
committed, industrious, ethical, or whose interests are less compatible with those of the 
principal than expected), and moral hazard (i.e. “lack of effort on the part of the agent”) 
(Chrisman et al., 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989: 61; Jensen, 1994; Schulze et al., 2001). Within 
the context of agency theory, people can be motivated by nonmonetary factors such as 
altruism, and may harm themselves and others in the case of asymmetric altruism 
(Jensen, 1994). For instance, when parents with nepotistic tendencies exclusively hire, 
evaluate, and promote offspring (or other kin) based on irrelevant criteria (e.g., kinship 
ties) in contrast to competence (Perrow, 1972), this leads to adverse selection, and results 
in inertia in strategic decision making. These problems can be detrimental to long term 
family firm success and growth (Chua et al., 2003; Dyer, 2006).  
Principal-principal versus Principal-agent Agency Problems 
In corporations owned and/or managed by families, agency problems tend to be 
different from those in nonfamily firms exhibiting more principal-agent agency problems, 
as well as from privately held family firms, because of the existence of various groups of 
owners and/or managers with different, and often conflicting interests (Gomez-Mejia et 
al. 2001). When family owners often hold management positions, the interests of owners 
and managers tend to be relatively more aligned than in nonfamily publicly traded firms. 
Furthermore, direct involvement of family owners in management increases effective 
monitoring over the managers (Maury, 2006). Consequently, publicly traded family firms 
often exhibit less severe principal-agent agency problems that are rooted in the separation 
of ownership and management.  
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However, family owners and managers in family controlled corporations are 
likely to pursue interests that are not identical to those of noncontrolling shareholders, 
who have less power because of their relatively lower levels of ownership and no active 
participation in management. Hence, in publicly traded family firms, the concern is that 
when the management and board positions are dominated by family members, they may 
act only for the controlling family (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Some families may exhibit 
more concern with the private benefits of control; i.e. benefits appropriated by large 
shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and the 
preservation of socioemotional wealth to achieve family-centered noneconomic goals 
(Chrisman et al., 2003, forthcoming; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) than increasing 
shareholder value. For example, a controlling family may favor expansion to create jobs 
for its members and sustaining its control, even though the investment may not be 
profitable for the firm and may lower shareholder value. Therefore, some family firms 
exhibit more severe principal-principal agency problems arising between controlling and 
noncontrolling shareholders. 
Principal-principal agency problems are usually in the form of expropriation of 
noncontrolling shareholder wealth and/or managerial entrenchment. Expropriation occurs 
when governance is weak, particularly when large or majority owners control the firm 
and limit noncontrolling owners‟ right to appropriate returns on their investments 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). Concentrated control enhances monitoring 
over agents (who may also be owners), while increasing the incentive and power of 
owners to expropriate minority shareholder wealth (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; 
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Andres, 2008; La Porta et al. 1999). Expropriation can be in the forms of tunneling 
through non-arm‟s-length, related-party, and self-dealing transactions (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Young et al., 2008). Management can also hold excessive cash within the 
firm, allowing the family to use it for their private benefit instead of investing or 
returning it to investors as dividends (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Managers can also be 
resistant to value-increasing takeovers in order to protect the private benefits of family 
control, which can also harm firm performance and lower shareholder wealth (Mahoney 
et al., 1996, 1997; Cremers & Nair, 2005). Hence, family managers‟ anti-takeover 
actions, independent of the price offered, indicates managerial pursuit of self- and family-
interest at the expense of shareholder wealth (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Accordingly, 
Gompers et al. (2003) illustrate that anti-takeover Governance Index provisions in the US 
are associated with lower firm value. Building on Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the 
problem of expropriation can be severe particularly when the controlling owners are 
wealthy enough and they simply prefer to focus on the attainment of noneconomic goals.  
Aside from the expropriation problem, higher levels of ownership and 
management can also facilitate managerial entrenchment of family members. 
Entrenchment occurs when a manager remains active in the company and resists transfer 
of control despite the lack of qualifications (Anderson et al., 2002; Anderson & Reeb, 
2003a). Entrenchment can limit strategic change and increase inertia, which may be 
detrimental to firm performance. Entrenchment can persist when managers obscure or 
hide negative attributes, hire consultants to legitimize their decisions, influence the board 
to interfere with monitoring, manipulate information, make themselves indispensable by 
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creating complexities or initiating projects that require their skills and abilities, and 
attribute low firm performance to external factors (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Walsh & 
Seward, 1990). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) argue that family firms may be more prone to 
managerial entrenchment since family ties and emotions may influence the perceived 
competence of the family executive(s), lowering the effectiveness of monitoring and 
resulting in biased evaluation of executive performance.  
Hence, both expropriation and entrenchment of the controlling family are 
principal-principal agency problems which can harm noncontrolling shareholder value. In 
the next section, family involvement in corporate governance and performance 
differences not only between family and nonfamily firms but also among family firms 
themselves are discussed.  
Family Governance in Corporations 
Corporate governance involves the structure of authority determining allocation 
of funds and responsibilities (Daily et al., 2003; Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Gour & Shin, 
2005; Hart, 1995). Corporate governance is particularly important when agency problems 
prevail and they cannot be dealt with through incomplete contracts (Hart, 1995). The 
rights to determine the management of corporate resources are usually determined by 
ownership and involvement in management. Accordingly, the central concern of 
corporate governance is to construct a system of control, regulation, and incentives to 
effectively align the interests of managers and owners (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Turnbull, 1997). 
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Family firms differ from nonfamily firms and each other by the level and type of 
influence they exert on firm behavior through ownership and management (Chrisman, 
Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chua et al., 1999).  Family involvement is significant “when a 
family owns all or a controlling portion of the business and plays an active role in setting 
strategy and in operating the business on a day-to-day basis” (Kelly et al., 2000: 27). 
Ownership and management are critical in determining the family‟s ability to influence 
an ongoing business (Sundaramurthy & Kreiner, 2008). Concentrated ownership by 
families in publicly traded firms tends to be universally common, despite legal 
restrictions on high levels of ownership (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2009). An effective corporate governance can increase both 
controlling and noncontrolling shareholders‟ wealth and align their interests. In the 
following section, I discuss firm performance in publicly traded family versus nonfamily 
firms. 
Firm Performance in Family versus Nonfamily Firms 
Family ties, loyalty, and stability concerns tend to lengthen the horizons of family 
managers beyond their tenure and lifetime and provide incentives to make efficient 
investments in the firm, which can consequently maximize firm value (James, 1999). 
Since the family owner-managers‟ business actions are closely linked to the welfare of 
the current and future generations, they are less likely to pursue personal interests over 
family considerations (James, 1999).  
In addition to the extended horizons rooted in the primary desire for the family‟s 
continuity, unity, and legacy (Upton et al., 2001; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller & Le 
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Breton-Miller, 2008), there is a close link between family‟s wealth and the family firm‟s 
performance, particularly when family‟s ownership of the firm is relatively high 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). On the one hand, the particularistic perceptions of co-
ownership, parsimony owing to family‟s wealth at stake as well as the future generations 
in mind, can lead to family business members‟ current sacrifice for the long-run benefits 
for family by avoiding on-the-job consumption through lower dividends and profit 
sharing (James, 1999; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005a, 2005b). This can facilitate 
family owner-managers‟ efficient investment decisions (Carney, 2005). On the other 
hand, managers in nonfamily firms are more likely to be driven by current consumption 
(e.g. high compensation and/or profit sharing), which can result in underinvestment 
owing to substituting consumption for firm investment (James, 1999) or overexpansion to 
increase management complexity to justify higher CEO compensation (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1985).  
Accordingly, a prominent stream of research shows that family firms may 
outperform nonfamily firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Habbershon & 
Williams, 1999; Hoy & Verser, 1994; Lee, 2004, 2006; Martinez et al., 2007; 
McConaughy et al., 1998; McConaughy & Phillips, 1999). Nevertheless, while 
investigating the performance differences between not only family and nonfamily firms 
but also among family firms, studies also draw attention to different family involvement 
configurations (e.g. founding family control vs. descendant family control, family vs. 
nonfamily CEO, the degree of board independence, and family firm types), which may 
lead to performance differences not only between family and nonfamily firms, but also 
 
 
105 
among family firms as well (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2003b; Barth et al., 2005; Dyer, 
2006; Filatotchev et al., 2005; McConaughy et al., 1998; McConaughy & Phillips, 1999; 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Perez-Gonzales, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Studies show that these different configurations of family ownership and control can be 
associated with firm value positively or negatively or exhibit no relationship (O‟Boyle et 
al., 2008; Peng & Jiang, 2010).  
Family Involvement Configurations 
Founder-controlled versus Descendant-controlled Family Firms 
Findings are mixed concerning the performance differences between founder-
controlled and descendant-controlled family firms. Research shows that founder-
controlled firms can outperform not only nonfamily firms, but also descendant-controlled 
family firms (Andres, 2008; Barontini & Caprio, 2005; Lee, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Some scholars argue the opposite by showing 
that descendant-controlled firms are more efficient and profitable than founder-controlled 
firms (McConaughy et al., 1998; McConaughy & Phillips, 1999). According to Sraer and 
Thesmar (2007), family firms largely outperform nonfamily firms regardless of being 
controlled by the founding or descendant families in control, whereas Miller et al. (2007) 
show that only businesses with a lone founder, rather than a founding family, outperform 
others. Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) point out that family-controlled businesses 
perform well when they mitigate agency costs and foster stewardship behaviors among 
leaders.  
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Family versus Nonfamily CEO 
Researchers also investigate the impact of family and nonfamily CEOs on firm 
performance and provide mixed results (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003, Villalonga & Amit, 
2006; Minichilli et al., 2010). For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that when a 
family member serves as CEO, firm performance is better than with an outside CEO. 
Likewise, Villalonga and Amit (2006) show that family ownership creates value only 
when the founder serves as the CEO of the firm, or as its chairman with a hired CEO. 
However, the authors also show that when a descendant serves as CEO, firm value 
diminishes. A recent study by Minichilli et al. (2010) shows that the presence of a family 
CEO is beneficial for firm performance. However, the coexistence of family and 
nonfamily managers in top management teams can also create conflict and consequently 
harm firm performance (Minichilli et al., 2010).  
Burkart et al. (2003), however, argue that a professional nonfamily manager is a 
better manager than a family manager, which will affect firm performance positively. The 
authors also argue that the lack of separation of ownership and management and the 
prevalence of family firms can be indicators of financial underdevelopment in a country. 
In line with Burkart et al.‟s (2003) argument, Barth et al. (2005) show that family owned 
firms with CEOs who are family members are significantly less productive than 
nonfamily firms. The authors also show that when family owned firms are professionally 
managed by nonfamily managers, they are equally productive as nonfamily firms. 
Accordingly, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) show that stock prices decline when family 
successors are appointed, whereas there is no significant decrease in stock prices when 
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either nonfamily insiders or outsiders are appointed to CEO position in family firms in 
Canada. Bennedsen et al. (2007) present similar findings concerning the negative impact 
of family successions on firm performance in their study conducted in Denmark. Perez-
Gonzales (2006) also shows that firms with family CEOs underperform.  
Board Independence 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) argue that family CEOs can lead family firms 
to success when they are without complete voting power and accountable to independent 
directors. Consistent with Miller and Le Breton-Miller‟s (2006) argument, studies also 
explore the impact of board independence on performance in family firms. Research 
shows that board independence from the founding family has a positive effect on firm 
performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b, 2004; Filatotchev et al., 2005).  
Different Types of Family Firms 
Additionally, Dyer (2006) draws attention to the different types of family firms. 
Self-interested family firms exhibit family members looking after their own and the 
family‟s self-interest rather than the well-being of the firm, resulting in lower 
performance than nonfamily firms. Dyer (2006), however, argues that clan and 
professional firms can outperform nonfamily firms. In clan family firms, shared goals, 
norms, and values can foster healthy relationships, lower agency costs, and increase the 
firm‟s ability to leverage human, social, and financial capital. In professional family 
firms, family maintains significant ownership, however relies on professional managers 
to run the business. This can facilitate the efficient use of family assets like in the clan 
family firm. 
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Hence, the link between family involvement and firm performance depends upon 
various contingencies discussed in this section. A summary of the differences between 
the performance of family and nonfamily firms and among family firms themselves can 
be seen in Appendix D. 
The control enhancing governance provisions, which constitute an important part 
of corporate governance and may play a role in the relationship between family 
involvement and firm performance through generating principal-principal agency 
problems in publicly traded family firms, are discussed in the following section of this 
essay. 
Governance Provisions 
Gompers et al. (2003) identify 24 governance provisions used in corporations. 
The authors divide governance provisions into five groups based upon the purpose of 
their usage: tactics for delaying takeovers (delay), director/officer protection (protection), 
voting rights (voting), state laws (state), and other takeover defenses (other). However, 
the authors do not distinguish between family and nonfamily firms nor consider the 
differences between controlling family and noncontrolling owner groups and their 
distinct characteristics, interests, and rights within the context of family firms. For 
example, controlling owners can decide “what businesses to enter and exit, what 
companies to acquire, what assets to sell, how much to invest, what officers and directors 
to select, how much to pay them, and how much money (if any) to distribute to 
themselves and minority shareholders”, whereas noncontrolling owners‟ rights are “to 
participate in dividend or other cash-flow distributions (that controlling owners decide 
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on), and to benefit from capital gains (if there are any, and if the shares can be freely sold 
so that minority shareholders indeed realize those gains)” (Villalonga, 2008: 1,2). 
Controlling owners may pursue family-centered goals and strategies to achieve those 
goals, which may consequently be beneficial to the controlling family, but not to the 
noncontrolling owners and the firm in general, which can consequently harm firm 
performance. Hence, in this essay, governance provisions are classified based on the 
purpose of usage and the existence of different interest groups (i.e. controlling owners, 
noncontrolling owners, management and board, and others who are a broad group of 
employees) within the context of family firms, as can be seen in Appendix B. 
Based on the classification of governance provisions, hypotheses are developed in 
the following section. 
Hypotheses Development 
Zahra (2003) argues that family involvement significantly affects the strategic 
choices of the family firm. Consistent with Zahra‟s (2003) argument, Carney (2005) 
suggests that ownership allows family members to have control rights over the firm‟s 
assets and use these rights to influence and dominate decision-making making processes 
in family firms.  As family business researchers (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; James, 1999; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Zahra, 2003, 2005) point out, the combination of ownership and 
control can be advantageous and lead to greater investment efficiencies, as the bond 
between the firm and the family are strengthened and family interests are aligned with the 
family firm‟s interests. The alignment of interest between the firm and the family 
encourages strategic activities that can stimulate growth and improve performance 
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(Zahra, 2005). In addition, as Zahra (2005) argues, a family‟s involvement in the 
ownership and management of a business gives the family the discretion to generate 
strategic ideas and to execute their timely implementation. Thus, firms with family 
involvement exhibit strategic decisions which are shaped by values and aspirations of the 
family business owner(s) and/or manager(s), who exhibit personalistic, particularistic, 
and parsimonious tendencies (Carney, 2005), and longer investment horizons (Ward, 
1997; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; James, 1999; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Zahra et al., 
2008). Strategic decisions shaped by these characteristics can elevate performance. 
Family Involvement and Firm Performance 
Within the framework of agency theory and corporate governance, family 
ownership and management may be beneficial owing to easier monitoring and a concern 
for protecting the family‟s wealth. Studies show that family firms may outperform 
nonfamily firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; McConaughy et al., 1998). Consistent with the 
extant research, Claessens et al. (2002) show that concentrated ownership of a large 
shareholder constitutes a strong incentive to run the firm properly. However, the authors 
also illustrate that higher levels of concentrated control of a large shareholder can lead to 
agency problems of entrenchment and value extraction. Hence, beyond an optimum level 
of family ownership and management, family-firm specific agency problems coming into 
play may harm firm performance. Accordingly, studies generally suggest a nonlinear (i.e. 
an inverted u-shaped) relationship between family involvement and firm performance 
(e.g. Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2003b; Claessens et al., 2002; 
Morck et al., 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999). 
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One underlying reason for the nonlinear inverted u-shaped relationship between 
family involvement and firm performance may be the family‟s tendency to pursue 
noneconomic goals as family ownership and management increase (Sciascia & Mazzola, 
2008; Chrisman, Chua, Pearson & Barnett, 2010). They are able to do so owing to the 
legitimacy and power obtained through ownership and management positions they hold 
in the company (Chrisman et al., 2010). When the level of family management increases 
along with the level of family ownership, the noneconomic goals are likely to be aligned 
with the interests of both owners and managers, resulting in a relatively lower cost of 
adopting the goals and lower resistance by management and/or noncontrolling owners 
(Chrisman et al., 2010).  
When control is concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder, the 
shareholder may become entrenched and better able to extract value (Claessens et al., 
2002), which may consequently harm not only firm performance but also the economy in 
a broader sense (Chrisman et al., 2010; Morck et al., 1998; Morck & Yeung, 2003). For 
example, Morck et al. (1998) show that heir-controlled Canadian firms exhibit low 
financial performance owing to the expropriation of noncontrolling owners‟ wealth and 
the entrenchment of poorly performing managers whose firms continue to survive 
through access to capital and insulation from competition via political influence. 
Accordingly, when controlling owners‟ voting rights and controlling status are enhanced 
while also having managers‟ and directors‟ positions secured through the use of 
governance provisions, controlling owners‟ and managers‟ ability to pursue the family 
agenda and engage in opportunistic actions can increase. 
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Therefore, after a certain point, family ownership and management may lead to 
the adoption of family-centered goals and strategies which may diminish shareholder 
value since the benefits of the pursuit of family-centered nonceconomic goals are usually 
not transferrable to nonfamily members. Furthermore, principal-principal agency costs 
deriving from the controlling owners‟ and managers‟ expropriation of noncontrolling 
shareholder wealth and their entrenchment are likely to increase, which can consequently 
harm firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2010).  
Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, controlling families strengthen 
their ability to pursue family-centered noneconomic goals by using control enhancing 
corporate governance provisions which protect controlling owners‟ and managers‟ rights 
and may be associated with agency costs. According to Dyer (2006), certain governance 
mechanisms may be associated with more or fewer agency problems. Indeed, certain 
provisions protecting management and family shareholder rights can make firms 
susceptible to principal-principal agency problems in publicly traded family firms since 
they strengthen the controlling family business members‟ ability, power, and legitimacy 
to entrench themselves and extract value (Burkart et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2002). 
This is relevant to Alchian and Demsetz‟ (1972) agency concern regarding “Who will 
monitor the monitor?”.  
Since governance provisions differentially affect the balance of power in the firm 
(Gompers et al., 2003), the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling 
owners, noncontrolling owners, and management are also likely to interact with family 
involvement components (i.e. family ownership and family management) to determine 
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firm performance. Specifically, higher frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
controlling owners, management and directors, and others indicating higher management, 
director, and family shareholder power and ability to pursue family-centered 
noneconomic goals exclusively benefiting family members, are likely to weaken the 
positive effects and strengthen the negative effects of family involvement components on 
firm performance. Additionally, a higher frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
noncontrolling owners and others are likely to strengthen the positive effects and weaken 
the negative effects of family involvement components on firm performance. Owing to a 
prominent stream of research showing an inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
involvement and firm performance, this essay attempts to explore a relatively less 
investigated area (i.e. the moderators which may influence this relationship) in order to 
extend this line of research. 
Moderation Effects of Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners   
The higher frequency of the use of provisions, which create a wedge between 
controlling owners‟ voting rights and their cash-flow rights (i.e. unequal voting rights, 
cumulative voting, and supermajority) as well as secure sustainability of their controlling 
status through delaying or preventing takeovers (i.e. blank check, business combination 
law, poison pill, bylaw and charter, fair price, and antigreenmail), can elevate family 
owners‟ and managers‟ power. This can exacerbate expropriation of noncontrolling 
owners‟ wealth through strengthening the controlling family‟s ability to reap the private 
benefits of control and entrench themselves in ownership and management positions 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Andres, 2008; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Shleifer & 
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Vishny, 1997), weakening the positive effects and strengthening the negative effects of 
family ownership and family management on firm performance. The moderating effects 
of the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners in terms of their 
voting rights are expected to lead to a shift of the inverted u-shaped curve representing 
the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family 
management) and firm performance. 
Moreover, additional discretionary power, attained through the provisions 
protecting controlling owners, can allow both family owners and managers to pursue 
family agendas primarily benefiting the family and to consume perks, thereby reducing 
firm performance and noncontrolling shareholder value. At relatively smaller percentages 
of ownership of shares and higher voting rights, family owners‟ incentive to consume 
perks, rather than to maximize firm value increases since they gain 100 percent of the 
amount spent on perks, but their percentage of share in firm profits are only reduced 
according to their percentage share of the firm.   
Hypothesis 6a. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners 
in terms of their voting rights will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family ownership and firm performance, such that higher frequency of 
use of such mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of family ownership on 
firm performance up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative effects 
of family ownership on firm performance after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 6b. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners 
in terms of their sustainability of controlling status will moderate the inverted u-
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shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance, such that 
higher frequency of use of such mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of 
family ownership on firm performance up to an optimum level, and then 
strengthen the negative effects of family ownership on firm performance after the 
optimum level. 
Hypothesis 7a. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners 
in terms of their voting rights will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family management and firm performance, such that higher frequency of 
use of such mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of family management 
on firm performance up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative 
effects of family management on firm performance after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 7b. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners 
in terms of their sustainability of controlling status will moderate the inverted u-
shaped relationship between family management and firm performance, such that 
higher frequency of use of such mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of 
family management on firm performance up to an optimum level, and then 
strengthen the negative effects of family management on firm performance after 
the optimum level. 
Moderation Effects of Provisions Protecting Noncontrolling Owners  
These provisions (i.e. cash-out laws and secret ballot) protect noncontrolling 
owners by elevating the value of noncontrolling owners‟ shares while selling to a 
controlling owner and assuring confidentiality in voting. Particularly, the secrecy of 
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voting, which gives noncontrolling owners‟ a voice in firm governance, can constitute an 
internal control mechanism by monitoring controlling owners‟ actions and allowing 
potentially beneficial takeovers to take place by weakening the controlling family owners 
and managers‟ resistance and prevention tactics.  As a result, the use of these provisions 
can democratize the dominant family governance context by lowering the risk of 
expropriation of noncontrolling owners‟ wealth and entrenchment of the family and 
facilitate raising capital through attracting outside investors. Hence, the higher frequency 
of the use of these provisions is expected to strengthen the positive effects and weaken 
the negative effects of family involvement on performance. This is expected to lead to a 
shift of the inverted u-shaped curve representing the relationship between family 
involvement (i.e. family ownership and family management) and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 8a. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting noncontrolling 
owners  will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance, such that higher frequency of use of such 
mechanisms will strengthen the positive effects of family ownership on firm 
performance up to an optimum level, and then weaken the negative effects of 
family ownership on firm performance after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 8b. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting noncontrolling 
owners will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance, such that higher frequency of use of such 
mechanisms will strengthen the positive effects of family management on firm 
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performance up to an optimum level, and then weaken the negative effects of 
family management on firm performance after the optimum level. 
Moderation Effects of Provisions Protecting Management and Directors 
These provisions (i.e. classified board, special meeting, written consent, directors‟ 
duties, compensation plans, golden parachute, severance, contracts, indemnification, and 
limitations on director liability) protect managers and directors in terms of their position 
in the firm, monetarily, and legally. Family owners are often involved in management to 
exert family influence on the business (Brecht et al., 2005). When they are not actively 
involved in the management of the firm, they appoint well trusted associates to represent 
them (Combs, 2008; Jones et al., 2008). When managers‟ and directors‟ positions in the 
firm are insulated from proxy fights and takeovers, they have more freedom to act 
according to the controlling family‟s family-centered expectations and/or their own 
personal gains, which may not always be beneficial for firm performance. Hence, the use 
of provisions protecting managers and directors in terms of their positions in the firm 
combined with family‟s dominance in ownership and/or management can enhance the 
family‟s pursuing family agendas and exacerbate expropriation of noncontrolling owners‟ 
wealth and entrenchment of the controlling family, which can consequently harm firm 
performance.  
Moreover, as discussed and hypothesized in the previous section, family 
controlled publicly traded firms are expected to use provisions protecting managers and 
directors monetarily and legally less frequently than nonfamily firms. However, when/if 
they are used, they are expected to weaken the positive effects of family involvement on 
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firm performance and strengthen the negative effects, which can shift the inverted u-
shaped curve representing the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family 
ownership and family management) and firm performance. In the absence of the concern 
for the monetary and legal consequences of wrongdoings, managers and directors are 
more likely to be in compliance with the controlling family‟s family-oriented 
expectations in their actions even if they may not be beneficial for the shareholders and 
firm value in general.   
Hypothesis 9a. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting management in 
terms of their position in the firm will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family ownership and firm performance, such that higher frequency of 
use of such mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of family ownership on 
firm performance up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative effects 
of family ownership on firm performance after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 9b. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting management 
monetarily will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance, such that higher frequency of use of such 
mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of family ownership on firm 
performance up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative effects of 
family ownership on firm performance after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 9c. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting management legally 
will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance, such that higher frequency of use of such mechanisms will 
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weaken the positive effects of family ownership on firm performance up to an 
optimum level, and then strengthen the negative effects of family ownership on 
firm performance after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 10a. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting management in 
terms of their position in the firm will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family management and firm performance, such that higher frequency of 
use of such mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of family management 
on firm performance up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative 
effects of family management on firm performance after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 10b. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting management 
monetarily will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance, such that higher frequency of use of such 
mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of family management on firm 
performance up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative effects of 
family management on firm performance after the optimum level. 
Hypothesis 10c. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting management 
legally will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance, such that higher frequency of use of such 
mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of family management on firm 
performance up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the negative effects of 
family management on firm performance after the optimum level. 
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Moderation Effects of Provisions Protecting Others 
The higher frequency of the use of provisions protecting others (i.e. pension 
parachutes and silver parachutes) has implications for greater employee care since such 
provisions assure severance payments and secure the pension fund for a broad group of 
employees in the target firm in case of an acquisition or a takeover. However, since these 
provisions also make a takeover or acquisition more expensive for a potential bidder 
(Jensen, 1988), the controlling families are likely to use them as a takeover defense. 
Therefore, these provisions can make a takeover or an acquisition unattractive to the 
bidders, owing to the high cost. Hence, they may prevent potentially value-increasing 
takeovers or acquisitions from occurring. Since these provisions indirectly serve the 
purpose of sustaining family control, they can intensify the expropriation and 
entrenchment issues associated with family ownership and management, weakening the 
positive effects of family involvement on firm performance and worsening the negative 
effects. This is expected to shift the inverted u-shaped curve representing the relationship 
between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family management) and firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 11a. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting others (i.e. a broad 
group of employees) will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship between 
family ownership and firm performance up to an optimum level, such that higher 
frequency of use of such mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of family 
ownership on firm performance up to an optimum level, and then strengthen the 
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negative effects of family ownership on firm performance after the optimum 
level. 
Hypothesis 11b. Frequency of the use of provisions protecting others (i.e. a broad 
group of employees) will moderate the inverted u-shaped relationship between 
family management and firm performance up to an optimum level, such that 
higher frequency of use of such mechanisms will weaken the positive effects of 
family management on firm performance up to an optimum level, and then 
strengthen the negative effects of family management on firm performance after 
the optimum level. 
Methodology 
Data Collection 
Panel data regarding governance provision usage in firms was obtained from a 
larger project designed to investigate all the companies incorporated in the U.S. in the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center books in terms of their usage of 22 (business 
combination law and cash-out laws were missing in the dataset) out of 24 control 
enhancing governance mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003). Accounting, market, 
ownership, and management data was obtained from Thompson Reuters Thompson One 
Corporate Development database. Family business members were identified by using the 
Hoover‟s database and annual reports in Mergent Online. Data is analyzed on a restricted 
sample of firms based on publicly available data for the lag years 2002, 2004, and 2006 
regarding ownership, management, moderators, and control variables and the years 2003, 
2005, and 2007 regarding the dependent variable (i.e. firm performance).  
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Consistent with previous studies investigating publicly traded family firms, the 
sample came from the first 400 firms listed in S&P 500 (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 
2003b, 2004; Short et al., 2009; Combs et al., forthcoming). Missing data lowered the 
sample size to 386. S&P 500 stock market index is maintained by Standard & Poor‟s and 
involves 500 large-cap U.S. firms covering about 75% of the U.S. equity market. First, 
this sample includes both family and nonfamily firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) 
suggest that families are present in one-third of the S&P 500. Second, family firms 
among the population are likely to have substantial numbers of nonfamily shareholders 
unlike privately held firms. Hence, this sample is representative of the publicly traded 
family and nonfamily firm population. 
Variables  
Dependent Variable 
Firm performance was measured by the Tobin‟s q (Chung & Pruitt, 1994) with 
accounting data provided by Thomson Reuters. The use of this firm performance 
measurement in this essay followed Anderson and Reeb (2004), Villalonga and Amit 
(2006a, 2006b, 2009b), and Miller et al., (2007). Tobin‟s q is a market based measure of 
firm performance incorporating current operations, potential growth opportunities, and 
future operating performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Hence, it reflects both current 
and anticipated profitability. Additionally, this market-based measure of firm 
performance is reflective of shareholder wealth creation, which suits the main concerns 
of this dissertation. 
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Tobin‟s q is the ratio of the firm‟s market value to replacement value of its assets 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2007; Richard et al., 2009). The formula for 
Tobin‟s q (Miller et al., 2007) is as follows: ((commonshares outstanding*calendar year 
closing price)+(current liabilities-current assets)+(long-term debt)+(liquidating value of 
preferred stock)) / total assets). For robustness checks, data regarding other firm 
performance measures concerning profitability such as Return on Assets (ROA = Net 
Income / Average Total Assets), Return on Equity (ROE = Net Income / Shareholders‟ 
Equity), and Return on Investment (ROI = Net Income / Total Assets) (Carton & Hofer, 
2006) were collected. The years were 2003, 2005, and 2007 for the dependent variable. 
Independent Variables 
Family ownership (FO) is the percentage of total firm ownership held by 
members of a family. Family management (FM) is the number of individual family 
members who are in top management and/or the board of directors. The squared family 
ownership (FO
2
) and the squared family management (FM
2
) variables were used to 
indicate nonlinear relationships between independent variables and dependent variable. 
For robustness tests, the proportion of number of family managers and/or the board of 
directors (PFM) to total number of managers and/or the board of directors was also 
calculated. The years were 2002, 2004, and 2006 for the independent variables. 
Moderators 
Moderators consist of 7 categories of governance provisions that group the 22 
available provisions (Business Combination Law and Cash-out Laws were missing in the 
dataset) identified by Gompers et al. (2003) according to the purposes of their usage by 
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firms. Judgment-based categorization (Perreault & Leigh, 1989) of the governance 
provisions was used. The validity of this categorization was confirmed by three expert 
judges who assessed the degree to which the provisions represent the categories 
(Netemeyer et al., 2003).  
The first moderator was the frequency of the use of governance provisions 
protecting controlling owners through voting rights (VOTING). This variable involved 
the following provisions: (1) Unequal voting rights, (2) Cumulative voting, and (3) 
Supermajority. The second moderator was the frequency of the use of governance 
provisions protecting controlling owners through sustaining control status (STATUS) and 
includes the following provisions: (1) Blank check, (2) Poison pill, (3) Bylaw, (4) 
Charter, (5) Fair price, and (6) Antigreenmail. The third moderator, the frequency of the 
use of governance provisions protecting noncontrolling owners (NONCONTROLLING) 
included provisions concerning: (1) Secret ballot. The fourth moderator was the 
frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting management and directors in 
terms of their position (POSITION). This variable involved the following provisions: (1) 
Classified board, (2) Special meeting, (3) Written consent, and (4) Director‟s duties. The 
fifth moderator, the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting 
management and directors monetarily (MONETARY) included provisions concerning: (1) 
Compensation plans, (2) Golden parachute, and (3) Severance. The sixth moderator was 
the frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting management and directors 
legally (LEGAL). This variable involved the following provisions: (1) Contracts, (2) 
Indemnification, and (3) Limitations on director liability. The seventh moderator was the 
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frequency of the use of governance provisions protecting others (OTHERS) involving 
provisions: (1) Pension parachutes, and (2) Silver parachutes. 
In a given year, provisions that were used by a firm were coded as “1” and 
provisions not used are coded as “0”. The frequency of the use of each category was 
calculated by adding usage/no usage figures (i.e. 1/0) in each category. For robustness 
tests, particularly when one provision group (i.e. NONCONTROLLING) included only 
one provision due to missing provision data, categorical provision group variables were 
also included (1 = at least one mechanism present; 0 = none). The years were 2002, 2004, 
and 2006 for the moderators. 
Control Variables 
 Variables that were expected to influence firm performance were controlled. 
Larger companies may have performance advantages over small and medium size firms 
owing to economies of scale, consequently affecting their firm performance (Hansen & 
Wernerfelt, 1989). Hence, firm size (FS) was controlled and measured via the log of the 
number of employees following Dewar and Dutton (1986). In addition, older firms may 
have the advantage of being established with a history of past successes, which can 
influence their performance (Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989). Firm age (FA) was measured 
as the number of years the firm has been in existence since founding. Additionally, 
family firms may have competitive advantages in some industries compared to others 
(Chrisman et al., 2010; Pollak, 1985), which can influence their performance. Primary 
firm industry (FI) was measured by classifying all firms into one of four industrial 
categories: (1) retail, (2) service, (3) manufacturing, and (4) other, following Chrisman et 
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al. (2010). Three categorical variables, coded 1-0, were created to indicate retail, service, 
and manufacturing firms. Firms in other industries were coded as zero for each variable. 
For further specification of industry, four-digit SIC codes and sector names were also 
identified and entered for each firm.  
Additionally, generational majority in management and board was controlled 
since family influence tends to be weaker when family influence is more dispersed or 
fractionalized owing to the involvement of later generations (Schulze et al., 2003; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Two categorical variables, coded 1-0, were created to indicate 
first generation (GEN1) and second generation or later (GEN2). Nonfamily firms were 
those coded as zero for each of these two variables. Institutional owners such as mutual 
or pension funds may also play a significant role in corporate decision making (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004), which can consequently affect firm performance. Institutional ownership 
(IO) is the percentage of overall institutional ownership of voting shares outstanding. 
Similarly, ownership by other insiders can also influence decision making and firm 
performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Hence, other insiders’ ownership (OIO), which 
is the equity holdings of top managers and directors minus family ownership, was 
controlled to capture the incentive effects of other insiders‟ ownership (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2004). Firm risk (i.e. return volatility) may be another factor that can influence 
firm performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2004) since high level of risk may result in 
either above average returns or large amount of losses. Firm risk (FR) was measured as 
the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous 60 months, following Anderson 
and Reeb (2003a, 2004).  
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Also, investment into R&D and internationalization may lead firms to high or low 
performance (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999; Graves & Langowitz, 1993; Hitt et al., 1997). 
Hence, these variables were controlled. R&D (RD) level was calculated via R&D/sales 
ratio (Miller et al., 2007). Internationalization (INT) was measured as the percentage of 
foreign revenue (100% - percentage of domestic revenue). The years were 2002, 2004, 
and 2006 for the control variables. 
Analyses 
Table 3.1 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the 
variables used in the study. Table 3.2 presents the results of the Fixed Effects Tobit 
Models, with firm performance as the dependent variable.   
Hypotheses 6a through 10c were tested via Tobit panel data analysis for lag years 
which are 2003, 2005, and 2007 for the dependent variable and 2002, 2004, and 2006 for 
the controls, independent variables, moderators, and interactions. NLOGIT version 4.0 
Econometric software was used. The Fixed Effects Tobit estimation model was used to 
control for omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time, whereas 
random effects model is used when some variables may be constant over time but vary 
between cases and some variables may be fixed between cases but vary over time. 
NLOGIT4 selected the estimation model as the Fixed Effects estimation model. Tobit 
Fixed Effects estimation was used to adjust for large number of zero observations 
(Maddala, 1991). Prior to running the analyses, the variables‟ normality of their 
distributions was examined by graphing the distributions and examining the skewness 
and kurtosis in Excel. The variables which were not normally distributed were 
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transformed (e.g. log of firm size). Additionally, Variance Inflation Factors for the 
variables were calculated. Additionally, Variance Inflation Factors for the variables were 
calculated. VIFs range between 1.10 and 3.24. Collinearity was not a problem since all 
VIFs were less than 10. 
The number of observations in panel data analysis was 1,158 (i.e. 358 * 3 = 
1,158) since the lag years were 2002, 2004, and 2006 regarding ownership, management, 
moderators, and control variables and the years 2003, 2005, and 2007 regarding the 
dependent variable (i.e. firm performance) investigated for 386 firms. G*Power software 
is used for power analysis. The post-hoc test computed achieved power given alpha 
(0.05), sample size (1,158), and conventional small (0.10), medium (0.30), and large 
(0.50) effect sizes. Even at a small effect size, the power was .96, giving confidence that 
there was enough power to detect even small effects. Conventionally, in social sciences, 
80% and higher power at up to 0.10 alpha level is acceptable (Cohen, 1988).  
To examine the endogeneity (i.e. reverse causality), instrumental variables for 
both family ownership and family management were used. Stata 11 software was used to 
test family ownership and family management variables for endogeneity. Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test was performed by following the instructions provided by Stata at 
http://www.stata.com/support/. Concerning the endogeneity of family ownership, GEN 1 
(1
st
 generation‟s majority in management and board) and GEN2 1 (2nd generation‟s 
majority in management and board) instrumental variables were used. For family 
management variable, the instrumental variables were GEN 1 (1
st
 generation‟s majority 
in management and board), GEN2 1 (2nd or later generation‟s majority in management 
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and board), and PROPORFM (proportion of family managers and directors). Partial F-
test results indicated that the co-significance of the instrumental variables for family 
ownership were significant (χ
2 
= 32.45, p = .00). Partial F-test results also indicated that 
the co-significance of the instrumental variables for family management were significant 
(χ
2 
= 405.69, p = .00). Durbin-Wu-Hausman test tests the null hypotheses that family 
ownership and family management are exogenous. Hence, the results of Durbin-Wu-
Hausman show that family ownership (χ
2 
= .57, p = .45) and family management (χ
2 
= 
1.13, p = .29) variables can be considered as exogenous.
 
In panel data analyses, Model 1 was the base model where the set of control 
variables are entered. Manufacturing industry, firm size, other insiders‟ ownership, and 
firm risk were significant and service industry was marginally significant. The log 
likelihood function was -843.70.  In model 2, the independent variables were entered. 
The family ownership (FO) variable was positive and not significant (β=.91, ns). Family 
ownership squared (FOS) was negative and significant (β=-0.00, p<0.05). Family 
management (FM) was significant (β=1.10, p<0.05) and family management squared 
(FMS) was marginally significant (β=-0.18, p<0.10). The log likelihood function for the 
second model was -2902.08.  Model 3 introduced the moderators. The log likelihood 
function for the third model was -829.03. The frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting managers monetarily was negative and significant (β=-0.20, p<0.05) 
Model 4 introduced the interactions. The log likelihood function was -2796.64. 
The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting 
Controlling Owners‟ Voting Rights (FO*VOTINGRIGHTS) was positive and not 
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significant (β=.20, ns) and the beta coefficient of Family Ownership
2
*Frequency of the 
use of Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Voting Rights (FO
2
*VOTING) was 
negative and not significant (β=-.01, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 6a was not supported. 
The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting 
Controlling Owners‟ Status (FO*STATUS) was negative and significant (β=-.35, 
p<0.001) and the beta coefficient of Family Ownership
2
*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Status (FO
2
*STATUS) was positive and 
significant (β=01, p<0.001). Hence, Hypothesis 6b was supported.  
The beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Voting Rights (FM*VOTING) was negative and 
significant (β=-1.96, p<0.01) and the beta coefficient of Family Management
2
*Frequency 
of the use of Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Voting Rights (FM
2
*VOTING) 
was positive and significant (β=0.59, p<0.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 7a was supported. 
The beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Status (FM*STATUS) was positive and not significant 
(β=0.05, ns) and beta coefficient of Family Management
2
*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Status (FM
2
*STATUS) was positive and not 
significant (β=0.02, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 7b was not supported.  
The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Noncontrolling Owners (FO*NONCONTROLLING) was negative and not 
significant (β=-0.19, ns) and the beta coefficient of Family Ownership
2
*Frequency of the 
use of Provisions Protecting Noncontrolling Owners (FO
2
*NONCONTROLLING) was 
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negative and not significant (β=-0.00, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 8a was not supported. 
The beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Noncontrolling Owners (FM*NONCONTROLLING) was positive and 
significant (β=4.21, p<0.001) and the beta coefficient of Family 
Management
2
*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Noncontrolling Owners 
(FM
2
*NONCONTROLLING) was negative and significant (β=-0.84, p<0.001). Hence, 
Hypothesis 8b was supported.  
The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Managers‟ and Directors‟ Position (FO*POSITION) was positive and not 
significant (β=0.05, ns) and the beta coefficient of Family Ownership
2
*Frequency of the 
use of Provisions Protecting Managers‟ and Directors‟ Position (FO
2
*POSITION) was 
positive and not significant (β=0.00, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 9a was not supported. The 
beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting 
Managers and Directors Monetarily (FO*MONETARY) was positive and significant 
(β=0.55, p<0.001) and the beta coefficient of Family Ownership
2
*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Monetarily (FO
2
*MONETARY) was 
negative and significant (β=-0.01, p<0.001). However, the significant relationships were 
in the opposite direction than hypothesized. Therefore, Hypothesis 9b was not supported. 
The beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting 
Managers and Directors Legally (FO*LEGAL) was negative and significant (β=-0.28, 
p<0.001) and the beta coefficient of Family Ownership
2
*Frequency of the use of 
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Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Legally (FO
2
*LEGAL) was positive and 
significant (β=0.01, p<0.001). Hence, Hypothesis 9c was supported.  
The beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Managers‟ and Directors‟ Position (FM*POSITION) was negative and not 
significant (β=-0.03, ns) and the beta coefficient of Family Management
2
*Frequency of 
the use of Provisions Protecting Managers‟ and Directors‟ Position (FM
2
*POSITION) 
was negative and not significant (β=-0.01, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 10a was not 
supported. The beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Monetarily (FM*MONETARY) was 
negative and significant (β=-3.09, p<0.001) and the beta coefficient of Family 
Management
2
*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors 
Monetarily (FM
2
*MONETARY) was positive and marginally significant (β=0.33, 
p<0.10). Hence, Hypothesis 10b was supported. The beta coefficient of Family 
Management*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors 
Legally (FM*LEGAL) was positive and significant (β=1.71, p<0.001) and the beta 
coefficient of Family Management
2
*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting 
Managers and Directors Legally (FM
2
*LEGAL) was negative and significant (β=-.30, 
p<0.01). However, the significant relationships were in the opposite direction than 
hypothesized. Therefore, Hypothesis 10c was not supported.  
The analyses did not run for the dependent variable OTHERS owing to a lot of 
zero values. Therefore, Hypotheses 11a and 11b could not be tested.  
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Although not hypothesized, the results for the assumed inverted u-shaped 
relationships between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and family 
management) and firm performance were the following: The beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership was positive and not significant (β=0.91, ns) and the beta coefficient of 
Family Ownership
2
 was negative and significant (β=-0.00, p<0.05). The beta coefficient 
of Family Management was positive and significant (β=1.10, p<0.05) and the beta 
coefficient of Family Management
2
 was negative and marginally significant (β=-0.18, 
p<0.05). Therefore, the assumption of inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance was supported, whereas inverted u-shaped 
relationship between family ownership and firm performance was not supported. 
The results were compared to the Pooled Model through OLS Regression. The 
results of OLS were compatible with the Tobit panel data analyses. Robustness tests also 
include the analyses with categorical moderators (i.e. 1=at least one provision is used in 
each provision group; 0=none), the proportion of family managers and/or the board of 
directors (PFM), and other firm performance variables (i.e. ROA, ROE, and ROI). The 
results of these analyses were consistent with the results presented above.  
In sum, the results indicate that the hypotheses concerning (a) the moderation 
effects of the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners in terms of 
their sustainability of controlling status on the inverted u-shaped relationship between 
family ownership and firm performance (H6b), (b) the moderation effects of the 
frequency of the use of provisions protecting management legally on the inverted u-
shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance (H9c), (c) the 
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moderation effects of the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners 
in terms of their voting rights on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance (H7a), (d) the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting noncontrolling owners on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance (H8b), and (e) the moderations effects of the 
frequency of the use of provisions protecting management monetarily on the inverted u-
shaped relationship between family management and firm performance (H10b) were 
supported. In all, five of the twelve hypotheses that could be tested were supported (H6b, 
H9c, H7a, H8b, and H10b), two sets of relationships were significant in the opposite 
direction to what was predicted (H9b and H10c), and five other tests yielded no 
significant findings (H6a, H7b, H8a, H9a, and H10a). In addition, two other relationships 
that were hypothesized could not be analyzed (H11a and H11b). Significant interactions 
can be seen in Figures 3.2-3.8. 
Table 3.3 shows the summary of findings. In the following section, the results, 
future research directions, and implications for practice will be discussed. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Studies highlight the distinctive effects of family involvement (i.e. ownership and 
management) on the behavior and performance of publicly traded firms (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003, 2004; Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). 
However, we do not know enough about how and why firm behavior and performance in 
family firms differ from those in nonfamily firms and among family firms themselves, 
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and what the outcomes of the family involvement in the business are through the use of 
control enhancing governance mechanisms (Villalonga & Amit 2006, 2009).  
To fill this gap, this essay suggests that the theory of the family firm will be 
advanced by the investigation of the link between family involvement components (i.e. 
family ownership and family management), control enhancing governance provisions, 
and firm performance. Accordingly, this paper addresses how the frequencies of the use 
of different types of control enhancing mechanisms moderate the relationship between 
family involvement components and firm performance. I develop and test a model 
linking family involvement, control enhancing corporate governance mechanisms, and 
firm performance on a sample of 386 of the S&P500 firms. The model in this essay is 
concerned with the moderation effects of the use of governance provisions on the 
relationship between family involvement and firm performance. It is expected that the 
frequency of the use of governance provisions will have a negative moderating influence 
on the relationship between family ownership and family management and firm 
performance.  
The model is tested via panel data analyses. Findings support the hypotheses 
suggesting the moderation effects of (a) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
owners‟ control status on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership 
and firm performance (H6b), (b) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
management legally on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance (H9c), (c) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling 
owners in terms of their voting rights on the inverted u-shaped relationship between 
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family management and firm performance (H7a), (d) the frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting noncontrolling owners on the inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family management and firm performance (H8b), and (e) the frequency of the 
use of provisions protecting management monetarily will moderate the inverted u-shaped 
relationship between family management and firm performance (H10b). The results are 
consistent with the expected interplay between family involvement and the use of 
governance provisions in influencing firm performance.  
The supported moderation effects of the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting controlling owners in terms of their sustainability of controlling status on the 
inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance  (H6b) 
appears to be negative. This may be because the higher frequency of the use of provisions 
which secure sustainability of controlling owners‟ status can inflate family owners‟ 
power and authority, enabling them to engage in opportunistic behaviors. Family owners‟ 
equity rights at moderate levels enable them to effectively monitor and control, which can 
be beneficial to firm performance. However, enhanced power and authority through the 
use of provisions protecting controlling owners‟ status can weaken the positive effects of 
family ownership on firm performance since family owners may have the freedom to 
pursue family-centered noneconomic goals and enjoy the private benefits of control when 
their controlling status is secured. Particularly after an optimum level of family 
ownership, excessive power deriving from the combination of the higher levels of 
ownership and the use of provisions sustaining controlling owners‟ status can exacerbate 
principal-principal agency problems (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Andres, 2008; 
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Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) by allowing family owners to pursue 
family agendas primarily benefiting the family, which can be detrimental firm 
performance. 
The hypothesized positive moderation effect of the frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting noncontrolling owners on the relationship between family 
management and firm performance (H8b) was also supported. Hence, the use of 
provisions protecting noncontrolling owners strengthens the positive effects of family 
management up to an optimum level and then weakens the negative effects after an 
optimum level is reached. The use of secret ballot provision assuring confidentiality in 
voting can facilitate noncontrolling shareholders‟ activism directed toward the 
replacement of managers and directors or the transfer of control to a hostile takeover 
bidder in case of underperformance. Particularly, the secrecy of voting, which gives 
noncontrolling owners‟ a larger voice in firm governance, can constitute an internal 
control mechanism by monitoring managers and directors‟ actions and allowing 
potentially beneficial takeovers to take place by weakening the family managers‟ 
resistance and prevention tactics.  As a result, the threat of shareholder activism can be an 
internal monitoring mechanism and thereby discipline family managers, enhancing their 
positive impact on firm performance up to an optimum level of family management. 
Also, after an optimum level of family management is reached, this can weaken the 
negative effects of family management on firm performance, policing their expropriation 
and entrenchment attempts which can be triggered by their excessive power and 
authority.  
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The hypothesis suggesting the negative moderation effects of the frequency of the 
use of provisions protecting controlling owners in terms of their voting rights on the 
relationship between family management and firm performance (H7a) was supported. 
Family managers‟ discretion to generate strategic ideas and their timely implementation 
can be beneficial to firm performance up to an optimum level of family management. 
However, the higher frequency of the use of provisions, which create a discrepancy 
between controlling owners‟ cash flow and voting rights, can further enhance both family 
owners‟ and managers‟ power and authority. Controlling family‟s excessive discretionary 
power on strategic decisions and actions may weaken the positive effects of family 
management on firm performance since family management combined with the use of 
provisions enhancing controlling owners voting rights can enable family managers to 
focus primarily on the attainment of noneconomic goals that primarily benefit the family 
and to consume perks. Particularly after an optimum level of family management, the 
combined enhancement of voting rights of the controlling family and higher levels of 
family involvement in management and the board can increase family managers‟ ability 
to expropriate noncontrolling shareholder wealth and entrench themselves in 
management and board positions (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Andres, 2008; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), reducing firm performance.  
The significant findings in the opposite direction may initially seem paradoxical 
since the use of provisions protecting managers and directors monetarily has positive 
moderation effect on the relationship between family ownership and firm performance 
(H9b), while having negative moderation effect on the relationship between family 
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management and firm performance (H10b). When family members participate in the 
business through ownership only, monetary protection for managers and directors 
diminishes managerial risk bearing for nonfamily managers, enabling their taking more 
risk to engage in potentially fruitful projects which may be beneficial to firm 
performance. Family owners‟ effective monitoring can also limit nonfamily managers‟ 
opportunistic behaviors. Hence, combined effective monitoring of family owners and 
nonfamily managers‟ reduced risk bearing and increased risk taking may strengthen the 
positive effects of family ownership on firm performance and then weaken the negative 
effects of family ownership on firm performance. However, the combination of family 
management and the use of provisions protecting managers and directors monetarily can 
reduce the concern for monetary consequences of managerial wrongdoings and enable 
family managers and directors to engage in expropriation of noncontrolling shareholder 
wealth and managerial entrenchment activities, which can be detrimental to firm 
performance. 
The other conflicting set of results is regarding the use of provisions protecting 
managers and directors legally. The use of such provisions has negative moderation 
effect on the relationship between family ownership and firm performance (H9c), while 
having positive moderation effect on the relationship between family management and 
firm performance (H10c). The reason for the positive interaction between those 
governance provisions and family management may be that when family members 
directly benefit from reduced legal risk bearing because of being managers as well as 
owners, they may be more likely to formulate and implement aggressive business 
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strategies with potentially high returns. However, when legal protections are provided to 
managers, the family owners, who may not be managers, may veto the aggressive 
business strategies formulated by nonfamily managers, owing to a lack of trust or a 
concern for socioemotional wealth, even though they may yield high returns. 
There were also several hypotheses (H6a, H7b, H8a, H9a, and H10a) that were 
not supported concerning the moderation effects of the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting (a) controlling owners‟ voting rights, (b) noncontrolling owners, and (c) 
managers and directors‟ positions on the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance and the moderation effects of the use of provisions protecting (a) controlling 
owners‟ status and (b) managers and directors‟ positions on the relationship between 
family management and firm performance.  
The frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners‟ voting 
rights have significant moderation effects on the relationship between family 
management and firm performance (H7a), whereas it has insignificant moderation effects 
on the relationship between family ownership and firm performance (H6a). Accordingly, 
the combined effects of family management and the enhancement of controlling owners‟ 
voting rights appear to be more influential in determining firm performance than the 
combination of family ownership and the enhancement of controlling owners‟ voting 
rights. This may be because family owners tend to have substantial voting rights naturally 
deriving from their equity rights. Hence, the use of provisions enhancing controlling 
owners‟ voting rights may not substantially affect the impact of family ownership on firm 
performance. However, the use of provisions enhancing controlling owners‟ voting rights 
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combined with family management seem to have substantial impact on firm performance 
because family‟s participation in management and board combined with the controlling 
owners‟ elevated voting rights facilitate family influence over the business through 
multiple dimensions.  
The lack of reinforcing effects of the frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
noncontrolling owners on the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance (H8a) may be because of the noncontrolling owners‟ relatively low level of 
influence over the business compared to controlling owners even though provisions 
protecting noncontrolling owners may be in use.  
Also, the use of provisions protecting managers and directors‟ positions may not 
have significant influence on the effects of family ownership on firm performance (H9a) 
since any benefits or costs associated with those provisions may be mitigated by the 
monitoring abilities of family owners.  
Similarly, the use of provisions protecting managers and directors‟ positions 
(H10a) do not have significant moderation effects on the relationship between family 
management and firm performance. This may be because family managers and directors 
may be naturally expecting a relatively long tenure and higher levels of job security 
regardless of whether the provisions protecting their positions are in place or not. Hence, 
the use provisions protecting managers and directors‟ positions do not have substantial 
impact on the relationship between family management and firm performance. 
Finally, the use of provisions protecting controlling owners‟ status does not seem 
to influence the relationship between family management and firm performance (H7b). 
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This may be due to family‟s already assuming its control over the business through 
participation in management and board regardless of the use of provisions protecting their 
controlling status.  
Moreover, the assumed, but not hypothesized, inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family ownership and firm performance was not significant in this study, 
whereas the assumed, but not hypothesized, inverted u-shaped relationship between 
family management and firm performance was significant. This finding draws attention 
to the importance of family‟s involvement in management and board in determining firm 
performance, while ownership itself does not seem be sufficient to influence firm 
performance. On the one hand, this finding may be contrary to some studies suggesting 
that family ownership, rather than family management, is the key in differentiating family 
firms from nonfamily firms in other countries such as Germany and Chile (e.g. Klein, 
2000; Silva & Majluf, 2008). On the other hand, this finding is in line with Maury‟s 
(2006) distinction between active (i.e. family holds at least one of the top officer 
positions) and passive family control. The author also shows that active family control is 
associated with higher profitability compared to nonfamily firms, whereas passive family 
control does not influence profitability. Similarly, Andres (2008) shows that family firms 
may perform better than nonfamily firms only when the founding family is still active 
either on the executive or the supervisory board in Germany. The author also 
demonstrates that if families are only large shareholders without board representation, 
their firm performance is not distinguishable from that of nonfamily firms. Westhead and 
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Howorth (2006) also illustrate that family management, rather than family ownership, is 
associated with performance in firms in the UK. 
This essay contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it draws attention to 
the importance of family involvement within the context of corporations. Second, it adds 
to the understanding of how publicly traded family firms differ from nonfamily firms in 
terms of the impact of the frequency of the use of different types of control enhancing 
governance mechanisms on the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family 
ownership and family management) and firm performance, whereas studies mostly focus 
on the direct effects of family involvement or governance mechanisms on the firm 
performance (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2008; Andres, 2008). 
This essay is one of the few attempts to use agency theory and family governance 
perspective to explain differences between publicly traded family and nonfamily firms. 
Third, this essay introduces the interplay between family involvement and the use of 
governance provisions as an explanation for the existence of principal-principal agency 
problems in publicly traded firms. Owing to the vital presence of family control in many 
corporations, it is crucial to identify the differences between publicly traded family and 
nonfamily firms as well as the interactions between family involvement and control 
enhancing corporate governance mechanisms in determining firm performance. Indeed, 
family involvement leading to inherent differences between family and nonfamily firms 
can also distinguish among family firms. Consequently, the contributions of this essay 
move us forward in the advancement of the theory of the family firm (Chrisman et al., 
2005; Conner, 1991). 
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The limitations of this essay can also lead to a number of future research 
directions. First, as stated above, the regulatory context can affect the observed 
relationships and generalizability to the corporations around the world since the sample 
included S&P500 firms headquartered in the U.S. Even though increased globalization 
tends to cause similarities in business conduct in world economies, different legal 
regimes (e.g. common versus civil law) in different countries can result in differences in 
corporate governance (Peng & Jiang, 2010). For example, the legal system prevents 
pyramiding in the US, whereas it is permissible even in many developed countries in 
Asia and Europe (Peng & Jiang, 2010). Since legal context may be influential on the 
findings of this essay, future studies can test or extend the model in other countries with 
different legal systems. 
Similarly, despite the panel data analyses examining multiple years (2001, 2003, 
and 2005 regarding ownership, management, and control variables and the lag years 
2002, 2004, and 2006 regarding the frequency of the use of governance provisions), the 
findings may vary in other time periods (e.g. in 1990s) owing to the changes in the legal 
system. For example, the examined time periods in this essay involves the enactment and 
the aftermath of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, also known as Investor Protection Act, 
as a reaction to corporate accounting scandals. This act enhanced the reliability of 
financial reporting, transparency, and accountability through increased internal controls 
and auditing (Coates, 2007). Hence, future research can compare or contrast the findings 
of this essay to earlier periods than the periods examined in this essay. This can also 
illustrate whether legislation is influential on corporate governance. 
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Another limitation is that, in this essay, the seven categories of governance 
provisions that group the 24 provisions identified by Gompers et al. (2003) according to 
the purposes of their usage by firms are formed by a judgment-based categorization 
(Perreault & Leigh, 1989). Future research using different categorizations can provide 
further insights. 
 Aside from the future research directions suggested in the discussion of findings 
and limitations, there may be other factors that may affect the relationship between 
family involvement and performance in publicly traded family firms. The imminence of 
succession (Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 2003) is one of them. Furthermore, the effects of 
family involvement and control enhancing corporate governance mechanisms might vary 
in family firms depending upon diversification (Anderson & Reeb, 2003c; Jones et al., 
2008), entrepreneurial orientation (Dess & Lumpkin, 2005; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, 
2001), corporate entrepreneurship (Dess et al., 1999; Lumpkin et al., 2005), and life-cycle 
phases. All these contingencies suggest additional applications of corporate governance 
to the study of family businesses.  
 Family involvement in corporate governance has also implications for other lines 
of research such as strategy processes, which can affect firm performance. Aside from the 
agency view of conflict among shareholders, other types of conflict within the framework 
of strategy processes can be investigated in publicly traded family firms. Indeed, 
consensus and conflict among decision makers are important elements of strategy 
processes since they may lead to organizational outcomes such as decision quality, 
superior resource stocks, and high performance (Amason, 1996; Eddleston & 
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Kellermanns, 2007). Consensus can facilitate cooperativeness and cohesiveness in 
strategy implementation, whereas moderate levels of various types of conflict (e.g. task 
and process conflicts) can affect firm performance positively (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 
2004). In publicly traded family firms, family dynamics are expected to influence 
consensus or conflict since family members are usually involved in ownership, 
management, and board. However, we do not know enough about the impact of the 
family firm idiosyncrasies and the extent of family influence on the occurrence of 
conflict or consensus in decision making in family controlled publicly traded firms, 
which can affect decision quality and firm performance. Hence, future research can shed 
light onto how strategy processes may vary in publicly traded family firms. 
 In conclusion, this essay provides agency theory and family governance 
perspectives to family involvement in publicly traded family firms. The differences 
between family and nonfamily firms as well as the model presented in this essay can help 
scholars, family business members, and investors better understand family involvement, 
and how it impacts firm performance through the use control enhancing corporate 
governance mechanisms. If publicly traded family firms can elevate the positive effects 
of family involvement through the proper use of corporate governance mechanisms and 
mitigate agency problems, they can achieve long-term competitive advantages and 
superior performance. Publicly traded family firms concerned with maximizing 
shareholder value and attaining effective corporate governance through family control 
will be sought after by the investors and reap the benefits of positive corporate publicity.
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Table 3.1 
Descriptives and Correlations – Essay 2 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
*Variables (Descriptives and Correlations – Essay 2) continued: 
RETAIL: Retail industry 
SERVIC: Service industry 
MANUF: Manufacturing industry 
OTHER: Other industry 
IO: Institutional ownership 
FA: Firm age 
FSL: Log of firm size 
Variables* (Continued): 
OIO: Other insiders’ ownership 
FR: Firm risk 
FO: Family ownership 
FOS: Family ownership squared 
FM: Family management 
FMS: Family management squared 
FP1: Firm performance 
RD: Research and development 
INT1: Internationalization 
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Table 3.2 
Results of Analyses Testing Hypotheses 6a-11b 
 
 
Dependent variable: FP1 (Firm Performance)  (03, 05, 07)  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control Variables (02, 04, 06)     
GEN1 (Generational majority in management and board) .21 -.81* 1.26* -2.76*** 
GEN2 (Generational majority in management and board) -.22 -.11 .99 -2.46*** 
RETAIL  .87 1.05* .95+ .96* 
SERVICE .52+ -.23 .42 -.31 
MANUFACTURING .73** .73* .70** .52+ 
IO (Institutional Ownership) .01 .00*** .01 .00*** 
FA (Firms Age) -.00 -.00* -.00 -.00+ 
FSL (Log of Firm Size) -.58*** .00+ -.60*** .00+ 
OIO (Other Insiders‟ Ownership) .04*** -.00 .04*** -.00 
RD (Research & Development) .82 .00 .30 .00 
FR (Firm Risk) .00*** .00+ .00** .00+ 
INT1 (Internationalization) .00 .00*** .00 .00*** 
     
Independent Variables (02, 04, 06)     
FO (Family Ownership)  .91 -.03 .02 
FOS (Family Ownership Squared)  -.00* .00 -.02** 
FM (Family Management)  1.1* -.81 5.22*** 
FMS (Family Management Squared)  -.18+ .13 -.65*** 
     
Moderators (02, 04, 06)     
VOTING (Frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
owners through voting rights)   
  -.11 .29 
STATUS (Frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
owners through sustaining control status) 
  .01 -.02 
NONCONTR (Frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
noncontrolling owners) 
  .11 -.51+ 
POSITION  (Frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
managers‟ positions) 
  -.00 -.11 
MONETARY (Frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
managers monetarily) 
  -.20* -.22 
LEGAL  (Frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
managers legally) 
  .10 -.08 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactions (02, 04, 06) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
FOVOTING (Family Ownership *  Frequency of the 
use of provisions protecting owners through voting 
rights) 
   .20 
FOSVOTING (Family Ownership Squared *  
Frequency of the use of provisions protecting owners 
through voting rights) 
   -.01 
FOSTATUS (Family Ownership *  Frequency of the 
use of provisions protecting owners through sustaining 
control status) 
   -.35*** 
FOSSTATUS (Family Ownership Squared *  
Frequency of the use of provisions protecting owners 
through sustaining control status) 
   .01*** 
FONONCONTR (Family Ownership *  Frequency of 
the use of provisions protecting noncontrolling owners) 
   -.19 
FOSNONCONTR (Family Ownership Squared * 
Frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
noncontrolling owners) 
   -.00 
FOPOSITION (Family Ownership *  Frequency of the 
use of provisions protecting managers‟ positions) 
   .05 
FOSPOSITION (Family Ownership Squared *  
Frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
managers‟ positions) 
   .00 
FOMONETARY (Family Ownership * Frequency of 
the use of provisions protecting managers monetarily) 
   .55*** 
FOSMONETARY (Family Ownership Squared * 
Frequency of the use of provisions protecting managers 
monetarily) 
   -.01*** 
FOLEGAL (Family Ownership *  Frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting managers legally) 
   -.28*** 
FOSLEGAL (Family Ownership Squared * Frequency 
of the use of provisions protecting managers legally) 
   .01*** 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactions (02, 04, 06) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
FMVOTING (Family Management *  Frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting owners through voting rights) 
   -1.96** 
FMSVOTING (Family Management Squared *  Frequency of the 
use of provisions protecting owners through voting rights) 
   .59* 
FMSTATUS (Family Management *  Frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting owners through sustaining control status) 
   .05 
FMSSTATUS (Family Management Squared *  Frequency of the 
use of provisions protecting owners through sustaining control 
status) 
   .02 
FMNONCONTR (Family Management *  Frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting noncontrolling owners) 
   4.21*** 
FMSNONCONTR (Family Management Squared  *  Frequency 
of the use of provisions protecting noncontrolling owners) 
   -.84*** 
FMPOSITION (Family Management * Frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting managers‟ positions) 
   -.03 
FMSPOSITION (Family Management Squared * Frequency of 
the use of provisions protecting managers‟ positions) 
   -.01 
FMMONETARY (Family Management *  Frequency of the use 
of provisions protecting managers monetarily) 
   -3.09*** 
FMSMONETARY (Family Management Squared *  Frequency 
of the use of provisions protecting managers monetarily) 
   .33+ 
FMLEGAL (Family Management *   Frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting managers legally) 
   1.71*** 
FMSLEGAL (Family Management  Squared *   Frequency of the 
use of provisions protecting managers legally) 
   -.30** 
Log likelihood function -843.70 -2902.08 -829.03 -2796.64 
+p< .10; *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001     
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Table 3.3 
 
Summary of Findings – Essay 2 
 
Hypotheses Conditions that will demonstrate support for the hypotheses Findings 
(Table 3.2) 
H6a Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Voting Rights (FO*VOTINGRIGHTS) is 
negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership2*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Controlling 
Owners‟ Voting Rights (FO2*VOTING) is positive and significant 
(p<0.05). 
Not supported 
 
H6b Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Status (FO*STATUS) is negative and 
significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family Ownership2*Frequency 
of the use of Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Status 
(FO2*STATUS) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Supported 
(Figure 3.2) 
H7a Beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Voting Rights (FM*VOTING) 
is negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family 
Management2*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Controlling 
Owners‟ Voting Rights (FM2*VOTING) is positive and significant 
(p<0.05). 
Supported 
(Figure 3.3) 
H7b Beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Controlling Owners‟ Status (FM*STATUS) is 
negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family 
Management2*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Controlling 
Owners‟ Status (FM2*STATUS) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Not supported 
H8a Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Noncontrolling Owners (FO*NONCONTROLLING) is positive 
and significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership2*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Noncontrolling 
Owners (FO2*NONCONTROLLING) is negative and significant (p<0.05). 
Not supported 
H8b Beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Noncontrolling Owners 
(FM*NONCONTROLLING) is positive and significant (p<0.05) and beta 
coefficient of Family Management2*Frequency of the use of Provisions 
Protecting Noncontrolling Owners (FM2*NONCONTROLLING) is 
negative and significant (p<0.05). 
Supported 
(Figure 3.4) 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
 
 
Hypotheses Conditions that will demonstrate support for the hypotheses Findings 
(Table 3.2) 
H9a Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers‟ and Directors‟ Position 
(FO*POSITION) is negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta 
coefficient of Family Ownership2*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers‟ and Directors‟ Position 
(FO2*POSITION) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Not supported 
 
H9b Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Monetarily 
(FO*MONETARY) is negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta 
coefficient of Family Ownership2*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Monetarily 
(FO2*MONETARY) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Not supported 
(Significant, but in the 
opposite direction) 
(Figure 3.7) 
H9c Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Legally 
(FO*LEGAL) is negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta 
coefficient of Family Ownership2*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Legally 
(FO2*LEGAL) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Supported 
(Figure 3.5) 
H10a Beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers‟ and Directors‟ Position 
(FM*POSITION) is negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta 
coefficient of Family Management2*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers‟ and Directors‟ Position 
(FM2*POSITION) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Not supported 
 
 
H10b Beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Monetarily 
(FM*MONETARY) is negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta 
coefficient of Family Management2*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Monetarily 
(FM2*MONETARY) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Supported 
(Figure 3.6) 
H10c Beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Legally 
(FM*LEGAL) is negative and significant (p<0.05) and beta 
coefficient of Family Management2*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Managers and Directors Legally 
(FM2*LEGAL) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Not supported 
(Significant, but in the 
opposite direction) 
(Figure 3.8) 
H11a Beta coefficient of Family Ownership*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Others (FO*OTHERS) is negative and 
significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family 
Ownership2*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Others 
(FO2*OTHERS) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Not tested since analyses did 
not run with OTHERS 
variable 
H11b Beta coefficient of Family Management*Frequency of the use of 
Provisions Protecting Others (FM*OTHERS) is negative and 
significant (p<0.05) and beta coefficient of Family 
Management2*Frequency of the use of Provisions Protecting Others 
(FM2*OTHERS) is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Not tested since analyses did 
not run with 
OTHERS variable 
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Figure 3.1   Moderation Effects of the Frequency of the Use of Governance Provisions  
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Figure 3.2   Significant Interactions between Family Ownership and Status Provision  
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Figure 3.3   Significant Interactions between Family Management and Voting Provision  
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Figure 3.4   Significant Interactions between Family Management and Noncontrolling 
Provision  
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Figure 3.5   Significant Interactions between Family Ownership and Legal Provision  
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Figure 3.6   Significant Interactions between Family Management and Monetary 
Provision 
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Figure 3.7   Significant Interactions between Family Ownership and Monetary Provision  
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Figure 3.8   Significant Interactions between Family Management and Legal Provision  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION  
In this dissertation, I drew upon agency theory and corporate governance to 
classify corporate governance provisions within the context of family firms, investigating 
their propensity to use governance provisions and the impact of the use of those 
provisions on the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family ownership and 
family management) and firm performance. Indeed, the strategic decisions concerning the 
use of provisions and their interplay with family involvement components in influencing 
firm performance may shed light onto the governance dynamics associated with 
principal-principal agency issues in family controlled firms and the differences between 
not only family and nonfamily firms, but also among family firms themselves.  
In Essay 1, I applied agency theory and corporate governance to classify control 
enhancing corporate governance provisions and to examine the use of these provisions 
within the context of publicly traded family firms. First, I classified governance 
provisions within the context of family firms based on the purpose of usage and the 
existence of different interest groups (i.e. controlling owners, noncontrolling owners, 
managers and directors, and a broad group of employees) in publicly traded family firms. 
Then, I argued that family ownership and family management would differentially 
influence the frequency of the use of different types of control enhancing governance 
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provisions.  Specifically, I argued that family ownership will influence the frequency of 
the use of different types of provisions and family management will moderate the 
relationships between family ownership and the frequency of the use of governance 
provisions. I developed and tested the hypotheses on a sample of 386 of S&P500 firms. 
Findings did not support the hypothesized relationships in Essay 1.  
Several explanations are provided concerning the insignificant hypothesized 
relationships. First, the use of provisions might be institutionalized among corporations. 
This may have prevented the influential effects of family ownership and family 
management on the adoption and the use of provisions. Second, family firms may not 
need to use provisions more than nonfamily firms since their involvement in ownership 
and/or management already provides adequate protection of their interests. Moreover, 
family owners and managers with stewardship tendencies may choose not to use 
provisions which may be primarily benefiting the controlling family, rather than the firm 
and all shareholders as a whole. Furthermore, family owners and managers may have no 
greater power than nonfamily firms in the US to implement governance provisions owing 
to a strong legal system that places limits on the dominance of owners and managers. 
The results in Essay 1 also show interesting significant relationships between the 
use of provisions and the generation that is predominant among family managers and 
board members. Therefore, the generation of the family in charge tends to play a critical 
role on the propensity to use provisions.  
 In Essay 2, I investigated the link between family involvement (i.e. family 
ownership and family management), the use of governance provisions, and firm 
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performance. I suggested that the frequency of the use of different types of control 
enhancing governance provisions differentially influence the relationship between family 
involvement (i.e. family ownership and family management) in the business and firm 
performance. I developed and tested the hypotheses on the same sample I used in Essay 
1. Findings supported the hypotheses suggesting the moderation effects of (a) the 
frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling owners in terms of their 
sustainability of controlling status on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance, (b) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting 
management legally on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance, (c) the frequency of the use of provisions protecting controlling 
owners in terms of their voting rights on the inverted u-shaped relationship between 
family management and firm performance, (d) the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting noncontrolling owners on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance, and (e) the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting management monetarily on the inverted u-shaped relationship between family 
management and firm performance. 
Concerning the moderation effects of the frequency of the use of provisions 
protecting controlling owners in terms of their sustainability of controlling status on the 
inverted u-shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance, the 
higher frequency of the use of these provisions can elevate family owners‟ power. This 
increased power of the controlling family can enable family owners to pursue family-
centered goals and reap the private benefits of control, exacerbating principal-principal 
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agency problems and reducing firm performance. The significance of the moderations 
effects of the frequency of the use of provisions protecting management legally on the 
relationship between family ownership and firm performance may be owing to the family 
managers‟ freedom to act in accordance with the family owners family-centered 
expectations through the insulation from the legal consequences of wrongdoings. 
Furthermore, the significant moderation effects of the frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting controlling owners in terms of their voting rights on the inverted u-
shaped relationship between family management and firm performance may be explained 
by the strengthened discretionary power of the controlling family, allowing family 
managers to pursue family oriented goals primarily benefiting the family, thereby 
reducing firm performance. Similarly, the significance of the frequency of the use of 
provisions protecting management monetarily on the inverted u-shaped relationship 
between family management and firm performance may be that it reduces the monetary 
incentive of managers and directors for increasing firm performance. Unlike other 
provision groups with negative moderation effects, the positive significant moderation 
effect of the frequency of the use of provisions protecting noncontrolling owners on the 
inverted u-shaped relationship between family management and firm performance may 
be because of the threat of shareholder activism disciplining family managers and 
directors and mitigating their opportunistic behaviors.  
A significant finding in the opposite direction is concerning the moderation effect 
of the use of provisions protecting managers and directors monetarily on the relationship 
between family ownership and firm performance. Findings suggest significant positive 
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moderation effect of the higher frequency of the use of such mechanisms on the 
relationship between family ownership and firm performance, rather than negative 
moderation effect as hypothesized. This may be because of the combined benefits of 
family ownership ensuring effective monitoring and nonfamily managers and directors‟ 
lower risk bearing facilitating their risk taking and engaging in potentially profitable 
projects, which can be beneficial to firm performance.  
The other significant finding in the opposite direction than hypothesized is the 
moderation effects of the use of provisions protecting managers and directors legally on 
the relationship between family management and firm performance. Findings suggest 
positive moderation effects of the use of provisions protecting managers and directors 
legally on the relationship between family management and firm performance, rather than 
the hypothesized negative moderation effects. It appears that when the family shares the 
benefits of legal protection for managers, they may more likely to pursue high risk-high 
return strategies than when they do not. 
Hence, the results of this dissertation show that family ownership and family 
management are not related to the use of different types of governance provisions in 
publicly traded firms. However, the use of governance provisions tends to affect the 
relationship between the components of family involvement (i.e. family ownership and 
family management) and firm performance. 
On the one hand, as suggested in Essay 1, the findings concerning the lack of 
impact of family ownership and family management on the use of governance provisions 
have implications for the applicability of institutional and stewardship theories aside from 
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agency theory and corporate governance in studies exploring the use of provisions in 
publicly traded family firms. Indeed, studies investigating the use of provisions in 
publicly traded family versus nonfamily firms through the lens of institutional theory can 
shed light onto how and why the use of provisions may be similar in the two types of 
firms, thereby providing a better understanding of the governance dynamics in family 
controlled corporations. In addition, studies examining the propensity to use provisions in 
family firms within the framework of stewardship theory can explain why family owners 
and managers might be prone to show forbearance in the use of provisions even though 
their control of the firm might allow them the discretion to act more forcefully in their 
own interests.  
On the other hand, in Essay 2, the results suggesting the moderation effects of the 
use of provisions on the relationship between family involvement (i.e. family ownership 
and family management) and firm performance can be largely explained with agency 
theory logic. The use of provisions (e.g. provisions protecting controlling owners‟ voting 
rights) can enhance controlling family‟s power, authority, and legitimacy. Consistent 
with the main tenets of principal-principal agency view, increased power can enable 
family owners and managers to act opportunistically by expropriating shareholder wealth 
and entrenching themselves, if they want to. This consequently harms firm performance. 
Future research can build on the findings of this essay by investigating the impact of 
other contingencies (e.g. imminence of succession, diversification, entrepreneurial 
orientation, corporate entrepreneurship, and life-cycle phases) on the relationship 
between family involvement in corporate governance and firm performance.  
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 In sum, the findings of this dissertation can help scholars and practitioners have a 
better understanding of how and why family involvement in corporate governance can 
lead to distinct firm behavior and performance differences not only between family firms 
and nonfamily firms, but also among family firms themselves. If family firms can 
capitalize on the positive impact of family influence over the business and restrict agency 
problems, they can both prosper and exemplify effective corporate governance practices.
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Summary of Agency Theory 
 
Authors Agency 
Issues 
Agency Theory 
Ross (1973)  . All contractual arrangements contain important 
elements of agency (p. 134). 
Jensen & 
Meckling 
(1976) 
Owner-
manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. Agency relationship: A contract under which one 
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to agent (p. 308). 
. Agency costs (p. 308):  
(1) The monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, 
(2) The bonding expenditures by the agent 
(3) The residual loss 
. Agency costs arise in any situation involving 
cooperative effort (p. 309). 
. The issues associated with the separation of 
ownership and control are intimately associated 
with the general problem of agency. 
. The private corporation is simply one form of 
legal fiction which serves as a nexus for 
contracting relationships and which is also 
characterized by the existence of divisible residual 
claims on the assets and cash flows of the 
organization which can generally be sold without 
permission of the other contracting individuals 
(p.311). 
. The firm is a legal fiction which serves as a 
focus for a complex process in which the 
conflicting objectives of individuals are brought 
into equilibrium within a framework of 
contractual relations (p.311). 
. As the owner-manager‟s fraction of equity falls, 
his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this 
will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger 
amounts of the corporation resources in the form 
of perquisites for his own consumption (p. 313). 
. As the manager‟s ownership claim falls, his 
incentive to devote significant effort to creative 
activities such as seeking out new profitable 
ventures falls (p. 313). 
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Authors Agency Issues Agency Theory 
Demsetz 
(1983) 
Owner-manager 
 
 
. Ownership of the modern corporation is so diluted 
among the multitude of shareholders that their interests 
are essentially unrepresented when corporate 
management makes is decision.  
. Not every owner of shares can or wishes to control 
management, but those who purchase shares do presume 
that in the typical case there will be some owners with 
enough stake to oversee management (p. 387). 
Fama & 
Jensen 
(1983a) 
Owner-manager . The decision process is in the hands of professional 
managers whose interests are not identical to those of 
residual claimants (P. 6). 
. The separation of ownership and control is more 
precisely the separation of residual risk bearing from 
decision functions. 
Fama & 
Jensen 
(1983b) 
Benefits of 
separating residual 
claimants from 
decision makers 
. Control of agency problems in the decision process is 
important when the decision managers who initiate and 
implement important decisions are not the major residual 
claimants and therefore do not bear a major share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions. Without effective 
control procedures, such decision managers are more 
likely to take actions that deviate from the interests of 
residual claimants.  
. An effective system for decision control implies, almost 
by definition, that the control (ratification and 
monitoring) of decisions is to some extent separate from 
the management (initiation and implementation) of 
decisions. Individual decision agents can be involved in 
the management of some decisions and the control of 
others, but separation means that an individual agent does 
not exercise exclusive management and control rights 
over the same decisions (p. 304).  
Demsetz 
& Lehn 
(1985) 
Benefits of 
concentrated 
ownership 
. The more concentrated is ownership, the greater degree 
to which benefits and costs are borne by the same owner. 
. In a very diffusely owned firm, the divergence between 
benefits and costs would be much larger for the typical 
owner, and he/she can be expected to respond by 
neglecting some tasks of ownership. 
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Authors Agency Issues Agency Theory 
Eisenhardt 
(1985) 
Agency 
problem 
The agency problem is to determine the optimal 
contract for the agent‟s service (p.136). 
Shleifer & 
Vishny 
(1986) 
Large minority 
shareholder 
The presence of a large minority shareholder 
provides a partial solution to the free-rider problem 
(p. 461). 
Eisenhardt 
(1989) 
Owner-
manager 
Agency problem arises when (a) the desires or goals 
of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what 
the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that 
the principal cannot verify that the agent has 
behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of 
risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The problem 
here is that the principal and the agent may prefer 
different actions because of the different risk 
preferences (p. 58). 
Walsh & 
Seward 
(1990) 
 . 4 classes of managerial entrenchment practices: 
(1) Alter person assessments 
(2) Alter situation assessments 
(3) Alter performance assessments 
Neutralize internal control mechanisms 
Jensen 
(1994) 
Conflicts of 
interests and 
self-control 
problems 
. Money is not always the best way to motivate 
people. People are motivated by other things than 
money. 
. 2 sources of agency costs: 
(1) Conflicts of interests between people 
(2) Self-control problems-that is the actions that 
people take that harm themselves as well as 
those around them (p. 12). 
. The central proposition of agency theory is not that 
people are self-interested , or that conflicts exist. The 
central proposition of agency theory is that rational 
self-interested people always have incentives to 
reduce or control conflicts of interest so as to reduce 
the losses these conflicts engender (p. 13, 14). 
. Even if we instill more altruism in everyone, 
agency problems would not be solved. Put simply, 
altruism, the concern for the well-being of others, 
does not turn people into perfect agents who do the 
bidding of others (p. 14). 
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Shleifer 
& Vishny 
(1997) 
Owner-manager 
Owner-owner 
. The opportunities for managers to abscond with 
financiers‟ funds, or to squander them on pet 
projects, are plentiful and well-documented (p. 773). 
. Large investors reduce agency costs (p. 739). 
. Concentrated ownership has its costs as well (i.e. 
potential expropriation by large investors of other 
investors and stakeholders in the firm) (p. 739).  
. Managers can expropriate shareholders by 
entrenching themselves and staying on the job even if 
they are no longer competent or qualified to run the 
firm (p. 742,743). 
La Porta 
et al. 
(1999) 
Owner-owner of the controlling family, but at the same time they 
have the power to expropriate the minority 
shareholders as well as the interest in so doing. Cash 
flow ownership by the controlling shareholder 
mitigates this incentive for expropriation, but does 
not eliminate it (p. 511). 
Short & 
Keasey 
(1999) 
Owner-owner . The UK management become entrenched at higher 
levels ownership than their US counterparts (p. 79).   
. In the UK, management do not have the same 
freedom as their US counterparts to mount takeover 
defenses. 
Ang et al. 
(2000) 
Owner-manager 
Owner-owner 
 
Agency costs are significantly higher when an 
outsider rather than an insider manages the firm; 
inversely related to the manager‟s ownership share; 
increase with the number of nonmanager 
shareholders. 
Johnson 
et al. 
(2000) 
Owner-owner Tunneling comes in 2 forms (p. 22, 23): 
(1) A controlling shareholder can simply transfer 
resources from the firm for his own benefit 
through self-dealing transactions, such as 
outright theft or fraud, asset sales and 
contracts such as transfer pricing 
advantageous to the controlling shareholder, 
excessive executive compensation, loan 
guarantees, and expropriation of corporate 
opportunities. 
(2) A controlling shareholder can increase 
his/her share of the firm without transferring 
any assets through dilutive share issues, 
minority freeze-outs, insider trading, 
creeping acquisitions, or other financial 
transactions that discriminate against 
minorities. 
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La Porta et 
al. (2000) 
Owner-
owner 
. The fundamental agency problem is not the 
conflict between outside investors and managers, 
but rather that between outside investors and 
controlling shareholders who have nearly full 
control over the managers (p. 15). 
. In many countries, expropriation of minority 
shareholders and creditors by the controlling 
shareholders is extensive.  
Demsetz & 
Villalonga 
(2000) 
Owner-
manager 
. Diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some 
agency problems, also yields compensating 
advantages that generally offset such problems (p. 
209). 
Dharwadkar 
et al. (2000) 
Owner-
owner 
. Weak governance and limited protection of 
minority shareholders intensify traditional 
principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption 
and entrenchment) and create unique agency 
problems (expropriation) (p. 650). 
Scharfstein 
& Stein 
(2000) 
Owner-
manager  
. By rent-seeking, division managers can raise their 
bargaining power and extract greater overall 
compensation from the CEO. And because the 
CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this 
extra compensation may take the form not of cash 
wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting 
allocations (p. 2537). 
. CEO has the authority to allocate new investment 
across divisions and is charged with identifying, 
hiring, and retaining the division managers (p. 
2541). 
. CEO is the only one with any meaningful 
authority to allocate resources (p. 2559). 
Gomez-
Mejia et al. 
(2001) 
Owner-
owner  
. One cannot assume that the motivation, desires, 
and concerns of the family executive are identical 
to those of other family shareholders, nor that the 
family executive will try to do what is best for the 
firm rather than pursue a personal agenda (p. 7).  
. Higher executive entrenchment under family 
contracting because emotions may color perceived 
competence of the 
executive, reducing monitoring effectiveness. In 
other words, family status leads to biased judgment 
about the appropriateness of executive decisions (p. 
8).   
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Anderson 
et al. 
(2002) 
Shareholder-
bondholder 
. Founding family firms have incentive structures 
that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity 
and debt claimants.  
. Bond holders view family ownership as an 
organizational structure that better protects their 
interests (p. 1). 
. Family CEOs are more entrenched in their 
positions (p. 3). 
Claessens 
et al. 
(2002) 
Owner-owner . Separating control rights and cash-flow rights can 
create agency costs larger than the costs associated 
with a controlling shareholder who has a majority of 
cash-flow rights (p. 30). 
. East Asian firms show a sharp divergence between 
cash-flow rights and control rights-that is, the 
largest shareholder is often able to control a firm‟s 
operations with a relatively small direct stake in its 
cash-flow rights. Control is often enhanced beyond 
ownership stakes through pyramid structures and 
cross-holdings, and sometimes through dual-class 
shares. 
. The risk of expropriation of minority shareholders 
by large, controlling shareholders is an important 
agency problem in most countries (p. 30). 
Boubaker 
(2003) 
Owner-owner . Large controlling shareholders maintaining a grip 
on control while holding small fraction of cash flow 
rights are inclined to expropriate minority 
shareholders. 
. Pyramiding is the main device set to unduly 
entrench the large controlling shareholder (p. 1). 
Anderson 
& Reeb 
(2003a) 
Owner-owner . Founding families have the incentives and power 
to take actions that benefit themselves at the 
expense of firm performance (p. 1304). 
. Family ownership and control is associated with 
greater managerial entrenchment. 
Anderson 
& Reeb 
(2003b) 
Owner-owner . The consideration of potential owner-owner 
conflicts provides a new perspective on the relative 
role of independent directors in mitigating agency 
conflicts. Outside shareholders call for independent 
directors on the board to minimize family 
opportunism (p. 4). 
. Families themselves do not seek to place 
independent directors on the board. 
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Lemmon 
& Lins 
(2003) 
Owner-owner . In many East Asian firms, managers are able to 
effectively control the firm even though they may 
have relatively low cash flow ownership (p. 1447). 
. The ability to control the firm‟s assets is a 
necessary antecedent for expropriation of minority 
shareholders. 
Morck & 
Yeung 
(2003) 
Owner-
manager 
Owner-owner 
. In widely held firms, the concern is that 
professional managers may fail in their fiduciary 
duty to act for public shareholders. 
. In family business groups, the concern is that 
managers may act for the controlling family, but not 
for shareholders in general. 
. Agency issues are: the use of pyramidal groups to 
separate ownership from control, the entrenchment 
of controlling families, and non-arm‟s-length 
transactions (a.k.a. “tunneling”) between related 
companies that are detrimental to public investors 
(p. 1). 
. Beyond a certain point, increased managerial 
ownership reduces the efficacy of the corporate 
governance mechanisms (p. 8). 
Cronqvist 
& Nilsson 
(2003) 
Owner-owner . The controlling families have entrenched 
themselves considerably, suggesting that they derive 
large private benefits, and have close to complete 
discretion over the firm‟s decisions while owning 
only a fraction of the firm‟s equity in Sweden. 
. The lower operating performance is likely to stem 
from suboptimal investment decisions (p. 714). 
. Family controlling minority shareholders hang on 
to the control too long from the non-controlling 
shareholders‟ perspective; e.g., firms with family 
control are much less likely to be taken over 
compared to other firms (p. 715). 
Holderness 
(2003) 
Owner-owner . Block ownership is motivated both by the benefits 
of shared control: blockholders have the incentive 
and the opportunity to increase a firm‟s expected 
cash flows that accrue to all shareholders; and by 
the private benefits of control: blockholders have 
the incentive and the opportunity to consume 
corporate benefits to the exclusion of smaller 
shareholders (p. 60). 
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Gilson & 
Gordon 
(2003) 
Owner-manager 
Owner-owner 
. The presence of a large shareholder may better 
police management than the standard panoply 
of market-oriented techniques (p. 785). 
. The presence of a controlling shareholder 
reduces the managerial agency problem but at 
the cost of the private benefits agency problem. 
. Because there are costs associated with 
holding a concentrated position and with 
exercising the monitoring function, some 
private benefits of control may be necessary, to 
induce a party to play that role. 
. Noncontrolling shareholders will prefer the 
presence of a controlling shareholder so long as 
the benefits from reduction in managerial 
agency costs are greater than the costs of 
private benefits of control. 
. A controlling shareholder may extract private 
benefits of control in one of three ways: by 
taking a disproportionate amount of the 
corporation‟s ongoing earnings, by freezing out 
the minority, or by selling control (p. 786). 
Gilson (2004) Owner-manager 
Owner-owner 
. The role of controlling shareholders lies at the 
intersection of the two elements of the agency 
problem that is at the core of the public 
corporation governance.  
. The first element is the familiar agency 
problem that arises from the separation of 
ownership and control. 
. The second element is the conflict between 
controlling and noncontrolling shareholders 
over the potential for the controlling 
shareholder to extract private benefits of 
control.  
. The less the equity the controlling shareholder 
has, the greater the incentive to use control to 
extract private benefits. 
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Anderson & 
Reeb (2004) 
Owner-owner . The influence of independent directors may 
represent an important line of defense that 
minority shareholders can employ in protecting 
themselves against opportunism by large 
shareholders (p. 211). 
. Family influence provides benefits to 
minority shareholders, but too much influence 
creates the potential for moral hazard conflicts 
between the family and outside shareholders. 
. When the divergence between family- and 
outside-shareholder interests becomes large 
and costly, independent directors can intervene 
to protect the interests of all shareholders. 
. Inefficient controlling shareholders: The cost 
of private benefit extraction exceeds the 
benefits of more focused monitoring of 
management-minority shareholders are worse 
off from the monitoring effort. 
. Efficient controlling shareholders: The 
benefits of more focused monitoring exceed 
the cost of private benefit extraction and the 
value of minority shares increases as a result. 
Steier et al. 
(2004) 
 . Recent research suggests that agency issues in 
family firms are more complex than previously 
believed (p. 298). 
. Entrenched ownership and asymmetric 
altruism could create their own agency 
problems that must be controlled. 
. Agency issues are made more complex 
because of the juxtaposition of economic and 
non-economic goals in family firms. 
Morck et al. 
(2005) 
Owner-owner . Control rights exceeding cash flow rights 
protect the controlling owner from losing 
power and lead to agency problems, including 
non-value maximizing investment and 
incentives to divert resources (p. 675). 
Miller & Le 
Breton-
Miller 
(2006) 
Owner-
manager 
Owner-owner 
. Agency costs between owners and managers 
can be advantageously low if there is a close 
alignment or even identity between the 
interests of owners and managers (p. 74). 
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Villalonga 
& Amit 
(2006a) 
Owner-
manager 
Owner-owner 
. Owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is 
more costly than the conflict between family and 
non-family shareholders in founder-CEO firms.  
. The conflict between family and nonfamily 
shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more 
costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily 
firms (p. 1).  
Villalonga 
& Amit 
(2006b) 
Owner-
manager 
Owner-owner 
. Ownership concentration can mitigate the agency 
problem between owners and managers, but the 
separation of control and cash-flow rights can create 
substantial agency costs between large and small 
shareholders, as large shareholders can appropriate 
private benefits of control without incurring their 
fair share of the cost (p. 1, 2). This agency problem 
can be particularly acute when the large shareholder 
is an individual or family, since the incentives for 
both monitoring the affairs of the company and 
expropriating private benefits are not as diffuse as 
they are in most institutions. 
Maury 
(2006) 
Owner-
manager 
Owner-owner 
. The benefits from family control occur in 
nonmajority held firms (p. 321). 
. Family control lowers the agency problem between 
owners and managers, but gives rise to conflicts 
between the family and minority shareholders when 
shareholder protection is low and control is high. 
Ali et al. 
(2007) 
Owner-
manager 
Owner-owner 
. Compared to nonfamily firms, family firms in the 
U.S. face less severe agency problems that arise 
from the separation of ownership and management.  
. However, they are characterized by more severe 
agency problems that arise between controlling and 
noncontrolling shareholders (p. 1). 
Young et 
al. (2008) 
Owner-owner . Principal-principal conflicts are characterized by 
concentrated ownership and control, poor 
institutional protection of minority shareholders, and 
indicators of weak governance such as fewer 
publicly traded firms, lower firm valuations, lower 
levels of dividends payout, less information 
contained in stock prices, less investment in 
innovation, and, in many cases, expropriation of 
minority shareholders (p. 197). 
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Villalonga 
& Amit 
(2009a) 
Owner-
manager 
Owner-owner 
. When founders and their families are in control, 
the competitive advantage explanation dominates 
(p. 5). 
. When non-founding families and individual 
blockholders are in control, the private benefits 
explanation dominates. 
. While all types of controlling families and 
individuals seek to maximize value for 
themselves, only founding families are willing 
and able to maximize value for all shareholders. 
Villalonga 
& Amit 
(2009b) 
Owner-
manager 
Owner-owner 
. In large U.S. corporations, founding families are 
the only blockholders whose control rights on 
average exceed their cash-flow rights (p. 3047). 
. Indirect ownership through trusts, foundations, 
limited partnerships, and other corporations is 
prevalent but rarely creates a wedge (a pyramid).  
. The primary sources of the wedge are dual-class 
stock, disproportionate board representation, and 
voting agreements. 
. Potential agency conflict between large 
shareholders and public shareholders in the U.S. is 
as relevant as elsewhere in the world. 
Chrisman 
et al. 
(2010) 
 . Owner-owner agency problems appear 
particularly persistent in family firms. 
. Research is needed to assist in understanding the 
attributes that give rise to this type of agency 
problem. 
. Research that helps us understand the forces that 
facilitate or mitigate the power of controlling 
owners to expropriate minority shareholder wealth 
(compared to the ability of managers to 
expropriate shareholder wealth in general) in 
family firms would be valuable (p. 20). 
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Authors Corporate Governance and Control 
Herman 
(1981) 
. Control relates to power (p. 17). 
. The diffusion of ownership eventually makes possible the control 
of large corporations with very small stockholdings (i.e. 1 to 5 
percent) (p. 24).  
. Two criteria for a cohesive group control (p. 25, 26): 
(1) Use of voting powers, directly or by threat, in a collective 
manner, designed to influence the selection of board of 
directors 
(2) Use or threat of the use of power to buy and sell stock on a 
collective basis allowing them to exercise a decisive or 
substantial influence over corporate decision making 
. The dominant owners occupy the top offices themselves, or they 
select those who do (p. 26). 
. Strategic position as the basis of control is attained by one of the 
following (p. 26): 
(1) Initial possession of a large stock ownership position or a 
major stock acquisition; 
(2) Role in organization and promotion; 
(3) Management changes 
(4) The gradual accretion of power from within the organization 
. Ownership has been and remains an important basis for obtaining 
strategic position (p. 27). 
 . Stock-based power and strategic position reinforce each other (p. 
27). 
. The great majority of outside directors of large managerial 
companies play a limited, dependent, and passive role that has 
remained essentially unchanged (p. 32). 
. A friendly, helpful but definitely unthreatening, and perhaps really 
compliant and passive, board may be the norm (p. 37). 
. A very large proportion of outside directors have ties and 
obligations to insiders that are likely subtly to compromise their 
independence (p. 45). 
. Directors in large mainstream corporations normally tend to play a 
passive role, as invited guests, characteristically tied to the inside 
hosts by some sort of personal or business relationship (p. 48). 
. Management‟s control is facilitated by its domination of the board 
selection processes and the resultant capacity of top officials to mold 
boards into friendly and compliant bodies. The recent increase in 
number and proportion of outside directors, and the shift in director 
composition, has not altered this pattern to any significant degree (p. 
52). 
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Jensen & 
Ruback 
(1983) 
. Corporate takeovers generate positive gains, that target firm 
shareholders benefit (p. 1). 
Demsetz 
& Lehn 
(1985) 
. Those who own large fractions of the outstanding shares of a firm 
either manage the firm themselves or are positioned to see to it that 
management serves their interests (p. 1161). 
Grossman 
& Hart 
(1986) 
. Ownership is the purchase of the residual rights of control (p. 692). 
. Ownership is the power to exercise control (694). 
Harris & 
Raviv 
(1988) 
. One share-one vote constitutes a socially optimal corporate 
governance rule (p. ). 
. Other majority rules and/or multiple classes of shares are not 
socially optimal. 
Grossman 
& Hart 
(1988) 
. One share-one vote maximizes the importance of benefits to 
security holders relative to benefits to the controlling party (p. ). 
 
Morck et 
al. (1989) 
. A hostile bidder often buys the firm and implements profit 
increasing changes against the wishes of both the board and the top 
management of the target (p. 843). 
Harris & 
Raviv 
(1991)  
. Conflicts between shareholders and managers arise because 
managers hold less than 100% of the residual claim (p. 300). 
. This inefficiency is reduced the larger is the fraction of the firm‟s 
equity owned by the manager. 
Davis 
(1991) 
. The adoption of a poison pill is an exemplar of an agency problem, 
in which the interests of shareholders (i.e. in retaining an unfettered 
ability to receive takeover offers) conflict with those of managers (i.e. 
in protecting themselves and their organization from unwanted 
takeovers). The ability to affect this change both indicates and 
enhances managerial discretion: the apparent harmfulness to 
shareholders of poison pills implies that managers who are able to get 
them adopted already have substantial discretion, and once in place 
they buffer managers and their organization from the market for 
corporate control by raising the barriers to takeover (p. 585, 586). 
DeMarzo 
(1993) 
. Majority voting by shareholders is constrained by a group of 
shareholders, or Board of Directors, who control the voting agenda 
(p. 713). 
. Shareholders not on the Board have no influence on the equilibrium 
production choice of the firm. 
. Agenda control implies full control over the firm‟s investments (p. 
714). 
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Beatty & 
Zajac 
(1994) 
. Agency approaches can apply not only in situations in which 
managers own little equity, but in all situations in which there is no 
single 100-percent owner/entrepreneur who bears the full cost of his 
or her actions (p. 315). 
. A heavy use of insider directors who are from top management still 
suggests relatively weak monitoring (p. 318). 
. Insider-dominated boards imply problematic self-monitoring and 
particularly weak monitoring of the CEO. 
. Large-scale owners with large equity holdings and who is not on 
the board are likely to be keen monitors of managerial behavior. 
. The presence of an outside board chairman who is not also CEO 
can represent an additional monitor of managerial behavior (p. 319). 
Hart (1995) . Corporate governance issues arise in an organization whenever two 
conditions are present. First there is an agency problem, or conflict 
of interest, involving members of the organization – these might be 
owners, managers, workers or consumers. Second, transaction costs 
are such that this agency problem cannot be dealt with through a 
contract (p. 678). 
. Governance structure allocates residual rights of control over the 
firm‟s nonhuman assets (p. 680). 
. Because of the separation of ownership and control, and the lack of 
monitoring, there is a danger that the managers of a public company 
will pursue their own goals at the expense of those of shareholders 
(p. 681). 
. A major part of corporate governance concerns the design of such 
checks and balances. 
Agrawal & 
Knoeber 
(1996) 
. Monitoring by the firm‟s own large owners and board members 
creates its own agency problem: Who monitors the monitors? (p. 
380). 
. More concentrated shareholdings by insiders provide a greater 
incentive to monitor and reward the chief executive effectively. 
Wright et 
al. (1996) 
. The relationship between insider ownership and corporate risk 
taking may become negative at high levels of insider equity 
ownership (p. 444). 
Turnbull 
(1997) 
. Corporate governance describes all the influences affecting the 
institutional processes, including those for appointing the controllers 
and/or regulators, involved in organizing the production and sale of 
goods and services (p. 181). 
Danielson 
& Karpoff 
(1998) 
. Supermajority vote requirements, classified boards, and 
shareholder meeting requirements tend to be used in concert (p. 1). 
. Firms with poison pills tend to have relatively high institutional 
ownership and low managerial ownership, but a high proportion of 
independent directors. 
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Bolton & 
Scharfstein 
(1998) 
. Because large shareholders have a lot at risk, they will have 
incentives to monitor and control management (p. 101). 
Bolton & 
Von 
Thadden 
(1998) 
. Ownership structure (p. 2): 
(1) Ownership concentration: A large blockholder is expected to 
exercise control of management continuously.  
(2) Ownership dispersion: With reliance on secondary market 
trading to create concentration whenever necessary for 
intervention in managerial decision making. 
. The benefits of dispersion are mainly greater market liquidity and 
better risk-diversification (p. 2). 
Gedajlovic 
& Shapiro 
(1998) 
. Concentrated ownership is a powerful constraint on managerial 
discretion (p. 535). 
. In the U.S., shares in most large firms are relatively widely held, 
such that the largest shareholder holds a modest stake in the company 
(p. 536). 
 . Unless board members are significant owners, their incentive to 
monitor is low and will not approach that of a dominant, or majority 
shareholder. 
Duggal & 
Millar 
(1999) 
. Institutional investors enhance corporate efficiency in two ways. 
First, institutional investors perform quality research in order to 
identify efficient firms for investing funds, thus directing scarce 
capital to its most efficient use. Second, large institutional stakes in 
public corporations provide strong economic incentives for 
institutional investors to monitor managers (p. 105). 
Denis & 
Sarin 
(1999) 
. Ownership changes directly cause changes in the top management 
team and in board structure (p. 189). 
Mishra & 
Conaughy 
(1999) 
. Founding family control, not managerial ownership, matters in 
determining the level of debt financing (p. 62). 
. The aversion of debt by founding family controlled firms may have 
the side effect of reducing their potential growth rates by giving up 
profitable growth opportunities. 
. There is a potential for a conflict of interests between the founding 
family controlled firm CEO and outside shareholders in the form of 
the CEO reducing his risk exposure at the expense of the shareholders‟ 
potential higher returns in growth opportunities (p. 63). 
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Lazonick 
& 
O‟Sullivan 
(2000) 
. The corporations tended to both retain the money that they earned 
and the people whom they employed, and they reinvested in 
physical capital and complementary human resources. (p. 14). 
. Retentions in the forms of earnings and capital consumption 
allowances provided the financial foundations for corporate growth, 
while the building of managerial organizations to develop and 
utilize productive resources enabled investments in plant, 
equipment, and personnel to succeed (p. 14, 15). 
Gillan & 
Starks 
(2000) 
. The primary emphasis of activist shareholders has been to focus on 
the poorly performing firms in their portfolio and to pressure the 
management of such firms for improved performance, thus 
enhancing shareholder value. 
Holmstrom 
& Kaplan 
(2001) 
. The 1980s ushered in a large wave of merger, takeover, and 
restructuring activity (p. 121). 
. In the 1990s, hostility declined substantially. At the same time, 
other corporate governance mechanisms began to play a larger role. 
Daily et al. 
(2003a) 
. Inside equity owners, are likely exhibit fundamentally different 
relationships with firm processes and outcomes as compared to 
external equity owners. 
. Whereas inside owners are concerned with minimizing their 
exposure to risk, external owners may prefer managers to adopt 
relatively more risk in order to pursue growth opportunities.  
Holderness 
(2003) 
. Ownership concentration appears to have little impact on firm 
value (p. 60). 
Singh & 
Davidson 
(2003) 
. Managerial ownership is positively related to asset utilization but 
does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive discretionary 
expenses (p. 793). 
. Independent outsiders on a board do not appear to protect the firm 
from agency costs.  
. Higher executive representation on the board does not lead to 
higher agency costs in terms of managerial discretion expenses (p. 
814). 
Daily et al. 
(2003b) 
. Governance: the determination of the broad uses to which 
organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of 
conflicts among the myriad participants in organizations (p. 371). 
. Corporate governance mechanisms provide shareholders some 
assurance that managers will strive to achieve outcomes that are in 
the shareholders‟ interests (p. 372). 
. Shareholder activism is designed to encourage executives and 
directors to adopt practices that insulate shareholders from 
managerial self-interest by providing incentives for executives to 
manage firms in shareholders‟ long-term interests (p. 373). 
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Gedajlovic 
et al. 
(2003) 
. Governance can be conceptualized as a coherent system of 
incentives, authority relations, and norms of legitimacy (p. 910). 
Klapper & 
Love 
(2004) 
. Better corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating 
performance and market valuation (p. 703).  
Klein et al. 
(2005) 
. Effective compensation, disclosure and shareholder rights practices 
enhance performance and this is true for most ownership types in 
Canadian firms (p. 769). 
Morck et 
al. (2005) 
. Outside the US and the UK, large corporations usually have 
controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal 
control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such 
families control corporations without making a commensurate capital 
investment (p. 655). 
Pagano & 
Volpin 
(2005) 
. Weak shareholder protection allows entrepreneurs to extract private 
benefits of control (p. 1027). 
Yeh (2005) . The corporate value is higher when the largest shareholder owns 
more shareholder rights (ownership) in Taiwanese firms, supporting 
the positive incentive effect (p. 313). 
. The negative entrenchment effect becomes evident when the largest 
shareholder‟s cash flow rights are less than the median.  
. If the cash flow rights owned by the larger shareholder will restrain 
the negative entrenchment effect. 
. In family-controlled companies, the corporate value will decrease if 
the largest shareholder enhances their voting rights through cross-
shareholding, deeply participates in management or controls most 
board of directors. 
Gourevitch 
& Shinn 
(2005) 
. Corporate governance is about power and responsibility (p. ). 
Morck & 
Steier 
(2005) 
. Corporate governance in many countries is remarkably concentrated 
in the hands of a few wealthy families (p. 3).  
. Governance can deteriorate over a wide swathe of the economy if the 
patriarch, or heir, controlling a large business group grows inept, 
excessively conservative or overly protective of the status quo.  
. A pyramid is a structure in which an apex shareholder, usually a 
wealthy family, controls a single company, which may or may not be 
listed. Structures such as these are ubiquitous outside the UK and US 
(p. 2). 
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Cremers & 
Nair 
(2005) 
. Blockholders and the board of directors are often seen as the 
primary internal monitoring mechanism, while takeovers and the 
market for corporate control are the primary external mechanism. 
These different mechanisms work together in a system  to affect 
governance in firms (p. 2859).  
. Internal and external governance mechanisms are complements in 
being associated with long-term abnormal returns (p. 2862).  
Becht et 
al. (2005) 
. Collective action problem can be mitigated by: 
(1) Partial concentration of ownership and control in the hands of 
one or a few large investors 
(2) Hostile takeovers and proxy voting contests, which 
concentrate ownership and/or voting power temporarily when 
needed 
(3) Delegation and concentration of control in the board of 
directors 
(4) Alignment of managerial interests with investors through 
executive compensation contracts 
(5) Clearly defined fiduciary duties for CEOs together with 
class-action suits that either block corporate decisions that go 
against investors‟ interests, or seek compensation for past 
actions that have harmed interests. 
. The favored mechanism for resolving collective action problems 
among shareholders in most countries appears to be partial ownership 
and control concentration in the hands of large shareholders. Two 
important costs associated with this form:  
(1) Potential collusion of large shareholders with management 
against smaller investors 
(2) The reduced liquidity of secondary markets 
. The fundamental issue concerning governance by shareholders 
today seems to be how to regulate large or active shareholders so as 
to obtain the right balance between managerial discretion and small 
shareholder protection (p. 1).  
Beiner et 
al. (2006) 
. There is a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
firm value, i.e., firms with better corporate governance standards 
receive higher market valuations (p. 252). 
Bebchuk 
et al. 
(2008) 
. Increases in the entrenchment index (i.e. staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter amendments) 
level are monotonically associated with economically significant 
reductions in firm valuation as well as negative abnormal returns (p. 
1). 
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Villalonga 
(2008) 
. The value of a share depends on who holds it (p. 1). 
 
* The articles listed in Appendix B are concerning corporate governance pertaining to i)    
corporate control, power, ownership, and performance; ii) shareholder value and 
activism; and iii) control enhancing mechanisms. 
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Corporate Governance Provision Definitions  
 
 
Provisions Definitions 
Provisions protecting 
controlling owners 
through enhancing 
voting rights 
 
Unequal Voting 
Rights 
To limit voting rights of some shareholders and expand 
those of others. 
Cumulative Voting Allows shareholders to concentrate their votes and helps 
minority shareholders to elect directors.  
Supermajority Voting requirements for approval of mergers. 
Provisions protecting 
controlling owners 
through sustaining 
controlling status 
 
Blank Check A preferred stock over which the BOD has broad 
authority to determine voting, dividend, conversion, and 
other rights. It is used to prevent takeover by placing this 
stock with certain friendly investors.  
Business 
Combination Law 
Requires a waiting period for transactions such as 
mergers, unless the transaction is approved by the BOD.  
Poison Pills Give the holders of the target firm‟s stocks the right to 
purchase stocks in the target at a discount and to sell 
shares at a premium if ownership changes. This makes 
the target unattractive. 
Bylaw  Amendment limitations limit shareholders‟ ability to 
amend the governing documents of the company.  
Charter Limitations to change the governing documents of the 
company.  
Fair Price Requires a bidder to pay to all shareholders the highest 
price paid to any during a period of time before the 
commencement of an offer. This makes an acquisition 
more expensive. 
Anti-greenmail Prohibits a firm‟s controlling owners/managers from 
paying a raider „greenmail‟, which involves the 
repurchase of blocks of company stock, at a premium 
above market price, in exchange for an agreement by the 
raider not to acquire the firm. Eliminating greenmail may 
discourage potential bidders from considering the target 
firm for a takeover.  
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Provisions Definitions  
Provisions protecting 
noncontrolling 
owners 
 
Cash-out Laws Shareholders can sell their stakes to a controlling 
shareholder at a price based on the highest price of 
recently acquired shares. It works as fair-price provisions 
extended to nontakeover situations. 
Secret Ballot Confidential voting. Either an independent third party or 
employees sworn to secrecy count proxy votes and 
management does not look at proxy cards.  
Provisions protecting 
management and 
directors’ positions 
 
Classified Board The board is split into different classes, with only one 
class up for election in a given year. Hence, an outsider 
who gains control of a corporation may need to wait a few 
years in order to be able to gain control of the board. 
Special Meeting 
Limitations 
Bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled annual 
meeting to replace BOD or dismantle takeover defenses. 
Written Consent 
Limitations 
Bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled annual 
meeting to replace BOD or to dismantle takeover defense. 
Directors’ Duties Provides BOD with a legal basis for rejecting a takeover 
that would have been beneficial to shareholders. 
Provisions protecting 
management and 
directors monetarily 
 
Compensation Plans In case of a change in control, this provision allows 
participants of incentive bonus plans to cash out options or 
accelerate the payout of bonuses.  
Golden Parachutes Severance agreements that provide cash or noncash 
compensation to senior executives upon an event such as 
termination, demotion, or resignation following a change 
in control.  
Severance Agreements assuring executives of their positions or some 
compensation and are not contingent upon a change in 
control. 
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Provisions Definitions  
Provisions protecting 
management and 
directors legally 
 
Contracts Indemnifies officers and directors from certain legal 
expenses and judgments resulting from lawsuits. 
Indemnification Indemnify officers and directors from certain legal 
expenses and judgments resulting from lawsuits pertaining 
to their conduct. 
Limitations on 
Director Liability 
Limit directors‟ personal liability. 
Provisions protecting 
others 
 
Pension Parachutes To prevent an acquirer from using surplus cash in the 
pension fund of the target firm. 
Silver Parachute To provide severance payments to a large number of firm‟s 
employees upon a change in control.  
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Summary of Performance Differences between Publicly Traded 
Family and Nonfamily Firms 
 
Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Morck et 
al. (1988) 
. Tobin‟s Q first 
increases, then 
declines, and finally 
rises slightly as 
ownership by the 
BOD rises.  
. For older firms, 
there is evidence that 
Q is lower when the 
firm is run by a 
member of the 
founding family than 
when it is run by an 
officer unrelated to 
the founder (p. 293) 
Empirical                                                                                                                   
Hoy & 
Verser 
(1994) 
The findings of Daily 
and Dollinger (1992) 
that the unified 
ownership and control 
leads to performance 
advantages also 
supports the idea of a 
competitive advantage 
for such firms (p. 15).  
Theoretical      
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Literature Main 
Arguments and 
Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
McConaughy 
et al. (1998) 
. Founding 
family controlled 
firms are more 
efficient and 
valuable than 
non-founding 
family controlled 
firms that are 
similar with 
respect to 
industry, size, 
and managerial 
ownership.  
. Descendant-
controlled firms 
are more 
efficient than 
founder-
controlled firms.  
. Family 
relationships 
improve 
monitoring while 
providing 
incentives that 
are associated 
with better firm 
performance (p. 
1). 
Empirical CEOs are either 
the founder or a 
member of the 
founder‟s family.  
Firm value 
(Market-to-
book equity) 
. Size 
. Industry 
. Managerial 
Ownership 
219 firms 
listed in the 
Business 
Week CEO 
1000 
. CEO 
information: 
October 21, 
1987 
. Managerial 
ownership: 
June 1987 
Disclosure 
. Firm age: 
time from 
founding until 
1988. 
. Other data: 
198-1988 from 
Compustat 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Morck et 
al., (1998) 
. Heir-controlled 
Canadian firms 
show low 
financial 
performance (p. 
1). 
. Concentrated, 
inherited 
corporate control 
impedes growth. 
. The negative 
relationship 
between heir 
control and 
economic growth 
is due to heirs 
often being 
entrenched poor 
managers whose 
firms nonetheless 
survive due to 
their preferential 
access to capital 
and protection 
from competition 
(p. 40). 
Empirical . Heir controlled: 
Firms controlled by 
descendants of their 
founders. 
. Business 
entrepreneur-
controlled: Firms 
controlled by the 
founders. 
. Return on Assets 
. Return on Sales 
. Real growth in 
total sales  
. Growth in 
number of 
employees 
. Firm size 
. Firm age 
. Industry 
Canadian 
firms 
1984-1989 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are
Defined 
Performance 
Measure
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
James 
(1999a) 
. Family owned and 
managed firms 
exhibit performance 
advantages relative 
to firms in which the 
ownership and 
control functions are 
separated (p. 42). 
. There is evidence 
from firms with 
public stock 
offerings that 
family-run 
businesses 
outperform 
professionally-
managed companies 
(p. 53). 
Theoretica
l 
     
McConaug
hy & 
Phillips 
(1999) 
. Founder-controlled 
firms grow faster 
and invest more in 
capital assets and 
research and 
development. 
. However, 
descendant-
controlled firms are 
more profitable (p. 
123). 
Empirical Publicly 
owned firms 
whose CEOs 
are either the 
founder or a 
member of 
the founder‟s 
family. 
Average annual 
value  
 90 founder-
controlled 
firms and 57 
descendant-
controlled 
firms in 
October 21,  
1987 Business 
Week CEO 
1000  
. 1986-1988 for 
financial 
performance 
. 1987 for 
controlling owner 
information 
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Literature Main Arguments and 
Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Habbershon 
& Williams 
(1999) 
. Family companies have 
been described as having 
patient capital with the 
capacity to invest in long-run 
return opportunities. 
. They place emphasis on 
company growth potential 
over short-term sales growth. 
. Because of their long-run 
view, family firms are said to 
be less reactive to economic 
cycles, have a lower cost of 
capital, and have 
outperformed the S&P 500.  
. Family firms have been 
described as having higher 
profit margins, faster growth 
rates, more stable earnings, 
and lower dividend rates. 
. Family firms have exhibited 
lower debt/equity levels and 
provided a much better return 
on the original investment (p. 
5). 
Theoretical      
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Literature Main 
Arguments and 
Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined
Performance Measure Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Smith & 
Amoako-
Adu 
(1999) 
. When family 
successors are 
appointed, stock 
prices decline, 
whereas there is 
no significant 
decrease when 
either non-family 
insiders or 
outsiders are 
appointed in 
Canadian family 
controlled firms. 
. The negative 
stock market 
reaction to family 
successors is 
related to their 
relatively young 
age which may 
reflect a lack of 
management 
experience rather 
than their family 
connection per 
se. 
Empirical An actively 
managed 
family firm: 
(1) a 
corporation in 
which a 
person or a 
group related 
by family ties 
holds the 
largest voting 
block and 
holds at least 
10% of the 
total votes, 
and (2) the 
president 
and/or CEO is 
a family 
member 
before the 
succession. 
 
 
. Abnormal stock return: 
The difference between 
the monthly return of the 
company stock and the 
TSE 300 Total Return 
Index over the four years 
ending before the 
announcement of the 
resignation. 
. The average difference 
between the company‟s 
annual return on assets 
less the median return on 
assets of the industry for 
the four years prior to the 
succession. 
 124 actively 
managed 
family firms 
which were 
listed on the 
TSE between 
1962-1996 
and underwent 
a succession 
in which a 
family 
member, 
nonfamily 
insider or an 
outsider was 
appointed to 
be president or 
CEO. 
1962-1996 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Short & 
Keasey 
(1999) 
. The results indicate 
that the non-linear 
relationship exists 
between 
performance and 
managerial 
ownership in UK (p. 
98, 99). 
. The combination of 
the convergence of 
interest and 
entrenchment effects 
point towards a non-
linear relation 
between the 
performance of firms 
and managerial 
ownership (p. 81). 
Empirical Managerial 
ownership: % of 
shares held by 
directors and 
their immediate 
families at the 
accounting year 
end.  
. Market value of 
equity at the 
accounting year end, 
divided by the book 
value of equity at the 
accounting year end. 
. Return on 
shareholders‟ equity 
equal to profits 
attributable to 
shareholders divided 
by shareholders‟ equity 
and reserves. 
. Size: log of firm‟s 
sales. 
. Growth: average 
annual growth in 
sales 
. Debt: total debt 
divided by book 
value of total assets 
. RDTA: R&D 
expenditure 
divided by total 
assets. 
UK firms in 
the official 
list of 
London 
Stock 
Exchange  
1988-
1992 
Claessens 
et al. 
(2002) 
. Firm value 
increases with the 
cash-flow ownership 
of the largest 
shareholder in East 
Asia. 
. Firm value falls 
when the control 
rights of the largest 
shareholder exceed 
its cash-flow rights 
(p. 2741). 
Empirical Family owning 
group: a group 
of people related 
by blood or 
marriage. 
Firm value: market-to-
book ratio.  
. Sales growth in 
the previous year 
. Capital spending 
relative to sales in 
the previous year 
. Firm age 
. Firm size 
. Industry 
 
East Asian 
corporations 
1996 
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Literature Main Arguments and 
Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms are 
Defined
Performance Measure Control  
Variables 
Anderson 
& Reeb 
(2003a) 
. Family firms perform better 
than nonfamily firms. 
. Relation between family 
holdings and firm 
performance is nonlinear. 
. When family members serve 
as CEO, performance is better 
than with outside CEOs. 
. Family ownership is an 
effective organizational 
structure (p. 1301). 
Empirical The fractional equity 
ownership of the 
founding family and/or 
the presence of family 
members on the BOD 
used to identify family 
firms. 
. Tobin‟s Q 
. ROA 
. ROE 
. Net Income 
. Firm size: log of the 
book value of total 
assets. 
. Growth 
opportunities: the 
ratio of R&D to total 
sales.  
. Firm risk: the 
standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns 
for the prior 60 
months.  
. Debt: long-term debt 
divided by total 
assets. 
. Firm age: the natural 
log of the number of 
years since the firm‟s 
founding.  
. Outside directors  
. CEO compensation 
. Blockholders with at 
least a 5% equity 
stake. 
. Incentive effects of 
other insiders‟ 
ownership: Equity 
holdings of officers 
and directors less 
family ownership. 
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Literature Main 
Arguments and 
Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Anderson & 
Reeb 
(2003b) 
. Independent 
director 
influence 
exhibits a 
positive and 
significant 
relation to firm 
value in 
founding-family 
firms. 
. As family 
power increases 
and independent 
director 
influence 
decreases, firm 
value decreases 
(p. 28).  
Empirical Family firm when 
founding family is 
present in the firm. 
. Tobin‟s Q: 
market value 
of total assets 
divided by the 
replacement 
costs of assets. 
. Economic 
Value Added: 
Net operating 
profit less the 
opportunity 
cost of capital 
for the funds 
invested in the 
firm.  
. Firm size: log 
of total assets. 
. Investment 
opportunity: 
R&D expenses/ 
fixed assets. 
. Firm risk: 
standard 
deviation of 
stock returns for 
the previous 60 
months.  
. Firm age: log 
of the number 
of years since 
the firm‟s 
founding.  
. Officer and 
director 
holdings less 
family 
ownership. 
. Long-term 
debt/total 
assets. 
. EBITDA: 
Return on 
Assets 
S&P 500 
firms  
1992-1999 
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Literatur
e 
Main Arguments and 
Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample 
Burkart et 
al. (2003) 
. A professional manager 
is a better manager than 
the heir (p. 2167). 
. The separation of 
ownership and 
management is an 
indication of a superior 
corporate governance 
environment (p. 2193). 
Theoretical     
Cronqvist 
& Nilsson 
(2003) 
. Family controlling 
minority shareholders 
(CMSs) are associated 
with largest discount on 
firm value in Sweden. 
. Return on assets is 
significantly lower for 
firms with concentrated 
vote control. 
. Family CMSs seem to 
hang on to the control 
too long (p. 695). 
. The lower operating 
performance is likely to 
stem from suboptimal 
investment decisions. 
Empirical . Controlling owner: 
an owner with > and 
equal to 25% of the 
votes.  
. Founder family 
ownership: Ownership 
by the founder or 
descendants of the 
founder , and 
individuals affiliated 
with the founder. 
. Non-founder family 
ownership: The 
aggregate block vote 
ownership > and equal 
to 5% of the votes by 
individuals 
unaffiliated with the 
founder. 
Tobin‟s Q: the ratio 
of market value of 
assets to the 
replacement cost of 
total assets, which is 
a measure of the 
contribution of 
intangible assets. 
. Firm size 
. Leverage 
309 
Swedish 
firms traded 
on 
Stockholm 
Stock 
Exchange 
during 
1991-1997. 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are
Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Anderson 
& Reeb 
(2004) 
. Family firms, on 
average, perform 
better than non-family 
firms. This result, 
however, appears to 
be primarily driven by 
family firms with 
greater degrees of 
board independence 
relative to family 
firms with few 
independent directors 
(p. 231). 
. When family control 
of the board exceeded 
independent director 
control, the firm‟s 
performance was 
significantly poorer; 
when family control 
was less than 
independent 
directors‟, 
performance was 
better (p. 232). 
Empirical Family firm is 
defined based on 
the fractional 
equity ownership 
of the founding 
family and/or the 
presence of family 
members serving 
on the BOD. 
Tobin‟s Q: the 
market value of 
total assets 
divided by the 
replacement 
costs of assets. 
. Firm size 
. Institutional 
owners 
. Incentive 
effects of other 
insiders‟ 
ownership: the 
equity holdings 
of officers and 
directors minus 
family 
ownership. 
. CEO 
compensation 
S&P 500 firms 
between 1992-
1999. 
1992-
1999 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Klein et al. 
(2005)  
No evidence that 
family ownership 
affects performance in 
Canadian firms (p. 
770). 
Empirical Family control: A 
family controlling 10% 
or more of the voting 
rights. 
Firm value: Tobin‟s 
Q 
. Firm size 
. Leverage 
(Debt/Equity 
ratio) 
. Average sales 
growth 
. Profit 
variability 
. Industry 
263 
Canadian 
firms 
2002 
Barth et al. 
(2005) 
. Family-owned firms 
are less productive 
than nonfamily-
owned firms in 
Norway. 
. Family owned firms 
managed by a person 
hired outside the 
owner family are 
equally productive as 
non-family-owned 
firms, while family-
owned firms managed 
by a person from the 
owner family are 
significantly less 
productive (p. 107). 
Empirical Family firm: At least 
33% of the shares are 
owned by one family. 
 Productivity: 
Standard Cobb-
Douglas 
productivity 
function 
. Industry 
. Stock 
exchange 
affiliation 
438 
Norwegian 
firms 
1996 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Barontini 
& Caprio 
(2005) 
. Valuation and 
operating performance 
are significantly 
higher in founder-
controlled 
corporations, and are 
at least not worse than 
average in 
descendant-controlled 
corporations.  
. Family control is 
positive for firm value 
and operating 
performance in 
Continental European 
firms. 
. When a descendant 
takes the position of 
CEO, family-
controlled companies 
are not statistically 
distinguishable from 
non-family ones in 
terms of valuation and 
performance (p. 1). 
Empirical Family control: 
Family controls 
more than 51% 
of direct voting 
rights, or 
controls more 
than the double 
of the direct 
voting rights of 
the second 
largest 
shareholder. 
. Tobin‟s Q 
. ROA 
. Industry 
. Firm size 
. Growth: % 
increase in 
sales from 
previous year 
. Leverage: 
Debt/Equity 
5,547 
corporations 
in 13 
Western 
European 
countries 
1999-2001 
Carney 
(2005) 
Family-controlled 
firms‟ competitive 
advantage arises from 
their system of 
corporate governance. 
Theoretical      
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Filatotchev 
et al. 
(2005) 
Board 
independence from 
founding family 
and board 
members‟ 
financial interests 
has a positive 
impact on 
performance in 
Taiwan (p. 257). 
Empirical Family ownership: 
the equity holding of 
the largest 
individual 
shareholder and 
close family. 
. Return on 
capital 
employed: 
Profit before 
tax/Total Issued 
capital 
. ROA 
. Sales 
Revenue: % of 
issued capital 
. Earnings per 
share: (Profits 
after tax-
Dividend paid 
on preference 
shares)/Total 
issued shares 
. Industry 
. Logarithm of 
capital intensity 
ratio 
. Logarithm of 
number of 
employees 
. Logarithm of 
age 
. Gearing ratio 
. Profit margin 
.Firm‟s 
membership to 
a bigger group 
. Logarithm of 
size of the 
board 
. Number of 
supervisors 
228 
Taiwanese 
firms listed 
in Taiwan 
Stock 
Exchange 
1999 
Perez-
Gonzales 
(2006) 
. Firms where 
incoming CEOs 
are related to the 
departing CEO, to 
a founder, or to a 
large shareholder 
underperform. 
. Lower 
performance in 
firms that appoint 
family CEOs (p. 
1559). 
Empirical Family succession: 
Any management 
change where the 
new CEO was 
related by blood or 
marriage to: (a) the 
departing CEO, (b) 
the founder, or (c) a 
large shareholder. 
. Average 
unadjusted 
operating return 
on assets 
. Industry- 
adjusted 
operating return 
on assets. 
. Market to 
book ratio 
. R&D/assets 
  
335 
nonfinancial, 
nonutility 
firms 
1994 
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Literature Main 
Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Villalonga 
& Amit 
(2006a) 
. Family 
ownership 
creates value 
only when the 
founder serves 
as the CEO of 
the family firm, 
or as its 
chairman with a 
hired CEO. 
. Dual class 
shares, 
pyramids, and 
voting 
agreements 
reduce the 
founder 
premium. 
. When 
descendants 
serve as CEOs, 
firm value is 
destroyed (p. 
385). 
Empirical Family firm: 
(1) Family has shares 
(2) Family has shares 
and has family officers 
and directors 
(3) Family is largest 
vote holder 
(4) Family is largest 
shareholder 
(5) Family has any 
shares, and is in 
second or later 
generation 
(6) Family is largest 
voteholder, and has 
family officers and 
directors 
(7) Family is largest 
shareholder and has at 
least 20% of the votes 
(8) Family has shares 
and family directors 
but no family officers 
(9) Family is largest 
voteholder, has at least 
20% of the votes and 
has family officers and 
directors, and is in 
second or later 
generation. 
Tobin‟s q: 
market-to-
book value 
. Governance 
Index 
. % of 
ownership in 
the firm by 
nonfamily 
blockholders 
. Proportion of 
nonfamily 
outside 
directors 
. Market risk 
. Corporate 
diversification 
. R&D/sales 
. Capital 
expenditures 
relative to 
property, plant, 
and equipment 
. Dividends 
relative to the 
book value of 
equity 
. Leverage  
. Firm size 
. Firm age 
. Industry 
Fortune-
500 firms 
1994-
2000 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Villalonga 
& Amit 
(2006b) 
The impact of 
control-enhancing 
mechanisms on firm 
value depends on 
the specific 
mechanism used (p. 
1). 
Empirical Family firm: The 
founder or a 
member of his or 
her family by 
either blood or 
marriage is an 
officer, director, 
or blockholder, 
either individually 
or as a group. 
Tobin‟s q . Industry 
. Age 
. Firm‟s stock 
market risk 
. Corporate 
diversification 
. Capital 
expenditures 
relative to fixed 
assets 
. Dividends as  a 
fraction of book 
equity 
. Debt relative to 
the market value 
of equity 
. Firm size 
Fortune 500 
firms  
1994-2000 
Lee (2006) . Family firms tend 
to experience higher 
employment and 
revenue growth 
over time and are 
more profitable. 
. Firm performance 
improves when 
founding family 
members are 
involved in 
management (p. 
103). 
Empirical Family firm: 
Family members 
or descendants 
hold shares or are 
present on the 
BOD. 
. 
Employment 
growth 
. Revenue 
growth 
. Gross 
income 
growth 
. Net profit 
margin 
. Industry 
. Firm size 
. Firm growth 
opportunities: 
Ratio of capital 
expenditures over 
gross revenues 
. Firm age 
. Incentive effects: 
% ownership by 
officers & BOD 
403 S&P 
500 firms 
excluding 
banks and 
public 
utilities. 
1992-2002 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance Measure Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Maury 
(2006) 
. Active family 
control is associated 
with higher 
profitability compared 
to nonfamily firms, 
whereas passive 
family control does 
not affect 
profitability.  
. Active family 
control continues to 
outperform nonfamily 
control in terms of 
profitability in 
different legal 
regimes. 
. Active and passive 
family control is 
associated with higher 
firm valuations, but 
the premium is 
mainly due to high 
shareholder 
protection.  
. The benefits from 
family control occur 
in nonmajority held 
firms (p. 321). 
Empirical Family control: 
Family as 
largest 
controlling 
owner holds at 
least 10% of 
voting  rights 
and the CEO, 
Chairman, or 
Vice Chairman 
position is held 
by a family 
member. 
 
. Tobin‟s Q: The market 
value of common equity 
plus the book value of 
total assets minus 
common equity and 
deferred taxes divided by 
the book value of total 
assets. 
. ROA 
. ROE 
. Industry 
. Growth 
opportunities: 
Growth in net 
sales 
(Average 
growth over 
the 3-year 
period 1996-
1998). 
. Firm size 
. Leverage 
1672 
nonfinancial 
firms in 
Western 
Europe 
1996, 
1998, 
2003 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Dyer 
(2006) 
. Researchers 
typically classify 
family firms using a 0 
or a 1-either the firm 
is a family firm or 
not-and then compare 
the performance of 
the sample of family 
firms with those firms 
that are designated as 
nonfamily. Such a 
classification scheme 
fails to recognize 
which “family 
factors” lead to high 
performance. 
. Clan family firms 
and professional 
family firms will have 
higher performance 
than nonfamily firms. 
. Nonfamily firms will 
have higher 
performance than 
self-interested family 
firms. 
Theoretical      
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Miller & 
Le Breton-
Miller 
(2006) 
. Family businesses 
do best when they 
take advantage of the 
potential for lower 
agency costs and elicit 
attitudes of 
stewardship. This is 
most apt to occur 
when voting control 
requires significant 
family ownership, 
when there is a strong 
family CEO without 
complete voting 
control and 
accountable to 
independent directors, 
when multiple family 
members serve as 
managers, and when 
the family intends to 
keep the business for 
generations. Often, 
these conditions are 
found in an 
established family 
business still being 
run by its founder. 
Theoretical      
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are Defined
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Westhead 
& 
Howorth 
(2006) 
. Family firms did 
not report superior 
firm performance 
in the UK. 
. Management 
rather than the 
ownership 
structure of a 
family firm was 
generally 
associated with 
performance (p. 
301).  
Empirical Family firm: If 
more than 50% of 
shares was owned 
by members of the 
largest single 
family group 
related by blood or 
marriage and the 
company was 
perceived by the 
CEO/managing 
director/Chair to be 
a family business. 
. 6 performance 
indicators: 
(1) Sales 
revenue 
(2) Sales 
revenue growth 
rate 
(3) Cash flow 
(4) Return on 
shareholder 
equity 
(5) Gross profit 
margin 
(6) Net profits 
from operations 
. Industry 
. Firm age 
. Location 
905 firms 
in the UK  
1995 
Bennedsen 
et al. 
(2007) 
. Family 
successions have a 
large negative 
causal impact on 
firm performance 
in Denmark. 
. Family-CEO 
underperformance 
is particularly large 
in high-growth 
industries and for 
relatively large 
firms (p. ). 
Empirical Family CEO 
succession: the 
incoming CEO is 
related by blood or 
marriage to the 
departing CEO. 
Operating 
Profitability 
. Firm size 
. Firm age 
. Industry 
5,334 
successions 
in publicly 
and 
privately 
held firms 
in Denmark 
1994-
2002 
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Literature Main Arguments and 
Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined 
Performance Measure Control  
Variables 
Sraer & 
Thesmar 
(2007) 
. Family firms largely 
outperform widely held 
corporations over a time period 
between 1994 and 2000 in 
France. 
. This result holds for founder-
controlled firms, professionally 
managed firms, and firms run 
by descendants of the founder 
(p. 709). 
Empirical Family firm: The 
founder or a 
member of the 
founder‟s family is a 
blockholder of the 
company. This 
block represents 
more than 20% of 
the voting rights. 
Corporate performance:  
based on accounts, 
market value, or 
dividend payout. 
. ROA: EBITDA/Book 
value of total assets 
. ROE: Earnings/pre-tax 
profit 
. Market valuation: 
Market-to-book ratio 
(The sum of market 
capitalization and book 
value of assets minus 
book value of equity 
divided by book value of 
total assets). 
. Year 
. Industry 
. Log of assets 
. Log age 
. State ownership at some 
point 
. Leverage: ratio of debt 
to total assets 
Miller et al. 
(2007) 
. Fortune 1000 firms that 
include relatives as owners or 
managers never outperform in 
market valuation, even during 
the first generation. 
. Only businesses with a lone 
founder outperform. 
. Neither lone founder nor 
family firms exhibited superior 
valuations. 
. Results confirm the difficulty 
of attributing superior 
performance to a particular 
governance variable (p. 829). 
Empirical Family firm: 
Multiple members 
of the same family 
are involved as 
major owners or 
managers, either 
contemporaneously 
or over time. 
Tobin‟s q: ratio of the 
market value to book 
value ((commonshares 
outstanding*calendar 
year closing 
price)+(current 
liabilities-current 
assets)+(long-term 
debt)+(liquidating value 
of preferred stock)) / 
total assets) 
. Industry 
. Advertising/sales  
. R&D to sales  
. New investment in plant 
and equipment 
. Leverage 
. Beta: volatility of returns 
. Total ownership of 
outside blockholders >5% 
. Special voting shares 
. Firm age 
. Log of firm sales 
. Sales growth 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Villalonga 
& Amit 
(2009a) 
. The impact of 
control enhancing 
mechanisms on firm 
value depends on the 
specific mechanism 
used: dual-class stock 
and disproportionate 
board representation 
have a negative 
impact, while 
pyramids and voting 
agreements have the 
opposite effect (p. 
3029). 
Empirical Family controlled firm: 
The founder or a 
member of his or her 
family by either blood 
or marriage is an 
officer, director, or 
blockholder, either 
individually or as a 
group. 
Tobin‟s q . Industry 
. Age 
. Stock market 
risk 
. Corporate 
diversification 
. Capital 
expenditures 
relative to 
fixed assets 
. Dividends as 
a fraction of 
book equity 
. Debt relative 
to market 
value of equity 
. Firm size 
Fortune 
500 firms 
1994-2000 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family Firms 
are Defined
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Villalonga 
& Amit 
(2009b) 
. Founding families 
retain control when 
doing so gives the 
firm a competitive 
advantage, not just 
when they can 
appropriate benefits 
of control at the 
expense of nonfamily 
shareholders. 
. Nonfamily 
shareholders in 
founding family firms 
are better off than 
they would be without 
family control (p. 36). 
Empirical . Family controlled 
firm:  
(1) The founder or a 
member of his or her 
family by either blood 
or marriage is an 
officer, director, or 
blockholder, either 
individually or as a 
group. 
(2) Firms in their 
second- or later 
generation and CEO is 
the founder or a family 
member of the 
founding family 
(3) family owns 5% or 
more of any class stock 
(4) Second- or later-
generation firms whose 
CEO is an individual 
blockholder or a 
member of a 
blockholding family. 
ROA: ratio of 
EBITDA to total 
assets 
. Age 
. Sales growth 
 
8,104 firms 2000 
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Literature Main Arguments 
and Findings                                                                                      
Research How Family 
Firms are 
Defined 
Performance 
Measure 
Control  
Variables 
Sample Period 
Minichilli 
et al. 
(2010) 
. The presence of 
family CEO is 
beneficial to the firm 
performance. 
. However, the 
coexistence of 
factions in family and 
nonfamily managers 
within the TMT has 
the potential to create 
schisms among the 
subgroups and 
consequently hurt 
firm performance (p. 
205). 
Empirical . Family 
control: The 
same family 
owns more than 
50% of the 
shares. 
ROA . Firm size 
. TMT size 
. CEO tenure 
500 Italian 
industrial 
family-
controlled 
firms 
2005 
Peng & 
Jiang 
(2010) 
. The net balance of 
the benefits and costs 
of family control in 
large firms is 
systematically linked 
with the legal and 
regulatory institutions 
governing investor 
protection (p. 267). 
Empirical Family firms are 
recognized as 
firms having a 
family as the 
largest 
shareholder 
with a 5% 
control rights 
share cut-off. 
Firm value: % 
of cumulative 
stock return 
from January 1 
to December 31 
1998. 
. Debt-to-assets ratio 
. Firm risk (beta) 
. Accounting 
transparency: Higher 
disclosure quality 
. Firm age 
. Market-to-book 
ratio 
. Capital-to-assets 
ratio 
. Industry  
. Country 
634 Asian 
firms (from 
7 Asian 
countries). 
1996 
 
